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PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES:
THE PROCESS/PRODUCT DISTINCTION
AND THE REGULATION OF CONSUMER CHOICE
Douglas A. Kysar∗
This Article examines a conceptual distinction between product-related information (such
as whether a consumer good threatens to harm its user) and process-related information
(such as whether a good’s production harmed workers, animals, or the environment) that
has appeared in various guises within international trade law; domestic environmental,
health, and safety regulation; and constitutional commercial speech jurisprudence. This
process/product distinction tends to dismiss information concerning processes as
unworthy of attention from consumers or regulators, at least so long as the processes at
issue do not manifest themselves in the physical or compositional characteristics of
resulting end products. Proponents have offered the process/product distinction as a
useful device for determining when consumer product regulations are likely to have drifted
beyond the satisfaction of significant consumer interest into areas of unjustified alarm,
disguised protectionism, or excessive encroachment onto competing interests, such as the
speech concerns of product manufacturers or the domestic sovereignty of foreign nations.
As this Article shows, however, the process/product distinction proves far too thin and
formalistic of a conceptual device, once one examines the full panoply of reasons why
consumers might express preferences for processes. Thus, rather than dismissing process
preferences as especially likely to be ill-informed or otherwise objectionable, this Article
argues in favor of acknowledging and accommodating such preferences within theoretical
frameworks for policy analysis. Indeed, in view of several growing phenomena —
including the cultural and political significance attached to the consumption function, the
effort by regulatory cost-benefit analysts to ground public policies on the values revealed by
individuals acting in their roles as market actors, and the integration of global product
markets without similarly expansive integration of the global regulatory system — this
Article concludes that, in the future, process preferences may serve as indispensable outlets
for public-regarding behavior.

INTRODUCTION

S

hortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. Commerce Secretary Don Evans was quoted as saying, “People ask all

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Robert Ahdieh, John Applegate,
Vicki Been, William Buzbee, Eric Freyfogle, Daniel Greenwood, Marc Miller, Trevor Morrison,
Jeffrey Rachlinski, Eric Rasmussen, Steven Shiffrin, Jeffrey Stake, Buzz Thompson, and Tom
Ulen, as well as participants in workshops at the University of Illinois College of Law, the Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, the University of British Columbia Faculty of Law,
the Cornell University Department of Science and Technology Studies, the University of Connecticut School of Law, the Cornell Law School, the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah, the Chicago-Kent College of Law, the Emory University School of Law, and attendees of presentations at the 2003 Harvard Environmental Law Conference, the 2004 Stanford
Law School Environmental Workshop Seminar, and the 2004 Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Forum. All misjudgments, errors, and omissions are my own.
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the time, ‘What can I do, what sacrifices can I make for my country?’”
His answer: “Go back to the stores.”1 Although long present in political and popular discourse,2 this conflation of patriotism with consumption, of civic life with market life, became unmistakably apparent in
the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon disasters. Across
the airwaves and in the newspapers, private consumer spending appeared as the primary, and at times the exclusive, avenue for citizen
participation in the nation’s effort to recover from 9/11.3
A similar collapsing of citizen values and market values appears in
the work of proponents of regulatory cost-benefit analysis. These
thinkers argue that public safeguarding of endangered species, air
quality, worker safety, and a host of other noncommodified goods
should be derived not from the willingness of citizens to support protective legislation through political activity, but from the willingness of
individuals to reveal a “vote” in favor of such goods through their decisions as consumers, laborers, or other private market actors.4 These
choices, the argument goes, are untarnished by voter irrationality,
agency capture, paternalistic overreaching, bureaucratic inefficiency, or
any of the numerous other ills often associated with government action.5 In a particularly dramatic illustration of this stance, John Graham, head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for
President George W. Bush’s Office of Management and Budget, suggested that revealed-preference methodologies could capture even the
monetized value of liberty.6
For better or worse, then, the market and the consumer are central
to public policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Indeed,
Mark Sagoff’s careful effort to distinguish between the values that individuals express in their capacities as citizens and those that they ex–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 Brandon Loomis, Commerce Secretary Urges Shopping, AP ONLINE, Nov. 19, 2001, 2001
WL 30246793 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 See generally LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER’S REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS
CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2003).
3 Cf. Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 786 n.8 (2003) (“Another example of the neoliberal
transformation of citizenship is the idea that Americans should express their patriotism in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 by going shopping.”).
4 Such “votes” can occur either through the “revealed preferences” of actual individual market
behavior or through the observed responses of subjects to experimental techniques, such as contingent valuation surveys, that attempt to provoke market evaluations of public goods. See
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 383 (1998).
5 See, e.g., id. at 378 (noting that analysts “attempt to vindicate consumer behavior and often
portray citizen preferences as misinformed, capricious, or insincere” (emphasis added)).
6 See Edmund L. Andrews, New Scale for Toting Up Lost Freedom vs. Security Would Measure in Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A13 (describing a request by the Office of Management and Budget for economic data regarding the value of privacy and liberty lost due to tighter
security measures).
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press as consumers7 has been challenged in fundamental ways by the
growing dominance of market-centered liberalism within academic,
policymaking, and public circles. Not only have Sagoff’s powerful arguments failed to slow the movement toward greater reliance on private market decisions as the standard for government provision of
public goods,8 but also, and perhaps more significantly, the very citizen
voices that Sagoff aims to preserve as the basis for societal decisionmaking seem endangered, as citizens come to view the government
and the political process in primarily market terms.9 In that sense,
even if Sagoff’s view does prevail at the level of policy development,
such that environmental, health, and safety standards continue to be
determined by the willingness of citizens to vote rather than the willingness of consumers to pay, the distinction will have little practical
significance if voting itself becomes simply another self-conscious
manifestation of market preferences.
This Article does not rehearse the well-worn, but important and
continuing, normative debates regarding the use of cost-benefit analysis in environmental, health, and safety regulation.10 Nor does it analyze the role of commercial relations and commercial activities in public life, except to observe their increasing prominence.11 Instead, this
Article examines recent developments in international trade law; envi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
7 See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 7–10 (1988); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS 144–47, 158–59, 203–10 (1993) (characterizing the market as “impersonal,” “egoistic,”
and incapable of adequately capturing the value of shared goods such as environmental quality);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 21–23, 44–45 (1997) (providing a variety of reasons why citizen preferences are more likely than consumer preferences to reflect concern for the public good).
8 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION, at ix (2002) (“Gradually, and in fits and starts, American government is becoming a
cost-benefit state.”).
9 Cf. COHEN, supra note 2, at 397 (noting that in the 1990s “the market relationship became
the template for the citizen’s connection to government,” and describing consequences of this development).
10 Compare FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (arguing that economic cost-benefit analysis is an unreliable decision technique that can never capture the full value of human life and
health), with CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(2002) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis should guide government regulation and that such
analysis need not undervalue life and health). For a summary of many of the important arguments, see Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 562–89 (2004).
11 See ULRICH BECK, WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION? 9 (Patrick Camiller trans., Polity Press 2000)
(1997) (defining “globalism” as “the view that the world market eliminates or supplants political
action”); THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM, MARKET
POPULISM, AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, at xv (2000) (calling “[m]arket populism”
the “centerpiece of the new American consensus”); LESLIE SKLAIR, GLOBALIZATION: CAPITALISM
& ITS ALTERNATIVES 108–15 (2002) (describing the “culture-ideology of consumerism” as one of
the central pillars of neoliberal globalization).
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ronmental, health, and safety regulation; and constitutional law, all of
which challenge in subtle ways the notion of a stark divide between
citizen preferences and consumer preferences. Specifically, these developments suggest, at least with regard to some areas of choice, that
consumer preferences may be heavily influenced by information regarding the manner in which goods are produced. Such information
— which this Article refers to as “process information”12 — can include the labor conditions of workers who produce a consumer good,
the environmental effects of a good’s production, the use of controversial engineering techniques such as genetic modification to create a
good, or any number of other social, economic, or environmental circumstances that are related causally to a consumer product, but that
do not necessarily manifest themselves in the product itself. As will be
seen, although such factors generally do not bear on the functioning,
performance, or safety of the product, they nevertheless can, and often
do, influence the willingness of consumers to purchase the product.
Consumers, in other words, often have “preferences for processes.”13
Such preferences long have been a feature of the mass consumer
marketplace — consider, for example, once-significant levels of con–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
12 A common term from international trade discussions, “processes and production methods”
(PPMs), highlights the “way in which products are manufactured or processed and natural resources extracted or harvested.” ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PROCESSES AND
PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS): CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND CONSIDERATIONS ON USE OF
PPM-BASED TRADE MEASURES 7 (1997), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/
87fae4004d4fa67ac125685d005300b3/e84ef77f9aae7954c12564f000379377/$FILE/08E73097.ENG.
This Article conceives of process information slightly more broadly to encompass not only production methods, but also a variety of social, economic, and ecological effects of production.
13 See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION
THROUGH LAW REFORM (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at ch. 4, at 4–5, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (recounting recent instances in which consumer awareness of labor
conditions has led to boycotts and other market actions); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES 9 (1991) (observing “recent growth in
numbers of environmentally concerned consumers throughout the OECD area”); ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 12, at 7 (“Consumers in many countries are increasingly seeking information on how the PPMs of the products they buy affect the environment.”);
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING ISSUES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES
WORLDWIDE 60 (1998) (identifying forty-nine “third-party” environmental labeling schemes
worldwide in 1997, only seventeen of which existed in 1989), available at http://www.epa.gov/
oppt/epp/pubs/envlab/wwlabel3.pdf; Julie A. Caswell et al., Unifying Two Frameworks for Analyzing Quality and Quality Assurance for Food Products, in GLOBAL FOOD TRADE AND CONSUMER
DEMAND FOR QUALITY 43, 55–58 (Barry Krissoff et al. eds., 2002) (identifying animal welfare,
biotechnology, environmental impact, worker safety, and other “process attributes” as important
components of consumer product evaluations); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the
Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 176 (2004) (noting that “as environmental data and
analysis become more accessible, additional buyers will be positioned to factor environmental
considerations into their choices”); Heiner Imkamp, The Interest of Consumers in Ecological
Product Information is Growing — Evidence from Two German Surveys, 23 J. CONSUMER POL’Y
193, 195–99 (2000) (observing an increase between 1989 and 1998 in consumer interest in information on the ecological impact of products).
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sumer demand for “Union Label” goods14 — yet the theoretical challenges that they pose have been insufficiently explored. Given the partial dependency of consumer demand on perceptions of manufacturing
processes, lawmakers cannot determine product information disclosure
policies strictly with reference to revealed preferences in the manner
desired by advocates of cost-benefit analysis, at least not without engaging in a form of analytical bootstrapping.15 Instead, some prior decision must be made about how to manage consumer access to process
information, a decision that in turn influences the pattern of preferences that will emerge following the regulatory decision. For example:
To what extent should consumers be made aware that animals may
have suffered pain in order for a particular product to reach the market? Should governments require labeling of food items that have
been developed using genetically modified (GM) ingredients? Should
national governments be able to require foreign producers to disclose
information regarding production processes if the processes do not
physically impact consumers or environmental conditions in the importing nation? Should private efforts by citizen groups to raise
awareness about these types of process-related issues be subjected to
regulation, liability, or other means of governmental control?
As Part I of this Article details, questions of this nature increasingly
are being resolved in a manner that burdens or denies consumer access
to process information. Broadly speaking, policymakers and litigants
in a number of critical subject areas have argued in favor of a conceptual demarcation between production processes and the goods that result from them. According to this “process/product distinction,” information about the details of production processes, as opposed to
information about products, is thought to constitute a presumptively
illegitimate basis for regulatory or consumer differentiation. Like
process preferences themselves, this process/product distinction enjoys
a pedigree almost as lengthy as that of the mass consumer market–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
14 See LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING
OF CONSUMER SOCIETY 108–28 (1997).
15 As discussed below, recent experimental psychological research suggests that process prefer-

ences are likely to be context-dependent and therefore difficult to estimate in the absence of some
prior specification of the consumer’s information environment, see infra pp. 627–32; see also
SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 17 (“[W]hen preferences are a function of legal rules, the government
cannot take preferences as given . . . . Moreover, the rules cannot be justified by reference to the
preferences . . . .”); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, AM. ECON.
REV. PAPERS & PROC., May 2003, at 175, 178 (noting that, because “[w]hat people choose often
depends on the starting point, and hence the starting point cannot be selected by asking what
people choose,” this “problem of circularity” will sometimes make it impossible to make regulatory
decisions based on what consumers prefer); cf. Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75,
75–78 (1998) (describing conceptual problems created for economic theory when markets “influence the evolution of values, tastes, and personalities”).
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place.16 However, the more recent developments gathered in this Article reflect a trend that is both new and consequential — namely, a palpable shift toward a consumer marketplace in which consumers will
be presumed or permitted by government regulators to regard only the
functional characteristics of products, leaving the ethical and environmental implications of process characteristics to be dealt with exclusively in other forums or by other decisionmakers.
As will be seen, the underlying concerns that drive policymakers to
embrace the process/product distinction are not without justification.
Just as a representative democracy is said to temper the excesses of
popular political will,17 proponents of the process/product distinction
believe that withholding process-based considerations from consumers
helps to moderate market demand in cases where unfettered consumer
choice could lead to socially undesirable outcomes. Such outcomes
may occur either because individuals suffer from certain informational
and cognitive deficiencies that impair their ability to comprehend
process information accurately, or because interest groups have strong
incentives to exploit public perceptions of manufacturing processes for
private purposes.18
Despite the real significance of these underlying concerns, this Article demonstrates that each appearance of the process/product distinction suffers from an insufficient appreciation of consumers’ full interest in process characteristics, an omission that in turn masks important
conceptual shortcomings of the distinction as a tool for legal analysis.
Part II therefore offers three accounts of consumer process preferences
that collectively sharpen the focus of the various substantive debates
that the process/product distinction presently attempts to resolve.
The first account posits that consumers demand process information because they wish to encourage or discourage the production practice in question through their market activity. In that sense, private
consumption takes on a self-consciously political dimension: consumer
behavior is directed not merely at satisfying personal needs or desires,
but at shaping the way in which goods are produced. From this perspective, the accuracy of consumer perceptions and beliefs becomes a
crucial factor for policymakers to consider when deciding whether to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
16 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–72 (1918) (striking down a federal prohibition
on the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor as beyond congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause because the “goods shipped are of themselves harmless”). The case
was overruled explicitly by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941), which recognized
that the process/product distinction adopted in Hammer “ha[d] long since been abandoned.” Id.
at 116.
17 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 49–52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999) (arguing that the structures of representative democracy protect individuals and the public
welfare from the self-interested demands of factions).
18 See infra pp. 586–89.

532

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:525

require product labeling or some other means of enabling consumers to
act on their process preferences. For instance, are consumers justified
in worrying about the effects of GM agriculture, or should governments discourage consumer suspicion by making it harder to identify
goods that have been developed using GM technologies? As Part II
discusses, although there is reason to agree with leading commentators
that often “experts are right and ordinary people are wrong,”19 there is
reason also to believe that public reactions to health and safety hazards are richer and more value-laden than typical expert assessments.
In that respect, policymakers seem to have underestimated the coherence, and even occasional wisdom, of consumer process preferences.20
Moreover, on the remaining two accounts of process preferences,
consumer demand for process information is not viewed as entirely instrumental, such that its wisdom depends wholly on empirical questions about the social, economic, or environmental consequences of
consumer actions. Rather, consumers are seen to avoid or acquire
goods produced through certain processes merely because their knowledge, or lack of knowledge, regarding such processes affects the degree
of benefit that they derive from their purchases. Just as money is not
purely fungible to social beings,21 consumer products — even when
physically indistinguishable — are not perfect substitutes to the extent
that they are produced using different processes about which consumers have strong feelings.22 Consumers may hold such preferences because they derive procedural utility from participating in a marketplace that palpably links their purchasing decisions with important
process-related policy issues. Alternatively, consumers may view consumption choices, at least in part, as moral acts that have personal significance irrespective of their instrumental effects. In either case —
whether understood as an expressive or as an ethical act — processbased decisionmaking appears to be largely inseparable from other aspects of consumer demand that traditionally have been deemed beyond
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
19
20

Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1146 (2002) (book review).
See generally FRANK FISCHER, CITIZENS, EXPERTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE
POLITICS OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (2000) (describing ways in which local lay knowledge can provide invaluable assistance to expert understanding and public policy formation).
21 See generally VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994) (describing
how socioeconomic factors influence the way that money is perceived and handled, despite its ostensible fungibility).
22 See Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and
Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 671, 686 n.24 (1993) (noting that “a
delicious piece of apple pie that was known to be stolen would not be the same object as a physically similar piece of pie that came as a gift”); Deirdre S. Shaw & Ian Clarke, Culture, Consumption and Choice: Towards a Conceptual Relationship, 22 J. CONSUMER STUD. & HOME ECON.
163, 166 (1998) (arguing that “for many consumers ethical attributes are one among a ‘bundle’ of
other product attributes that must be evaluated when making purchase decisions”).
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scrutiny within the framework of market liberalism.23 In that sense,
the process/product distinction seems to be an ill-conceived basis for
regulating consumer choice.
Part II concludes by considering the future significance of process
preferences to civil society in light of both the seemingly inexorable social and economic trends of globalization and the growing theoretical
importance of private market behavior to understandings of civic participation and government regulation. As will be explained, the already heroic conceptual role of the consumer within market liberalism
seems poised to become even more heroic. Long expected to help raise
collective welfare through constant material accumulation,24 consumers also now are being charged with determining the outcome of important policy disputes by revealing — again through private market
behavior — their true level of support for human safety, the environment, and a host of other public goods. Although proponents of this
valuation methodology expect market choices to reveal purely private
preferences, individuals acting on process preferences instead seem to
regard consumption at least partially as an act of public significance.
Indeed, in coming years, rising levels of affluence,25 combined with the
continued overshadowing of civic life by market life, may lead individuals to view purposeful consumption as their surest, if not their
only, means for public expression and engagement. The result may be
a novel political economy.
To summarize, three prominent interconnected trends — the equation of civic responsibility with consumer spending, the displacement
of politically determined regulatory policies by market-derived environmental, health, and safety standards, and the global integration of
consumer product markets — have been joined by a less-noted fourth
trend: the struggle for control over consumer access to information regarding the processes by which products come into being. This Article
aims to identify and expand on this underappreciated trend in the following manner. First, it demonstrates that the process/product distinction is a prominent element of the effort to resolve policy disputes that
involve the entanglement of consumer regulation with broader social
or environmental questions. Second, it shows that the distinction is
too thin and formalistic of a conceptual device to address those policy
disputes in a stable or satisfying manner. Finally, it argues more
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
23 See Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision,
46 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 702 (1985) (describing traditional liberal theory’s embrace of the principle
of “equal respect for the differing preferences and visions of the good life with which individual
consumers and producers approach the market”).
24 See infra pp. 632–44.
25 As described below, consumer preferences for processes are likely to become more significant as rising incomes permit greater expenditures on consumer goods that are made using environmentally or socially preferable processes, see infra pp. 638–39.
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broadly in favor of acknowledging and accommodating process preferences within policy analysis, given the potential significance that such
preferences may serve in the future as outlets for public-minded
behavior.
It is important to note that this Article makes no claim about the
desirability or effectiveness of consumer behavior as a regulatory tool
when viewed in isolation from the various cultural, economic, and political trends that are described alongside the growth of process preferences.26 If one does accept the existence and strength of these trends,
however, then it follows that process preferences can be expected to
capture the displaced moral and political sentiments of individuals
who have been encouraged to regard the market as a more sure route
to self-expression and efficacious activity than traditional public channels. To that extent, product labels may become significant venues for
the expression and evaluation of policy issues that, for better or worse,
seem no longer to resonate in alternative forums.27 Similarly, consumption communities organized around process-related issues appear
destined to become some of the most active and visible citizens’ groups
of global civil society,28 emerging, somewhat ironically, from the one
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
26 As described below, consumer behavior provides only an imperfect substitute for conventional regulation from the standpoint of achieving specified policy goals, see infra pp. 537–39.
Even assuming that it is necessary to view process preferences as an important policy component
of the evolving regulatory state, as this Article does, a series of difficult policy design and implementation questions remain. Cf. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the
Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 673
(1979) (analyzing the use of customer preference and market competitiveness models to examine
difficult regulatory questions concerning when and how to intervene in an effort to improve imperfect consumer information). Relevant topics include the extent to which a market unconstrained by the process/product distinction would respond to consumer process preferences; the
likelihood that manipulative process representations would undermine consumer confidence in
the market for process-distinguished goods; the difficulty of estimating benefits from mandatory
labeling policies given the apparent context dependence of process preferences; and a host of other
theoretical and technical issues. Questions of that nature are undoubtedly important, and they
are addressed briefly below. See infra pp. 625–28, 630–32. For the most part, however, such
questions are beyond the scope of this Article, which aims instead to identify and understand an
aspect of consumer behavior that has been largely absent from theoretical frameworks for policy
analysis, even before questions of implementation can be raised.
27 See BECK, supra note 11, at 146 (hypothesizing that product “biographies” might allow “the
much-vaunted responsible citizen . . . to decide how much he or she valued making the everyday
act of purchase a political ballot over global forms of work and life”).
28 Many commentators believe that commercial relations stand outside the realm of civil society by definition. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Toward Democratic Consolidation, in THE GLOBAL
RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 227, 228 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 2d ed. 1996)
(noting that the notion of “civil society” excludes “the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms”). The process-based consumer campaigns described in this Article, however, undeniably involve “citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and
ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state
officials accountable.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Moreover, the communities that form around
process-based campaigns often provide casebook studies of how global networks of diverse groups
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force that has been most successful at cohering disparate individuals
and entities across the globe — the faceless and impersonal producerconsumer relationship.29
Rather than lament or praise these trends, this Article largely accepts their existence and instead asks how they might impact future
conceptions and practices of governance. As Fred Aman has written,
“the essence of democracy in the 21st century depends on the ability of
citizens to affect the policies that globalization would now seem to dictate.”30 Because process preferences provide an outlet for the expression of public values through a market medium that is being endorsed
simultaneously as a primary locus of choice, opportunity, and responsibility, individuals may well come to view such preferences as their
most appropriate mechanism for influencing the policies and conditions of a globalized world. Accordingly, the central normative conclusion of this Article is that, if private market behavior is to serve the
expansive evaluative function that proponents of the liberal market vision have proposed for it, then consumers should receive an informational context that is appropriately robust for the role they are being
asked to serve. Similarly, if individuals come to perceive their civic
role as primarily one of consumer purchase, then the state should not
simultaneously deprive them of the information that is needed to express political values through their consumption choices. In short,
policymakers and commentators should discard the view that consumer preferences for processes are somehow less appropriate or worthy of governmental support than preferences for products.
I. THE PROCESS/PRODUCT DISTINCTION
Contemporary consumer product markets are characterized by
ever-increasing technological and geopolitical complexity. Consumers
now have access to goods whose very existence was scientifically uni–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
can operate effectively in domains where law has not or cannot achieve satisfactory results. Thus,
even companies that fall outside of “civil society” are inextricably bound up with social and environmental welfare issues that civil society addresses. See, e.g., Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 211, 237–41 (2002–2003) (providing
an extended analysis of the forest certification network — a community comprising forest industry companies, environmental nongovernmental organizations, indigenous groups, community
organizations, and labeling bodies — that monitors and assesses international forestry certification
systems). For an important theoretical discussion of such transnational networks, see ANNELISE
RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000).
29 See SKLAIR, supra note 11, at 277 (detailing the growing consumer movement and calling it
“one of the central issues around which the embryonic anti-globalization movement is coming together”).
30 AMAN, supra note 13 (manuscript at preface, at 1); see also BECK, supra note 11, at 13 (noting that, because globalization entails “world society without a world state and without world
government,” new forms and modes of governance must be contemplated (emphasis omitted)).
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maginable just a few decades ago. They also encounter goods with a
production history that bears the imprint of countless economic actors
from across the globe, actors whose lives and working conditions are
enmeshed in an intricate web of economic and political interdependence. Naturally, both the mounting technological sophistication of
consumer products and the “cross-border interpenetration of economic
life”31 tend to raise the stakes of consumption, expanding the uncertainty and the potential magnitude of social and environmental consequences that result from private consumer spending.32
For the most part, however, individuals do not confront these consequences in their capacity as consumers. As Wendell Berry has written, “[t]he global economy institutionalizes a global ignorance, in which
producers and consumers cannot know or care about one another, and
in which the histories of all products will be lost.”33 In the United
States, such institutionalized ignorance is compounded by the fact that,
with very few exceptions,34 product manufacturers must only ever disclose material health and safety risks or other attributes that inhere in
an end product itself and that therefore threaten to harm or mislead
the purchaser directly.35 “Disclosure of the conditions or methods of
manufacture,” by contrast, “has long been deemed unnecessary under
the law.”36 Thus, although the development seems to have occurred by
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor
Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 93, 95 (1999).
32 See Meidinger, supra note 28, at 233 (“The emergence of worldwide production and consumption chains has increased the scope of both transnational interdependence and the externalities associated with market activities.”); cf. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility
in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 721–24 (2002) (surveying a multitude of social and environmental responsibility issues that multinational corporations face
within the context of their global operations). See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY (Mark
Ritter trans., Sage Publ’ns 1992) (1986) (documenting social, economic, and technological forces
that in combination have led to a worldwide “risk society”).
33 WENDELL BERRY, The Whole Horse, in THE ART OF THE COMMON-PLACE: THE
AGRARIAN ESSAYS OF WENDELL BERRY 236, 244 (Norman Wirzba ed., 2002).
34 Labeling requirements pertaining to a good’s country of origin are the most prominent exception. See 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2000) (“[E]very article of foreign origin . . . imported into the
United States shall be marked in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the
nature of the article . . . in such manner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United
States . . . the country of origin of the article.”). In recent years, Congress has struggled over the
question whether to extend country-of-origin labeling requirements to meat and other perishable
agricultural commodities. See Jacquelyn Trussell, Note, The Birth Place of Food Products: Do
You Know Where Your Food Comes From?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 285, 285–88 (2004) (detailing recent legislation requiring such labeling and subsequent congressional postponements of
the legislation’s effective date).
35 For a comprehensive overview of product labeling requirements that federal, state, and
common law have imposed, see Lars Noah, The Imperative To Warn: Disentangling the “Right To
Know” from the “Need To Know” About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293
(1994).
36 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179 n.10 (D.D.C. 2000); see also
United States v. Ninety-Five Barrels, More or Less, Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438,
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historical happenstance rather than by deliberate design, one nevertheless might say that the process/product distinction is a concept already
central to the regulation of consumer product markets.
Moreover, as this Part describes, an increasing formalization of the
process/product distinction has appeared recently in diverse subject
areas. Consequently, product manufacturers not only remain generally
free of mandates to disclose process information, but also are beginning to enjoy legal protections both from government efforts to introduce such mandates and from consumer efforts to obtain and act on
process information through other means. Such attempts to cordon off
process information for special treatment are motivated by several
overlapping concerns.
Most notably, proponents of the process/product distinction argue that consumer decisionmaking premised
on process information frequently will lead to harmful, self-defeating,
or otherwise unwise choices.37 For instance, labeling of GM food
products has been criticized by scholars who doubt the ability of consumers to appreciate the environmental, health, and safety benefits
that the new technology promises.38 Similarly, commentators have
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
444–45 (1924) (interpreting the Food and Drugs Act of 1906 not to require disclosure of process
information because, “[w]hen considered independently of the product, the method of manufacture is not material”); J. Howard Beales III, Modification and Consumer Information: Modern
Biotechnology and the Regulation of Information, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105, 112 (2000) (“In the
absence of specific health concerns, or material effects on the characteristics of the resulting product, regulatory policies have not required disclosure of processes that are used to produce a particular food.”); Karen A. Goldman, Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods: Legal and Scientific
Issues, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 717, 723–28 (2000) (describing the “dichotomy between
labeling based on method of production and labeling based on safety concerns raised by the product itself,” and noting that labeling requirements only tend to be imposed in the latter case).
Although manufacturers rarely have been forced to disclose process information, they have
faced regulatory oversight of the accuracy of certain process-related disclosures that are made
voluntarily. See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385(b)(3), (d) (2000)
(containing a congressional finding that “consumers would like to know if the tuna they purchase
is falsely labeled as to the effect of the harvesting of the tuna on dolphins,” and establishing guidelines for “dolphin safe” labels on tuna); 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000) (declaring it unlawful to market
goods falsely as being produced by Native Americans); Guides for the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. § 260.7 (2004) (providing detailed guidelines for environmental marketing claims); “Made in USA” and Other U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,756 & n.1
(Dec. 2, 1997) (noting that the FTC has regulated claims that a product is of U.S. origin under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act since the 1940s). As noted below, the constitutional status of such regulations has been drawn into some question by recent litigation, see infra
section I.C.2, pp. 574–79.
37 Cf. Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. REV. 819, 819–20 (2002)
(“Consumer protection laws are said to increase prices and confuse consumers instead of arming
them with legal rights.”).
38 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 36, at 722, 760 (noting with approval industry concern that
“consumers may not have enough information on biotechnology to fairly evaluate [GM foods]”).
Proponents of the process/product distinction also might cite evidence of scientific illiteracy in
support of this contention. For instance, in one survey only forty-four percent of American respondents disagreed with the statement “Ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes, while genetically modified tomatoes do.” Gary E. Marchant & Andrew Askland, GM Foods: Potential Public
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concluded that environmental product labeling schemes “inhibit product development and result in the consumption of more scarce natural
resources and more harmful emissions to the environment than would
be the case if they were absent.”39 On the international level, environmentally motivated trade measures — such as import bans or labeling requirements triggered by the use of certain production processes
— likewise have been critiqued as tending to exacerbate, rather than
ameliorate, environmentally destructive activities.40 Even efforts by
developed nations to avoid the fruits of child labor have been challenged as likely to harm the very children whom nations seek to avoid
exploiting.41
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Consultation and Participation Mechanisms, 44 JURIMETRICS 99, 108 (2003) (citing NAT’L SCI.
BD., NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2002, at 7-21 to 7-22). Consumers themselves report that they do not feel well-informed regarding the scientific issues surrounding GM foods. See MARIO F. TEISL & JULIE A. CASWELL, INFORMATION POLICY AND
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD: WEIGHING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 19 (Univ. of Mass. Amherst Dep’t of Res. Econ., Working Paper No. 2003-1, 2003). Nevertheless, researchers have
found that differences in scientific education and knowledge are only weakly correlated with differences of opinion regarding the desirability and appropriateness of genetic engineering, a result
that suggests many variables other than purely scientific criteria may be at stake in GM food disputes. See Susanna Hornig Priest et al., The “Trust Gap” Hypothesis: Predicting Support for Biotechnology Across National Cultures As a Function of Trust in Actors, 23 RISK ANALYSIS 751, 757
(2003) (reporting that less than seven percent of the country-by-country variance in biotechnology
opinion poll results can be explained by differences in the degree of citizen knowledge).
39 JULIAN MORRIS, GREEN GOODS? CONSUMERS, PRODUCT LABELS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 98 (Inst. of Econ. Affairs, Studies on the Environment No. 8, 1997); see also Aaditya
Mattoo & Harsha V. Singh, Eco-Labelling, the Environment and International Trade, in ECOLABELLING AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 37, 39 (Simonetta Zarrilli et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter
ECO-LABELLING] (demonstrating that under certain plausible market structure assumptions, environmental labeling campaigns may increase sales of both environmentally friendly and unfriendly products); Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1435, 1445 (1995) (raising doubts about the efficacy of unregulated
environmental labeling in light of “consumers’ generally naïve understanding of the environment,
the lack of clear standards regarding the relationship between human activities and the environment, and the difficulty of verifying many environmental claims” (footnote omitted)).
40 See HÅKAN NÖRDSTROM & SCOTT VAUGHAN, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 3 (WTO, Special Studies No. 4, 1999) (arguing that “tackling [environmental] problems by targeting some indirect linkage, such as imports or exports, may divert attention from the underlying problems” and
that “[i]n some cases, putative trade remedies may even aggravate the problems”); Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, Trade, Growth, and the Environment, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7, 67
(2004) (arguing that restrictions on imports from developing countries may have negative environmental effects by lowering incomes in developing nations, by reducing the value of natural
resources, or by prompting the adoption of “an even dirtier slate of production”).
41 See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 126, 132
(2002) (arguing that the mere threat of a ban on products using child labor “led to the discharge of
female children [in the textile industry], who were often forced instead into prostitution by destitute parents”). Similar arguments have been made regarding the use of “sweatshop-free” labeling
to enable consumers to avoid products made under working conditions that are deemed objectionable by certifying bodies.
See DRUSILLA K. BROWN ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF
MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION ON WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9669, 2003) (“There is a real
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This belief that process preferences lead to unintended or selfdefeating consequences is driven by two underlying concerns. First,
scholars and lawmakers worry that individuals are ill-positioned to
recognize and resolve the tradeoffs entailed by modern production
processes in a globally integrated, technology-rich economy. Given
their inexpertise and the paucity of information available to them, as
well as the psychological tendencies that hinder their ability to assess
information that is made available to them,42 individual consumers are
believed to make especially unreliable evaluations of process-related
issues such as the propriety of GM agriculture. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, proponents of the process/product distinction worry
that individuals are vulnerable to exploitation by factions that manipulate process-related concerns in service of their private interests.
For instance, consumers may readily fall victim to cascade-like social
reactions, in which the vocal concerns of a few interested activists give
rise to unfounded, self-escalating public fears over stigmatized production processes.43 Industrial interests similarly may capitalize on public
fears in order to achieve protectionist goals through facially nondiscriminatory environmental, health, and safety regulations.44
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
danger therefore that well-intentioned efforts to raise the wages and working conditions of workers in developing countries may work to the detriment of these workers and their families.”).
42 For an important work surveying cognitive and social psychological research relating to risk
perception and examining the legal implications of individuals’ tendency to neglect probabilistic
information in favor of more emotionally charged reactions to risk, see Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61 (2002); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1059 (2000) (arguing that a
technocratic approach to risk regulation such as cost-benefit analysis “is most plausibly justified . . . as a way of counteracting predictable problems in individual and social cognition”); Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1123 (using psychological evidence of how individuals perceive and process risk information to conclude that “sensible policymakers should generally follow science and
evidence, not the public”).
43 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 683, 685 (1999) (arguing that exploitation by interest groups of cognitive heuristics might
lead to “mass delusions” and demands for “wasteful or even detrimental laws and policies”). In a
recent opinion, Justice Breyer similarly worried that “a purely ideological plaintiff” might wage a
“political battle” through litigation if a California consumer protection statute were applied to
process representations by product manufacturers without stringent constitutional safeguards.
See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2567 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of
certiorari); see also infra pp. 613–14. In an especially nuanced variation of this concern, Howard
Chang notes that while a comprehensive welfare analysis must account for the disutility caused
by individuals’ fears — even if scientifically unfounded — it also should consider the risk that
governmental acknowledgment of such fears might exacerbate the incentive of interest groups to
whip up further unfounded public concerns. See Howard F. Chang, Risk Regulation, Endogenous
Public Concerns, and the Hormones Dispute: Nothing To Fear But Fear Itself?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
743, 761–62 (2004).
44 See Gustavo Grunbaum, Dispute Settlement and U.S. Environmental Laws, in THE
GREENING OF TRADE LAW: INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES 51, 51 (Richard H. Steinberg ed., 2002) (describing the “success, increasing importance,
and mechanics of Baptist-bootlegger coalitions of environmental nongovernmental organiza-
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In light of these concerns, the process/product distinction has
emerged in several distinct legal areas as a mechanism for protecting
consumers from costly error and for reducing the harmful effects of interest-group manipulation. Specifically, the distinction has been employed in (1) international trade negotiations, as member nations of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor institution, the World Trade Organization (WTO), have struggled to determine the extent to which foreign product imports may be conditioned on compliance with domestic regulatory standards for processes
and production methods; (2) U.S. regulation of GM organisms, which
has maintained that “biotechnology should not be regulated as a process, but rather that the products of biotechnology should be regulated
in the same way as products of other technologies”;45 and (3) the development of a constitutional free speech position that regards consumer process preferences as insufficient either to support mandatory
state disclosure rules concerning process information or to subject voluntary manufacturer speech regarding processes to conventional advertising regulation. Together, these developments suggest a narrowing sphere of authority for individuals within the framework of market
liberalism: consumers remain sovereign with regard to products, but in
an era of profound market complexity and interest-group politics, governments must regulate processes according to science and other technical considerations, excluding the demands of consumers.
A. International Trade and “Products As Such”
Among legal academics, the most widely discussed modern articulation of the process/product distinction comes from the 1991 GATT
Tuna/Dolphin dispute panel report, which examined the permissibility
of U.S. import restrictions on tuna producers that failed to comply
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
tions . . . and industry in promoting U.S. environmental laws that also act as import restrictions”);
John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511,
521–25 (2000) (providing an overview of protectionist political influences in domestic policymaking); Richard W. Parker, The Case for Environmental Trade Sanctions, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 21,
28 (2001) (noting that “the danger of abuse” of environmental trade sanctions for protectionist
purposes “appears to be generic”); Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 401, 415 (2000) (finding “a certain truth” to the application of the Baptist-bootleggers metaphor
to environmental trade measures); David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of
the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 865,
922 (2000) (describing a “coalition of consumer and protectionist interests” supporting the European import ban on hormone-treated beef). But see Copeland & Taylor, supra note 40, at 59–60
(noting that “environmental policy is less effective and more costly” than alternative instruments
for distorting trade to benefit domestic industries).
45 Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods,
35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 431 (2002) (quoting COMM. ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PESTPROTECTED PLANTS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 22, 26 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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with the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).46 Although
the panel’s ruling was never adopted by the relevant countries and
therefore enjoys only limited jurisprudential force, the process/product
distinction that it announced has become a subject of intense debate
among member nations of the WTO. On the one hand, as John Jackson notes, “[t]rade policy experts are concerned that if a nation is allowed to use [a] process characteristic as the basis for trade-restrictive
measures, then the result would be to open a Pandora’s box of problems that could open large loopholes in the GATT.”47 On the other
hand, most commentators recognize that process-based trade measures
also are capable of expressing well-grounded and sincerely held concerns of consumers, such that restricting their use would prevent not
only disguised protectionism, but also a host of legitimate democratic
aims. Caught between these seemingly irreconcilable concerns, the international legal status of domestic efforts to support the satisfaction of
process preferences remains in doubt.
1. Process-Based Trade Measures Under GATT/WTO Jurisprudence. — Although the history of international trade reveals many examples of trade restrictions based on the manner in which foreign
goods are produced,48 in recent years the legitimacy of such measures
has come under intense scrutiny. Controversy has been sparked
chiefly by the Tuna/Dolphin panel’s response to Mexico’s challenge to
a U.S. ban on imports of Mexican yellowfin tuna under the MMPA.49
In this dispute, Mexico had failed to obtain U.S. certification that the
harvesting methods of its tuna industry resulted in an incidental dol–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
46 Panel Report, United States — Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991),
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I]; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994). Although the GATT/WTO regime has provided the most
prominent articulation, the process/product distinction also has appeared in other trade agreements. See Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes of a
Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851, 863 n.47 (2003) (noting that, under the North American Free
Trade Agreement, “an importing country may not impose restrictions based on the way a good
was manufactured in another country”).
47 John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1243 (1992); see also Gen. Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trade
and the Environment, at http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008-082/008-082.html (1992) (“Changing the
world trading rules so as to permit the suspension of trading rights of others by individual contracting parties, based simply on the unilateral and extra-territorial assertion of their environmental priorities, . . . [would risk] a big step down a slippery slope.”).
48 See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 459, 493–98 (1994) (providing a thorough history of environmentally motivated unilateral trade measures, many of which restrict goods based on their methods of manufacture); Alan Isaac Zreczny, The Process/Product Distinction and the Tuna/Dolphin Controversy:
Greening the GATT Through International Agreement, 1 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 79, 120 (1994) (describing a 1906 convention, a 1911 treaty, and a 1921 regional agreement, all regarding the regulation
of production processes).
49 See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 46, at 156–60.
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phin kill rate comparable to that of the U.S. tuna industry.50 Such certification was required under the MMPA, which established a moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals and marine
mammal products, with only limited exceptions.51
The MMPA trade provisions discriminated in practice against foreign producers, most notably by defining the permissible level of incidental dolphin mortality in a manner that prevented advance planning
by foreign fishing interests.52 Nevertheless, the GATT dispute panel
chose to rest its ruling on a much broader ground: it found that because the MMPA import restriction did not regulate “products as
such,” it did not constitute an internal product regulation that could be
analyzed and accepted under Article III of the GATT,53 which prohibits domestic product regulations that discriminate between “like products” of domestic and foreign origin.54 The United States had argued
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
50
51
52

See id. at 156–58.
Id. at 156; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (2000) (listing statutory exceptions).
See Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage To Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna/Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1,
112–20 (1999). Perhaps for this reason, the executive branch of the United States had been reluctant to enforce the import ban provisions of the MMPA. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit forced
its hand with a decision upholding a court-imposed injunction against U.S. importation of tuna
from Mexico. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’g 746 F.
Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that the U.S. Secretary of Commerce had not certified that
Mexico complied with MMPA incidental takings standards, and imposing an injunction against
importation of yellowfin tuna from Mexico).
53 Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 46, at 195.
54 Article III provides in part:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges,
and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production.
....
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. III, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT]. Product “likeness” under this Article conventionally involves four criteria:
the properties, nature, and quality of the products; the products’ end uses in a given market; consumers’ tastes and habits; and international tariff classifications. See Appellate Body Report,
European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products para.
85, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate Body Asbestos Report]. The Appellate Body Asbestos Report, however, indicated that other relevant criteria, such as direct health or
safety risks posed by a product, also may be considered. Id. paras. 149–54. Additionally, some
panels in the past have treated the “likeness” determination as primarily a question of whether the
products at issue are “directly competitive or substitutable.” Panel Report, Japan — Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, L/6216 (Nov. 10,
1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83, 93 (1988). For an insightful discussion of the “likeness”
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for a more inclusive definition of “like products” under Article III,
which would have permitted governments to make nonprotectionist
distinctions among products based on production and processing
methods. Because the dispute panel believed that such process characteristics “could not possibly affect tuna as a product,” the panel instead
regarded the MMPA trade prohibition as an unadorned ban on tuna
imports simply because they came from Mexico.55
Nor did the Tuna/Dolphin panel believe that the MMPA import
provisions could be justified under the general exceptions clause of Article XX of the GATT, which authorizes otherwise impermissible trade
restrictions when they are “necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health” or “relat[e] to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”56 In the panel’s view, the general exceptions clause did
not apply to trade measures apparently designed to influence “extrajurisdictional” practices.57 Because process-based trade measures appear, almost inherently, to seek transformation of conditions outside
the importing nation’s territory, the panel’s reasoning seemed to render
such measures irretrievably suspect under the GATT. Indeed, following the Tuna/Dolphin ruling, trade specialists widely accepted the view
that the GATT disallows product importation regulations not directly
related to physical or other tangible characteristics of a product.58
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
determination and the many complexities that it raises, see Robert E. Hudec, “Like Product”: The
Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 101 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C.
Mavroidis eds., 2000).
55 See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 46, at 195. Accordingly, the panel believed that the U.S.
regulation constituted a simple quantitative restriction on importation that was impermissible
under Article XI. See id. Article XI seeks to eliminate quantitative trade restrictions in general:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 54, art. XI, para. 1. This distinction is critical because, under an interpretive
note to Article III, GATT member nations have agreed that product measures applying to domestic and imported “like products” are to be analyzed only under Article III and its national treatment requirements. See John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and
the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004). By excluding process-based distinctions
from a consideration of the “likeness” of various products, the Tuna/Dolphin panel effectively
condemned process-based trade measures as per se violations of Article XI that must be justified,
if at all, under the exacting provisions of Article XX.
56 GATT, supra note 54, art. XX(b), (g).
57 See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 46, at 198–200.
58 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 12, at 27 (asserting that “[p]resent
trading rules do not allow one country to use trade measures for the purpose of unilaterally enforcing its own environmental preferences or requirements on other countries in cases where the
production externality has no spill-over effects”); Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and
the WTO, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM
AT THE MILLENNIUM 50, 60–61 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (noting “long-standing jurispru-
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Notwithstanding this apparent consensus, numerous academic
commentators criticized the process/product distinction as conceptually
flawed,59 and nongovernmental organizations excoriated it as an em–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
dence on process and production methods” that regarded such methods as unlawful); James Cameron & Karen Campbell, A Reluctant Global Policymaker, in THE GREENING OF TRADE LAW:
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 44, at 23, 41
(“[C]urrent WTO doctrine does not permit considering the means by which a product is made to
distinguish between products and to determine whether they are ‘like products.’”); Alicia Morris
Groos, International Trade and Development: Exploring the Impact of Fair Trade Organizations in
the Global Economy and the Law, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 379, 408 (1999) (stating that “WTO rules
mandate that goods cannot be subject to statutory labeling requirements or differentiated on the
basis of how they are produced”); Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 32 INT’L LAW. 619, 624 (1998) [hereinafter Hudec,
GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation] (noting that “product distinctions based on
characteristics of the production process, or of the producer, that are not determinants of product
characteristics are simply viewed as a priori illegitimate”); Robert E. Hudec, The Product-Process
Doctrine in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 187, 187 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick
eds., 2000) (noting that “the effect of [the process/product] doctrine was to make it prima facie
GATT-illegal for governments to impose tax or regulatory disadvantages on imported products
because of the way they were produced — except where the manner of production had some impact on the characteristics of the product itself”); Tanyarat Mungkalarungsi, The Trade and Environment Debate, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 361, 370 (2002) (claiming that “[p]roduct distinctions based on characteristics of the production process or of the producer that are not
determinants of product characteristics are viewed as illegitimate”); Peter W.B. Phillips & William
A. Kerr, Alternative Paradigms: The WTO Versus the Biosafety Protocol for Trade in Genetically
Modified Organisms, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 2002, at 63, 70 (“The WTO does not allow trade
barriers to be put in place on the basis of production and processing methods. Only product
characteristics can be used.”); see also Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Harmonization and Trade
Policy, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 267, 280 (Durwood
Zaelke et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT] (observing that “[i]t is
dogma in trade policy circles that unilateral import standards should relate to products only —
not processes”); Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking
the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 59, 76–77 (2002) (gathering quotations from commentators indicating widespread belief in the view that “WTO rules do not permit importing governments to make distinctions based on the production process”); Robert Howse & Donald Regan,
The Product/Process Distinction — An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade
Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 249, 251 (2000) (noting that “it is widely thought that all process-based
measures not directly related to physical characteristics of the product itself are prima facie violations of GATT”).
59 See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE
FUTURE 134 (1994) (urging departure from the process/product distinction); Steve Charnovitz,
Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and Their Application to Environmental Trade Measures,
7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 320 (1994) (arguing that the Tuna/Dolphin ruling was “seriously flawed”);
Steve Charnovitz, Solving the Production and Processing Methods (PPMs) Puzzle, in THE
EARTHSCAN READER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 229, 250
(Kevin P. Gallagher & Jacob Werksman eds., 2002) (arguing that the process/product distinction in
international trade law “has prevented a reasoned discourse about how to distinguish appropriate
from inappropriate [regulations aimed at processes and production methods]”); Ilona Cheyne, Environmental Unilateralism and the WTO/GATT System, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 433, 450
(1995) (arguing that the concept of “‘products as such’ . . . imposes an inappropriately narrow
limitation and unnecessarily excludes unilateral measures”); David Pearce, The Greening of the
GATT: Some Economic Considerations, in 1 TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR
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blem of the international trading regime’s alleged disregard for public
concerns such as environmental protection, labor standards, or human
rights.60 Believing that the doctrine would not hold in the wake of this
mounting criticism,61 a number of commentators offered theoretical
and textual exit strategies for future dispute settlement panels. Several
scholars, for instance, formulated more or less elaborate typologies of
process-based trade measures, hoping to isolate those measures that
are most susceptible to abuse as protectionist devices, and therefore
most in need of the exacting scrutiny applied in Tuna/Dolphin.62 Others argued, as the United States had in the original Tuna/Dolphin dispute, that the GATT should not subject process-based regulations to
stricter scrutiny than it does to other product regulations, and therefore
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
BALANCE 20, 28–29 (James Cameron et al. eds., 1994) (criticizing Tuna/Dolphin I on the ground
that both products and production methods can cause negative externalities in the form of environmental damage in the exporting country and welfare loss in the importing country); see also
Douglas J. Caldwell & David A. Wirth, Trade and the Environment: Equilibrium or Imbalance?,
17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 563, 573 (1996) (observing widespread agreement that the process/product
distinction is problematic and arguing that “[t]he level of consensus among these authors on this
important question appears to be sufficiently widespread that policymakers might well take
note”).
60 See Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal
Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491, 494 (2002) (“[A]fter
Tuna/Dolphin, environmentalists — and others with concerns about how the trading system balances competing values — saw the GATT as a regime dedicated to the triumph of free trade over
all other human concerns.”).
61 See John H. Jackson, The Limits of International Trade: Workers’ Protection, the Environment and Other Human Rights, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 222, 224 (2000) (“[T]he productprocess distinction will probably not survive and perhaps should not survive.”).
62 See, e.g., ESTY, supra note 59, at 121–22 (describing, in descending order of urgency and
legitimacy, a hierarchy of environmental measures aimed at curtailing activity that generates,
from environmental effects within a country’s own borders, to transboundary effects originating
abroad but causing harm within a country’s borders, to effects that cause harm to the atmosphere,
oceans, or other aspects of the global commons, to effects that occur purely within a foreign country’s borders); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 12, at 15–16 (classifying non–
product-related PPMs by the character of the harm against which they are directed, including
transboundary pollution, effects on the management of transboundary living resources, global
environmental concerns, and effects limited to the territory of the exporting country); Charnovitz,
The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, supra note 58,
at 67–69 (distinguishing between “how-produced,” “government policy,” and “producer characteristics” process-based trade measures and arguing that “how-produced” measures are the least susceptible to abuse); Sanford E. Gaines, Processes and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound
Policy for Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 383, 390 (2002)
(distinguishing among “product regulations,” which target “the design, characteristics, and uses of
particular products”; “resource access regulations,” which govern the manner and extent to which
publicly owned resources such as timber and minerals may be extracted; and “PPM regulations,”
which set standards for the environmental impact of production facilities and processes); Henry L.
Thaggert, A Closer Look at the Tuna-Dolphin Case: “Like Products” and “Extrajurisdictionality”
in the Trade and Environment Context, in 1 TRADE & THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR
BALANCE, supra note 59, at 69, 82 (arguing that nondiscriminatory environmental regulations
should be valid if they target activity causing harm to the domestic environment, the global commons, or a migratory species that passes through the domestic jurisdiction).
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that the Article III “like products” analysis should include process
characteristics.63
Although much uncertainty still clouds the debate over processbased trade measures, one nevertheless can state with confidence that
the Tuna/Dolphin dispute would be analyzed differently today. Most
notably, the Appellate Body of the WTO appears to have rejected the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
63 See, e.g., Christopher A. Cherry, Comment, Environmental Regulation Within the GATT
Regime: A New Definition of “Product”, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1093, 1096–98 (1993) (arguing
that the notion of “product” in Article III should encompass the entire history of a product’s
manufacture, consumption, and disposal); Michael C. Strauss, The Logic of Accommodating
Process-Based Environmental Trade Measures Within the GATT: Welfare Principles from Law &
Economics 21 (Aug. 30, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (arguing in favor of the notion of “the ‘essential’ product,” which acknowledges that “the
production and consumption of [a] product tangibly [a]ffect [people’s] lives at the point of production, the point of consumption and between”), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/rats/
wtoPaper.html; see also Thaggert, supra note 62, at 72–73 (arguing that there is evidence in the
drafting history of the GATT to suggest that “otherwise like products may be deemed ‘unlike’
based upon differences in production”).
In a particularly well-crafted version of the “like products” argument, Robert Howse and
Donald Regan argue that “[i]f we assign ‘like’ its ordinary meaning in context, ‘not differing in
any respect relevant to an actual non-protectionist regulatory policy’, then physically identical
products that differ only in their processing histories may be ‘unlike’, because the processing differences may be relevant to such a policy.” Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 261. Accordingly, if
one views dolphin-safe and dolphin-unsafe tuna as “unlike” products based on their different
processing histories, then the MMPA’s import provisions come to resemble a pairing of two distinct nondiscriminatory internal product regulations — one that applies to all dolphin-safe tuna,
irrespective of origin, and one that applies to all dolphin-unsafe tuna, again irrespective of origin.
Howse and Regan’s argument, however, has been criticized for downplaying the greater risk of
disguised protectionism posed by process-based trade measures, as opposed to product-based
measures. See Gaines, supra note 62, at 426 (“Trade policymakers are known for their hard-bitten
skepticism that environmental protections are just an excuse for ‘green’ protectionism and discrimination. The realism deficit in environmental terms of the Howse/Regan [analysis] . . . means
that their policy prescriptions fall short of the level of security and predictability that trade policy
demands against subterfuge and deceit.”); John H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the
Product/Process Distinction, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 303, 304 (2000) (“With respect to the product/process problem, the issue is not so much whether this distinction can be justified in all contexts . . . , but rather how to develop some constraints on the potential misuse of process-oriented
trade barriers . . . .”). Moreover, even if Howse and Regan are correct that the Tuna/Dolphin
panel fashioned the process/product distinction without an adequate textual basis, it is difficult to
put the genie back in the bottle. Some trade advocates appear to believe that, whether or not the
process/product distinction exists as a matter of formal trade doctrine, it will continue to exist as a
matter of practice. See Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking
the Myth of Illegality, supra note 58, at 91–92 (“Whatever the validity of [Howse and Regan’s]
legal analysis, any optimism that future WTO panels will tolerate origin-neutral PPMs in the context of Article III would be unfounded.”); Gaines, supra note 62, at 405 (noting the position of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that “[p]resent trading rules
do not allow one country to use trade measures for the purpose of unilaterally enforcing its own
environmental preferences or requirements on other countries . . . where the production externality has no spill-over effects,” and arguing that the position is “an accurate statement of current
WTO practice and sentiment” even if not “an accurate statement of WTO law” (second alteration
in original) (quoting ORG. OF ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 12, at 27) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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view that the process/product distinction gives rise to a per se ban on
process-based trade measures. In two decisions regarding the permissibility of certain U.S. trade restrictions designed to protect endangered
turtle species that may be harmed by shrimp harvesting,64 the Appellate Body made clear that process-based trade measures are eligible for
salvation under Article XX under appropriate circumstances. As long
as the importing nation has a “sufficient nexus” with the environmental ill targeted by the measure, the measure is “not disproportionately wide in its scope and reach,” the “means and ends relationship”
between the measure and its espoused policy goal is “close and
real,” and certain other conditions are satisfied, the Appellate Body
appears prepared to accept that the GATT permits process-based trade
measures.65
The Shrimp/Turtle rulings do not disturb previous GATT jurisprudence or commentary regarding the coverage of Article III. Thus, because process-based trade measures still must qualify for exceptional
treatment under Article XX and are not analyzed as internal product
regulations under Article III, the process/product distinction survives
in modified form within international trade law. This continuing effect of the distinction is significant because, as Sanford Gaines has
emphasized, Article XX tends to be read stringently in the context of
environmental trade measures.66 In particular, nations defending
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
64 Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle I]; Appellate Body Report,
United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle II].
65 Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 64, at paras. 133, 141. The other conditions are described below, see infra pp. 549–51. As Robert Howse notes, the Appellate Body avoided deciding whether
an actual territorial nexus was needed by noting that the endangered turtles targeted by U.S. import restrictions migrate at one time or another through U.S. territorial waters. See Howse, supra
note 60, at 504. In Howse’s view, the nexus requirement likely will serve in future WTO rulings
to prohibit process-based trade measures when the targeted process or condition does not exist in
the importing nation and therefore does not require a comparable domestic restriction. See id.
(arguing that “it should be sufficient, as required by the text of Article XX(g), that the U.S. measure was even-handed, imposing a conservation burden on its own producers and consumers, and
not merely attempting to externalize the costs of environmental protection to the producers of
other countries”). Austria provided a well-known example of such an asymmetric, process-based
trade restriction in the early 1990s when it attempted to ban the importation of tropical timber
products that had not been sustainably harvested. See Atsuko Okubo, Environmental Labeling
Programs and the GATT/WTO Regime, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 599, 611–12 (1999). Because Austria lacked a tropical forest of its own to conserve, developing nations argued that such
actions were impermissibly discriminatory. See id. at 612.
66 See Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 739, 743–44 (2001); see also
Donald M. McRae, GATT Article XX and the WTO Appellate Body, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON, supra note 58, at
219, 230 (noting interpretive decisions that “have led the Appellate Body to adopt a restrictive
approach to . . . the chapeau — an approach that results in a very limited role for the Article XX
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process-based regulations must show that the challenged regulation fits
within one of Article XX’s enumerated exceptions and that the regulation passes muster under Article XX’s prefatory “chapeau.”67 Thus,
the process/product distinction still poses a serious obstacle to processbased trade measures, even if they are not per se impermissible following the Shrimp/Turtle rulings.68
2. The Special Case of Product Labeling. — Frequently lost amidst
the furor over the Tuna/Dolphin ruling is the fact that the panel had
no difficulty at all with the United States’ labeling program for dolphin-safe tuna. Under the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
exceptions”); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment:
The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 277 (1997) (noting that the
stringent interpretation of “necessary” under Article XX(b) “constitutes too great an infringement
on the sovereign powers of states to take decisions (one hopes) by democratic means so as to solve
problems and satisfy their constituents”); David A. Wirth, International Trade Agreements: Vehicles for Regulatory Reform?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 331, 336 (noting that Article XX paragraphs
(b) and (g) have been “interpreted rather restrictively”).
67 See ARTHUR EDMOND APPLETON, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING PROGRAMMES:
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW IMPLICATIONS 162 (1997). The Article XX chapeau requires that
trade restrictions “are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade.” GATT, supra note 54, art. XX.
68 See Hudec, The Product-Process Doctrine in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence, supra note 58, at
188 (observing that “the product-process doctrine still remains a potentially lethal threat to process-based regulation”). Perhaps seeking to strike a final blow to the process/product distinction,
Howse recently has pointed to language in the Appellate Body Asbestos Report that suggests both
that the definition of “like products” should encompass a wide variety of characteristics, including
nonphysical ones, and that the analysis under Article III should take account of subcategories of
products, even when they are otherwise determined to be “like” products on a more general level.
See Howse, supra note 60, at 515–16 (citing and discussing Appellate Body Asbestos Report, supra
note 54). Based on these two interpretive points, Howse argues that future dispute settlement
panels might choose to characterize an MMPA-type trade restriction as an internal product regulation affecting turtle-friendly and turtle-unfriendly shrimp in a manner that is “no less favorable”
to foreign producers as a group. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The process-based trade
restriction therefore would be treated no differently from a product-based one, and the process/product distinction would all but disappear from international trade law. Id.
Other commentators are skeptical of Howse’s argument. They point chiefly to the fact that,
because the health risks posed by asbestos include threats to product users themselves, France’s
trade measure banning the importation of asbestos-containing products clearly can be characterized as a product-focused regulation, rather than a process-focused one. See Gaines, supra note
62, at 418; Manoj Joshi, Are Eco-Labels Consistent with World Trade Organization Agreements?,
38 J. WORLD TRADE 69, 77 (2004). Whether the Appellate Body would be similarly generous in
the context of a purely process-based trade measure, these critics point out, is a far less certain
proposition. See Gaines, supra note 62, at 418 (noting that “[i]t is one thing to argue that two
slightly different products with similar characteristics and uses might nevertheless be different, as
the Appellate Body did in the EC-Asbestos case,” but that “[i]t is altogether a different matter to
propose . . . that physically indistinguishable products might nevertheless be treated as not ‘like’
based only on the circumstances of their manufacture”); Joshi, supra, at 77 (noting that, although
the Appellate Body Asbestos Report may have “left the field open for interpretation in future
cases[,] . . . as of now there has been no case of a Panel finding two products unlike merely based
on [process characteristics that do not tangibly affect the end product]”).
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Act (DPCIA),69 both foreign and domestic producers are prohibited
from using the term “dolphin safe” or its equivalent on tuna packaging
if their product is harvested using driftnets, purse seine nets, or other
processes likely to injure or kill dolphins.70 Additionally, DPCIA directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish “an official mark that
may be used to label tuna products as dolphin safe” in accordance
with federal guidelines.71 In rather sharp contrast to its ruling with
regard to the MMPA, the Tuna/Dolphin panel found the U.S. “dolphin
safe” labeling regulations to be consistent with the GATT.72 Notably,
the panel rested its ruling on the fact that “[a]ny advantage which
might possibly result from access to this label depends on the free
choice by consumers to give preference to tuna carrying the ‘Dolphin
Safe’ label.”73
Notwithstanding the Tuna/Dolphin panel’s acceptance of the
DPCIA program, many commentators in the years following the report
have viewed both voluntary and mandatory government labeling programs as illegal, or at least vulnerable, under the GATT if they are
premised on environmental or other process-related conditions.74 To
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
69
70

16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(1) (West Supp. 2004). In the case of purse seine nets and other harvesting methods “identified by the Secretary as having a regular and significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins,” producers still can use the “dolphin safe” label if they provide adequate
assurance that “no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets or other gear deployments
in which the tuna were caught.” Id. § 1385(d)(1)(D). In 2002, the Secretary of Commerce decided
to permit “dolphin safe” labeling for tuna harvested by purse seine netting in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific. Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, 68 Fed. Reg. 2010, 2010–11 (Jan. 15, 2003).
Critics attacked the regulation in court, charging that the Secretary’s action would contribute to
significantly higher levels of dolphin mortality and was at odds with the terms of the DPCIA. See
Earth Island Inst. v. Evans, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1068, 1075–76 (N.D. Cal. 2003). In 2004, a federal district court agreed with the critics:
[The administrative record] reflects an agency that (1) continued to drag its feet on conducting critical mandated research, (2) continued to ignore the fact that the best scientific evidence that was available, while not conclusive, pointed toward the fishery as the
cause of the dolphins’ failure to recover as expected, and (3) compromised the integrity
of its finding by allowing trade policy considerations to infect the decision-making process.
Earth Island Inst. v. Evans, No. C 03-0007 TEH, 2004 WL 1774221, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9,
2004).
71 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(3)(A).
72 Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 46, at 204.
73 Id. at 203.
74 See Groos, supra note 58, at 408 (“WTO rules mandate that goods cannot be subject to
statutory labeling requirements or differentiated on the basis of how they are produced . . . .”);
Okubo, supra note 65, at 600 (“One thing that all environmental labeling schemes have in common . . . is their uncertain status in relation to free trade.”); see also Caldwell & Wirth, supra note
59, at 588 (observing that “ecolabelling schemes” have become “a major flash point in the current
debate” regarding trade and the environment); Erik P. Bartenhagen, Note, The Intersection of
Trade and the Environment: An Examination of the Impact of the TBT Agreement on Ecolabeling
Programs, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 68 (1997) (“[T]he current GATT regime creates much uncertainty about the future viability of voluntary, PPM-based ecolabeling schemes.”).
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complicate matters further, product labeling schemes also now must be
evaluated in light of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)75 and the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement),76 both of which were
adopted as part of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The SPS
Agreement applies to all product regulations that are designed to protect human, animal, or plant life from “pests, diseases, disease-carrying
organisms or disease-causing organisms,” or from “additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.”77 The TBT Agreement covers all other mandatory or voluntary technical product standards. In simple terms, one can think of
the TBT and SPS Agreements as more detailed and precise elaborations of the types of requirements that have been imposed within
GATT jurisprudence through Article XX.78 It is important to note,
however, that the two Agreements apply to product standards, regulations, and procedures, whether or not such measures are alleged to discriminate against imported products. Thus, whereas previously countries did not violate GATT rules “as long as product standards [were]
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
The argument against mandatory labeling programs would be similar to the Tuna/Dolphin
panel’s analysis of the MMPA import provisions: because process information does not affect a
“product as such,” a national measure that blocked entry of unlabeled products would constitute a
simple import ban that would have to be justified, if at all, under Article XX. See APPLETON,
supra note 67, at 161–62. WTO panel members then might conclude that a voluntary labeling
program provides a less trade-restrictive alternative to a mandatory system, rendering the latter
program illegal under the Article XX chapeau. Voluntary programs, however, might still be challenged as disguised restrictions on trade, particularly in those instances where there is dispute
about scientific evidence relating to the harmfulness or significance of the process at issue or
where the regulating jurisdiction lacks a strong connection to the process or condition that the
measure targets. See, e.g., Philip Bentley Q.C., A Re-Assessment of Article XX, Paragraphs (b)
and (g) of GATT 1994 in the Light of Growing Consumer and Environmental Concern About Biotechnology, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 107, 128–29 (2000) (arguing that voluntary use of non-GM
labeling could create a barrier to trade unless an accompanying disclaimer informed consumers
that “no significant difference has yet been shown between foods with and without GMOs” (quoting C. Ford Runge & Lee Ann Jackson, Labelling, Trade and Genetically Modified Organisms —
A Proposed Solution, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 111, 119 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Gaines, supra note 62, at 400 (characterizing certain PPM measures as “an effort by one country
simply to impose its environmental norms extraterritorially on uninterested or unwilling foreign
sovereigns”).
75 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS — RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 27
(1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS AGREEMENT].
76 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS — RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 27 (1994), http://www.wto.
org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf [hereinafter TBT AGREEMENT].
77 SPS AGREEMENT, supra note 75, Annex A § 1(a), (b).
78 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 142–43 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that the TBT Agreement “is really a more expansive formulation of Article XX”).
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applied nondiscriminatorily,”79 now such standards must conform to
the dictates of the TBT and SPS Agreements even when they are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Member states may challenge product labeling regulations under
either the TBT or the SPS Agreement. If the TBT Agreement governs, then such regulations must avoid imposing “unnecessary obstacles to international trade” and must not be “more trade-restrictive
than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective.”80 In addition, product
regulations must be based on available international standards unless
the regulating nation can show that such standards are “ineffective or
inappropriate.”81 If the SPS Agreement applies, then regulations must
be “based on scientific principles,” supported by “sufficient scientific
evidence,” and applied “only to the extent necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health.”82 To fulfill this mandate, member nations must either rely on international standards when establishing
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations or defend their selection of a
higher level of protection by identifying a “scientific justification” in
accordance with risk assessment procedures.83 Finally, member nations must “ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
79 John J. Barceló III, Product Standards To Protect the Local Environment — the GATT and
the Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 755, 761
(1994).
80 TBT AGREEMENT, supra note 76, art. 2.2. The TBT Agreement governs voluntary product
labeling regulations with slightly less stringency than it oversees mandatory regulations. See
Okubo, supra note 65, at 623. This more relaxed standard, however, has not prevented the development of doubt and controversy regarding the permissibility of voluntary process-related labeling programs under the Agreement. See id. at 621 (noting “debate over whether voluntary environmental labeling or eco-labeling acts as a de facto non-tariff trade barrier”). In addition, there
has been some confusion regarding whether the TBT Agreement reaches voluntary labeling
schemes that target process-related information, as opposed to product-related information. See
Gaines, supra note 62, at 396–97 (noting that, due to a drafting ambiguity in the TBT Agreement,
“there has been furious discussion but no consensus view within the WTO about how closely nonmandatory PPM measures such as eco-labels must be ‘related’ to the product to fall within the
scope of the TBT Agreement”). Another interesting and potentially far-reaching aspect of the
TBT Agreement is the requirement that nations supervise the design and implementation of even
private, nongovernmental labeling programs. See Okubo, supra note 65, at 633–34.
81 TBT AGREEMENT, supra note 76, art. 2.4. Important sources of international standards
include the Codex Alimentarius Commission for food safety, the International Office of Epizootics
for animal health, and the International Plant Protection Convention for plant health. See Steve
Charnovitz, The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation by World Trade Rules, 13 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 271, 286 (2000). In addition, although it is not strictly speaking an intergovernmental
organization, the International Organization for Standardization provides another significant forum for devising consensus product standards. See Wirth, supra note 66, at 347.
82 SPS AGREEMENT, supra note 75, art. 2.2. The SPS Agreement creates an exception to this
rule for cases in which scientific evidence is insufficient. See id. art. 5.7. In such cases, nations
may adopt precautionary measures on a temporary basis, but these countries remain under an
ongoing duty to revisit the state of scientific knowledge and the basis for precaution. See id.
83 Id. arts. 3.3, 5.
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than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.”84
Defenders of the SPS Agreement believe that it will enhance the
quality of democratic deliberation by forcing countries explicitly to
identify scientific and empirical support for their domestic policy
choices.85 Others conclude, as Alan Sykes has, that the Agreement
“unmistakably elevates the policing of trade restrictive measures above
the ability of national governments to address risk in the face of scientific uncertainty.”86 Whether the SPS Agreement and related aspects
of GATT/WTO law truly promote democratic outcomes, rather than
displace them, may well turn on the untested questions of whether and
to what extent process-related labeling requirements are permissible
under the SPS Agreement. That is, even granting that the rules of the
international trading system can improve “democratic rationality” by
discouraging regulatory actions premised on “popular prejudice and
alarm,”87 what is to be made of public concern that persists despite a
lack of scientific evidence to support it? In such situations, may governments adopt labeling requirements as an intermediate position between, on the one hand, acceding to scientifically groundless policy
demands and, on the other hand, ignoring altogether the sincerely expressed concerns of citizens?88 As the next section describes, no dispute presents these questions in more stark or contentious form than
the recently filed U.S. trade complaint over European regulation of
GM foods.89
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
84
85

Id. arts. 5.5, 5.6.
See Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the
World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329, 2330 (2000) (“If rational deliberation is an important element in making democratic outcomes legitimate, then providing some role for scientific
principles and evidence in the regulatory process may enhance, rather than undermine, democratic control of risk.”); cf. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 44, at 577 (“An objective evidence
requirement . . . would weaken the power of protectionist interest groups, thereby reinforcing domestic democracy.”).
86 Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A
Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 368 (2002); see also Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO
from Becoming the “World Trans-science Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy,
and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 319 (1998) (concluding that “[c]ases under the SPS Agreement implicate the momentous clash between the interest in efficient international trade and the sovereign duty to protect health”).
87 Howse, supra note 85, at 2330, 2336.
88 See Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, supra note 42, at 101–
02 (describing the difficulty of evaluating appropriate governmental responses to “a quasi-rational
public panic, based on an intense emotional reaction to a low-probability risk”).
89 During the long-festering trade dispute over Europe’s refusal to permit importation of U.S.
meat due to the use of hormone treatment, Europe rejected an offer by the United States to settle
the dispute by labeling U.S. meat exports. See Sean D. Murphy, Does the World Need a New International Environmental Court?, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 333, 339 (2000) (noting
that settlement discussions broke down over the precise wording of the proposed label); Michele
D. Carter, Note, Selling Science Under the SPS Agreement: Accommodating Consumer Preference
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B. Genetic Engineering and “Substantial Equivalence”
For close to ten thousand years, humankind has relied on hybridization and other methods of biotechnology to improve plants and animals for use in food production.90 More recently, however, geneticists
have developed a cluster of bioengineering techniques that allow the
introduction of desired traits into host species with a speed and flexibility previously unknown to science.91 Many American consumers
report that they oppose the use of these techniques in agricultural production,92 and that they strongly support mandatory labeling of retail
products derived from GM organisms.93 Nevertheless, industry estimates suggest that as many as sixty percent of all processed food items
on U.S. supermarket shelves contain undisclosed GM ingredients.94
The manner in which this curious juxtaposition came about provides
one of the most telling illustrations of the process/product distinction
and its growing importance within government regulation of environmental, health, and safety risks.95
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
in the Growth Hormones Controversy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 625, 654 (1997). Although such
a compromise would have resolved “one of the longest running trade disputes in the modern trading system,” Sykes, supra note 86, at 358, it would not have shed light on the vexing questions
whether and to what extent process-related labeling requirements are consistent with international trade law in the absence of a voluntary settlement.
90 See CALESTOUS JUMA, THE GENE HUNTERS: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR
SEEDS 108–09 (1989) (noting that agricultural biotechnology dates back at least to the use of fermentation in 7000 BC). According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, agricultural biotechnology consists of “a collection of scientific techniques . . . that are used to create, improve, or
modify plants, animals, and microorganisms.” U.S. Dep’t Agric., Biotechnology and U.S. Agricultural Trade: Questions and Answers, at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/biotech/Q&As.html (last modified Nov. 7, 2003). Commentators in GM agriculture debates frequently use the term “biotechnology” to refer more specifically to modern genetic engineering techniques such as recombinant
DNA isolation, cloning, and sequencing. See Michael John Gulliford, Comment, Much Ado
About Gene Patents: The Role of Foreseeability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 715 (2004).
91 Specifically, by allowing genetic material to be “spliced” into a host organism directly at the
level of DNA, such techniques permit “the formation of new combinations of heritable material . . . [that are] incorporat[ed] into a host organism in which they do not naturally occur but in
which they are capable of continued propagation.” JOHN E. SMITH, BIOTECHNOLOGY 38 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 3d ed. 1996).
92 See, e.g., Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Americans Are Far More Comfortable
with Genetic Modifications of Plants Than Animals, Public Sentiment About Genetically Modified
Food: September 2003 Update, at http://pewagbiotech.org/research/2003update/4.php (last visited
Nov. 14, 2004) (reporting that forty-one percent of survey respondents believed it was “somewhat
bad” or “very bad” to use genetic modification of plants to make produce last longer). Even more
Americans reportedly opposed the genetic modification of animals. See id.
93 See TEISL & CASWELL, supra note 38, at 2 (citing results from multiple polls).
94 See Henrique Freire de Oliveira Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A Need for International Regulation, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 131 (2000); Julie Teel, Student Article,
Regulating Genetically Modified Products and Processes: An Overview of Approaches, 8 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 649, 649 (2000).
95 For more comprehensive analyses of U.S. regulation of genetically engineered agricultural
products, see Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically
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1. Modern Genetic Engineering Processes. — Neither the potential
benefits nor the potential risks of modern genetic engineering are insignificant. On the positive side, supporters of GM technologies emphasize that GM crops can reduce the need for external pesticide applications by incorporating insect and disease resistance traits directly
into a plant’s genetic makeup.96 Similarly, plants can be engineered to
tolerate herbicide applications in a manner that potentially enables the
use of fewer chemicals to achieve a desired level of weed control.97
Other potential enhancements for agricultural crops include improved
plant tolerance to unfavorable growing conditions,98 and various
means of improving the handling, distribution, and processing of food
products.99 Finally, although such products have yet to make a significant appearance in the consumer marketplace, proponents of GM
foods also envision a future in which agricultural products express desirable output characteristics, such as improved nutritional content or
a more aesthetically pleasing texture and appearance.100
On the negative side, opponents worry that GM food products may
pose human health risks that, given the novelty of GM technologies,
scientists will have difficulty identifying. Opponents voice concerns
about the potential toxicity and allergenicity of GM food products,101
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297 (2002); Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience,
Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167 (2004); Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory
Policy on Genetically Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733 (2003); McGarity, supra note 45.
96 See Indur M. Goklany, The Future of Food, F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL’Y, Summer
2001, at 59, 60. Indeed, according to USDA researchers, pesticide use has fallen measurably following widespread U.S. adoption of GM corn, cotton, and soybean crops. See JORGE
FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO & WILLIAM D. MCBRIDE, ADOPTION OF BIOENGINEERED CROPS 27
(U.S. Dep’t Agric., Agricultural Economic Report No. 810, 2002) (estimating a reduction, related
to the adoption of genetically engineered crops, of 6.2% of total pesticide treatments), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer810/aer810.pdf.
97 See Mandel, supra note 95, at 2181. To date, the overwhelming majority of both field-tested
and marketed GM organisms have been engineered to express either or both of these two traits.
See McGarity, supra note 45, at 410 (“Of the thousands of field trials that biotechnology companies have completed to date, 83 percent have involved plants genetically engineered for pest resistance or herbicide tolerance and only 22 percent tested plants with improved quality traits.”).
98 See Mandel, supra note 95, at 2181.
99 The first GM food organism submitted to the FDA for approval was a tomato that had
been engineered to stay firm and fresh for longer periods of time after being picked than conventional tomatoes. McGarity, supra note 45, at 413–14. Although this product was commercially
unsuccessful, biotechnology advocates continue to view increased fruit and vegetable shelf life as
an important input trait for research and development. See id. at 414.
100 See Mandel, supra note 95, at 2183.
101 Although GM crops frequently are engineered to contain pesticidal substances, the toxicity
of resulting food products is difficult to predict or detect because the products do not lend themselves to traditional methods of risk assessment. See I.R. Rowland, Genetically Modified Foods,
Science, Consumers and the Media, 61 PROC. NUTRITION SOC’Y 25, 27 (2002) (noting that toxicity assessment typically involves exposing laboratory animals to high levels of isolated chemicals,
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the impact of genetic engineering techniques on antibiotic effectiveness,102 the possibility that modified genetic material might transfer
“horizontally” to humans through ingestion or other biomechanisms,103 and the potential for GM processes to have adverse effects on important nutrient levels in food products.104 With regard to
ecological consequences, evidence suggests that GM crops may
threaten desirable nontarget species such as monarch butterflies or
beneficial predatory insects,105 may cause unpredictable ecological disturbances as engineered traits spread to neighboring species,106 and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
and that “complex mixtures of complex chemicals,” such as novel GM foods, cannot be administered to animal subjects in this conventional manner). Similarly, because bioengineers sometimes
incorporate proteins from nonfood sources whose allergenic potential is presently unknown, resulting GM food products pose at least a possibility of serious allergic reactions for some consumers. See id. at 28 (noting that “[a]ssessing the allergenic potential of novel foods presents major
problems, since there are no reliable tests for predicting allergenicity”).
102 Scientists sometimes link manipulated genes with a “marker gene” that is resistant to antibiotics, thereby raising the possibility that antibiotics will treat humans less effectively as this resistance spreads. See id. This concern should dissipate, however, as scientists respond to pressure to
phase out the use of antibiotic-resistant marker genes. See Anthony J. Conner et al., The Release
of Genetically Modified Crops into the Environment — Part II. Overview of Ecological Risk Assessment, 33 PLANT J. 19, 28 (2003).
103 See Conner et al., supra note 102, at 27.
104 See McGarity, supra note 45, at 422–23.
105 In 1999, a preliminary study in Nature demonstrated lethal effects of pollen from Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) corn on monarch butterfly larvae. See John E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen
Harms Monarch Larvae, 399 NATURE 214, 214 (1999). Follow-up research in the wake of the
media attention generated by this study determined that most GM corn did not express the Bt
toxin at sufficiently high levels to threaten monarchs in actual field environments, as opposed to
the conditions evaluated in the initial laboratory study. See Genetically Engineered Organisms —
Public Issues Education Project, Impact of Bt-Corn on Monarch Butterflies, at http://www.geopie.cornell.edu/issues/monarchs.html (last updated Aug. 16, 2004). Notably, however, researchers
did find that one variety of Bt corn approved for commercial use was capable of increasing larvae
mortality in field environments. See id. This variety had not been widely adopted — and has
since been discontinued — and thus the monarch butterfly species was never seriously threatened.
See id. Nevertheless, the risk of adverse effects of GM crops demonstrated by this example remains a serious concern. See David E. Ervin et al., Towards an Ecological Systems Approach in
Public Research for Environmental Regulation of Transgenic Crops, 99 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS &
ENV’T 1, 6 (2003) (noting that “there are still questions being raised about the effects of long-term
and low-level exposure to Bt in corn pollen on monarch larvae survival and fitness”); see also
A.N.E. Birch et al., Interactions Between Plant Resistance Genes, Pest Aphid Populations and
Beneficial Aphid Predators, in SCOTTISH CROP RESEARCH INST., ANNUAL REPORT 1996/97, at
68, 71–72 (1997) (reporting the development of reproductive difficulties in ladybugs that had been
fed aphids reared on GM potatoes), available at http://www.scri.sari.ac.uk/SCRI/web/FILES/
AnRp967.pdf; Angelika Hilbeck et al., Effects of Transgenic Bacillus thuringiensis Corn-Fed Prey
on Mortality and Development Time of Immature Chrysoperla carnea (Neuroptera: Chrysopidae),
27 ENVTL. ENTOMOLOGY 480, 482–84 (1998) (demonstrating negative health effects among lacewings reared on prey that had been fed Bt maize).
106 See Ervin et al., supra note 105, at 5 (noting that “[t]here is little doubt in the scientific community that genes will move from crops into the wild” and that “[g]ene transfer could become a
problem if the transferred genes do not have deleterious effects on the crop-wild hybrids, but instead confer an ecological advantage”).
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may hasten the development of resistance among target pest species.107
Finally, in addition to these concerns about human health and the environment, some individuals object to GM technologies on cultural, religious, ethical, or other nontechnical grounds. For instance, some believe that GM agriculture exacerbates the trend toward concentrated,
monocultural production, thereby threatening national food security
and traditional agrarian culture.108
Because many of the foregoing positive and negative effects are
highly speculative,109 policymakers have been required to resort to default assumptions when developing regulatory frameworks for GM
crops and products. Many jurisdictions, for instance, have employed
the precautionary principle, a decisionmaking heuristic that “counsels
serious contemplation of regulatory action in the face of evidence of
health and environmental risk, even before the magnitude of risk is
necessarily known or any harm manifested.”110 Consistent with this
precautionary approach, Europe requires manufacturers both to dem–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
107 See Bratspies, supra note 95, at 300 n.14 (“[T]here is some degree of scientific certainty that
it is a question of when — not if — insects will develop resistance to [GM] plants engineered to
produce pesticides, herbicides or other ‘plant-incorporated proctectorants.’”). The EPA has acknowledged this risk by requiring non-GM biological “refuge” areas to be planted around GM
crops, although it is doubtful that these requirements have much practical effect due to the EPA’s
lack of a strong enforcement regime. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Bridging the Genetic Divide:
Confidence-Building Measures for Genetically Modified Crops, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 63, 72–73
(2003) (concluding that the EPA’s system for regulating GM crops containing pesticides is “full of
holes”). The risk of resistance is of special concern to organic producers, who long have relied on
the Bt bacteria as a last resort to combat pests, but who now see the Bt gene being expressed directly in GM maize crops on millions of acres across the United States. Indeed, a study by the
National Research Council concluded that “[i]nsect resistance to Bt crops is considered inevitable.” COMM. ON ENVTL. IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH COMMERCIALIZATION OF TRANSGENIC
PLANTS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC PLANTS:
THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF REGULATION 76 (2002).
108 See Melissa L. Finucane, Mad Cows, Mad Corn and Mad Communities: The Role of SocioCultural Factors in the Perceived Risk of Genetically-Modified Food, 61 PROC. NUTRITION
SOC’Y 31, 31, 33 (2002); Marden, supra note 95, at 761 (noting that demands for mandatory labeling of GM foods reflect “the desire to safeguard the purity of the food, prevent potential allergic
reactions, avoid a process that interferes with religion or moral views, and promote traditional
farming”).
109 See, e.g., ROYAL SOC’Y OF CANADA, ELEMENTS OF PRECAUTION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE REGULATION OF FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY IN CANADA 132 (2001) (concluding that “the quantity and the quality of research on the potential environmental impacts of [GM organisms] is not
sufficient to address many of [the field’s most] pressing questions”), available at http://www.rsc.ca/
foodbiotechnology/GMreportEN.pdf.
110 David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U.
L. REV. 1315, 1315 (2003). For an overview of the precautionary principle in international and
domestic environmental law, as well as an exploration of the principle’s implications for international trade, see Joint Working Party on Trade & Env’t, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Uncertainty and Precaution: Implications for Trade and Environment, COM/ENV/TD(2000)114/
FINAL (Sept. 5, 2002).
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onstrate the safety of GM crops and food products before they are
marketed, and to label such products even after they are approved.111
The United States, in contrast, has embraced the doctrine of “substantial equivalence,” under which regulators subject GM food products to no greater regulatory oversight than the unmodified products
that they are shown to strongly resemble.112 Of course, given that a
GM product almost certainly has been altered to an extent that is sufficiently “novel” to earn intellectual property protection for its developer,113 one naturally might wonder how such a product could ever be
deemed substantially equivalent to an unmodified product. The answer lies in the highly stylized definition of “substantial equivalence.”
Most notably, the substantial equivalence determination accords no
significance to the fact that a product has been developed using modern genetic engineering processes.114 Rather, substantial equivalence
is determined solely with reference to the compositional and other tangible characteristics of the modified organism and its conventional
counterparts.115
The substantial equivalence doctrine is built upon a variation of
the process/product distinction: absent some identifiable alteration in
the physical features and characteristics of the end product, the doctrine assumes that modification of a plant’s or animal’s genetic
makeup is an inconsequential process about which neither regulators
nor consumers should concern themselves. Similarly, a recent draft
risk assessment from the USDA addressing the hazards of cloned livestock advocates a “compositional analysis method” of risk assessment,
under which regulators assume that “food products from healthy animal clones and their progeny that are not materially different from
corresponding products from conventional animals are as safe to con–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
111
112

Europe’s regulation of GM food products is briefly described below, see infra pp. 562–63.
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SAFETY EVALUATION OF FOODS DERIVED
BY MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 14–16 (1993) (introducing the “substantial equivalence” concept). For an overview of U.S. use of the substantial equivalence doctrine in GM regulation, see infra section I.B.2, pp. 558–62.
113 For a discussion of intellectual property issues in the context of agricultural biotechnology,
including the controversial “terminator” gene technology that was developed to enforce patent
rights by rendering GM seeds sterile, see Cullen N. Pendleton, The Peculiar Case of “Terminator”
Technology: Agricultural Biotechnology and Intellectual Property Protection at the Crossroads of
the Third Green Revolution, 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 1 (2004).
114 See McGarity, supra note 45, at 429 (“[T]he baseline assumption of the substantial equivalence doctrine is that there is nothing inherently novel about plant breeding through modern genetic engineering.”).
115 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 112, at 11. An obvious theoretical
problem then becomes how to determine the class of compositional and other tangible characteristics that provide the benchmark for the substantial equivalence determination. See Rowland,
supra note 101, at 27.
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sume as their conventional counterparts.”116 The process of cloning
itself, in other words, lacks conceptual significance, just as the process
of genetic manipulation carries no significance under the substantial
equivalence doctrine. As shown by the discussion of U.S. GM food
regulation in the following subsection, these various uses of the process/product distinction can have significant implications for the manner in which regulators address novel technologies.
2. U.S. Regulation of Genetically Modified Food Products. — In
the early years of recombinant DNA research in the United States, the
National Institute of Health categorically banned all releases of the
products of recombinant DNA technology into the environment.117
This ban was lifted in 1982 and, following years of delays caused by
litigation and community challenges, the first U.S. field testing of a
GM organism began in April, 1987, near Brentwood, California.118 At
the time, the United States had adopted a regulatory stance toward agricultural biotechnology that declined to single out GM organisms for
enhanced scrutiny based solely on their method of production. Specifically, in June of 1986, a working group convened by President
Reagan’s Domestic Policy Council published a policy document, “Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology,” establishing
the fundamental premise that modern genetic engineering did not ipso
facto warrant any more regulation than “traditional genetic manipulation techniques” such as hybridization.119
Because the Coordinated Framework and subsequent executive
branch position statements embraced the substantial equivalence doctrine in this manner,120 policymakers determined that no new laws
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
116 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., ANIMAL CLONING: A RISK ASSESSMENT: DRAFT EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 6 (Oct. 21, 2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/cvm/index/cloning/CLRAES.pdf.
117 SHELDON KRIMSKY & ROGER P. WRUBEL, AGRICULTURAL BIOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SCIENCE, POLICY, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 159 (1996).
118 See PAUL B. THOMPSON, THE SPIRIT OF THE SOIL: AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS 35 (1995).
119 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,303 (June
26, 1986); see also Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49
Fed. Reg. 50,856, 50,857, 50,859–77 (Dec. 31, 1984) (summarizing laws that may regulate GM
products).
120 In 1990, the first Bush administration elaborated on the 1986 Coordinated Framework
through its articulation of “Four Principles of Regulatory Review for Biotechnology.” See Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753 app. at 6760 (Feb. 27, 1992). The first
of the four principles stated that “[f]ederal government regulatory oversight should focus on the
characteristics and risks of the biotechnology product — not the process by which it is created.”
Id. Similarly, in February of 1992, the Office of Science and Technology Policy published a “Final
Statement on Scope,” which announced that executive oversight of biotechnology products
“should not turn on the fact that an organism has been modified by a particular process or technique.” Id. at 6753.
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were required to regulate GM organisms.121 Instead, federal agencies
would share regulatory oversight duties by exercising their authority
under a pastiche of existing statutes.122 Accordingly, today the EPA
regulates environmental risks posed by GM organisms through its authority under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act123 and the Toxic Substances Control Act;124 the FDA evaluates the
safety and marketing of GM organisms intended for human consumption under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA);125
and the USDA, acting through its Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service under the Plant Protection Act,126 monitors the use of GM organisms in agricultural production.
Critics charge that the responsible agencies have diluted these
statutory powers in practice.127 For instance, the FDA arguably has
discretion to require thorough premarket review of GM food products
under the FFDCA’s grant of authority to regulate “adulterated foods”
and “food additives.”128 In practice, however, the FDA has conferred a
“generally recognized as safe” (GRAS) exemption from premarket review on any GM food crop deemed substantially equivalent to its traditionally bred parental strain.129 Moreover, the FDA has allowed
product manufacturers themselves to determine whether a substance
should be considered GRAS.130
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
121 See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, GUIDE TO U.S. REGULATION OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS, at i, 6 (Sept.
2001) [hereinafter PEW GUIDE], available at http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/issuebriefs/1-reg
guide.pdf.
122 See Nathan W. Eckley, Comment, Reaping the Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology
Through Uniform Regulation, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 433, 436–39 (2002).
123 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136–136y (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
124 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601–2692 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
125 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–399 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
126 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 7701–7772 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
127 See, e.g., Bratspies, supra note 95; Mandel, supra note 95; McGarity, supra note 45.
128 See Stanley H. Abramson & J. Thomas Carrato, Crop Biotechnology: The Case for Product
Stewardship, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 250–51 (2001); Ved P. Nanda, Genetically Modified Food
and International Law — The Biosafety Protocol and Regulations in Europe, 28 DENV. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 235, 246–47 (2000); Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, Policy in Flux: The
European Union’s Laws on Agricultural Biotechnology and Their Effects on International Trade, 4
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 243, 248–49 (1999); George E.C. York, Note, Global Foods, Local Tastes and
Biotechnology: The New Legal Architecture of International Agriculture Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 423, 437 (2001).
129 See Sheldon Krimsky & Nora K. Murphy, Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of Transgenic Food, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Nov. 2002, at 80, 82. GM substances altered in a manner such that they cannot be deemed GRAS are subject to regulation as
food additives. As of 2001, however, only one GM food product had triggered the food additive
review process. See PEW GUIDE, supra note 121, at 21 n.15.
130 See PEW GUIDE, supra note 121, at 20 (“FFDCA does not require FDA to make a premarketing determination that a potential food additive is GRAS; that determination is made by the
food manufacturer without FDA review.”); McGarity, supra note 45, at 438 (“Ultimately, the
agency leaves it up to the manufacturer to determine whether an added substance is GRAS.”).

560

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:525

The doctrine of substantial equivalence also finds expression in the
FDA’s labeling policy for GM foods. In its 1992 Policy Statement concerning GM food products, the Agency made clear that it did not regard the fact that an agricultural substance was produced through genetic modification techniques to be “material” information subject to
mandatory disclosure under the FFDCA.131 The Agency did indicate
that labeling would be required “if a food derived from a new plant
variety differs from its traditional counterpart such that the common
or usual name no longer applies to the new food, or if a safety or usage
issue exists to which consumers must be alerted.”132 The FDA might
require labeling, therefore, when developers incorporate known allergenic material into a food product or when the “concentration and
bioavailability of important nutrients” in the modified food product are
no longer within the range ordinarily seen in traditional counterpart
foods.133 Short of such extreme cases, however, the FDA concluded
that it lacks statutory authority to force disclosure of information related solely to the process by which a food product was developed.134
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Manufacturers may, but need not, petition the FDA for an affirmation that the Agency agrees
with the manufacturer’s GRAS determination. See, e.g., Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from
New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992); Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition, Guidance on Consultation Procedures: Foods Derived from New
Plant Varieties, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/consulpr.html (Oct. 1997). During its waning days,
the Clinton Administration issued a proposed regulation requiring premarket notification to the
FDA, but the Agency appears not to have pursued the issue further. See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (Jan. 18, 2001).
131 See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,984;
id. at 22,991 (“The agency is not aware of any information showing that foods derived by these
new methods differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way, or that, as a class, foods
developed by the new techniques present any different or greater safety concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding.”).
132 Id. at 22,991.
133 Id. at 22,992.
134 Referencing both the language of the FFDCA and the Agency’s own past practices, commentators have criticized the FDA’s conclusion that it lacked this authority. See, e.g., Lara Beth
Winn, Special Labeling Requirements for Genetically Engineered Food: How Sound Are the Analytical Frameworks Used by FDA and Food Producers?, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 667 (1999).
Farmed salmon provides an instructive comparison. In this context, the FDA has taken the position that canthaxanthin — the primary artificial coloring agent used by the salmon industry — is
a product additive whose use under the FFDCA must be disclosed to consumers in order to prevent the “economic fraud” that would occur if consumers assumed that farmed salmon is naturally colored. See 63 Fed. Reg. 14,814 (Mar. 27, 1998); FDA Listing of Color Additives Exempt
from Certification, 21 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(d)(3), 73.75(d)(4) (2004); FDA Food Labeling Requirements,
21 C.F.R. §§ 101.22(a), (b), (k)(2), 101.100(a)(2). The FDA could easily have applied this reasoning
to the GM context: just as consumers in the absence of disclosure might assume that salmon
products are not artificially colored, they also seem likely to assume that food products are not the
result of genetic engineering unless informed otherwise.
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Despite the failure of a legal challenge to these conclusions,135 opponents of GM foods have found some success in the court of public
opinion. For instance, the USDA’s 1997 proposed federal organic certification standards, which would have permitted the use of GM ingredients and other practices that were inconsistent with prevailing understandings of organic agriculture, prompted more public comments
— almost all of them negative — than any other proposed regulation
in the Agency’s history.136 Also around that time, more than 500,000
individuals signed a petition demanding that the FDA require labeling
of GM foods.137 Awareness of and opposition to GM food products
continued to mount as activists adopted a variety of publicity strategies. Finally, in late 1999, the FDA announced that it would hold a series of three public meetings to explain its position on GM foods and to
solicit views on whether the position should be altered.138
As the FDA would later acknowledge, “[m]ost of the comments [it
received] that addressed labeling requested mandatory disclosure of
the fact that the food or its ingredients was bioengineered or was produced from bioengineered food.”139 Nevertheless, the FDA held to its
position that genetic modification alone is not a material fact that must
be disclosed under the FFDCA.140 Instead, the Agency issued draft
labeling guidelines for voluntary disclosure by manufacturers, recognizing that “many consumers are interested in the information, and
some manufacturers may want to respond to this consumer desire.”141
Because it did not believe that food manufacturers could ensure that
their products were completely free of GM ingredients, the Agency
noted that “GM-free” labeling is likely to be misleading, and therefore
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
135 In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000), a federal district
court refused to find that the FDA’s presumption that GM foods meet the GRAS standard in the
absence of contrary evidence was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 181. The court also rejected a
challenge to the FDA’s labeling policy, accepting the Agency’s interpretation that the FFDCA required a “material” difference in products before consumer demand could even be considered. Id.
at 179 & n.10.
136 See Curt Anderson, USDA Urged To Scrap Organic Rules, AP ONLINE, May 1, 1998, 1998
WL 6659243 (noting that comments were “overwhelmingly negative”); Patrice Wendling, Permissive U.S. Rules Threaten the Meaning of “Organic”: New Serpent in the Garden, CAPITAL TIMES,
Apr. 25, 1998, 1998 WL 5869134 (noting that 115,000 public comments “obliterat[ed] the previous
record of 6,800 comments”).
137 See Lisa A. Tracy, Does a Genetically Modified Rose Still Smell As Sweet? — Labeling of
Genetically Modified Organisms Under the Biosafety Protocol, 6 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 156
(1999).
138 Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond; Public Meetings, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,470 (Oct. 25,
1999).
139 Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using
Bioengineering, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/biolabgu.html (Jan. 2001).
140 Id.
141 Id.
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unlawful. Moreover, the Agency noted that “[a] statement that a food
was not bioengineered or does not contain bioengineered ingredients
may be misleading if it implies that the labeled food is superior to
foods that are not so labeled.”142 Finally, in addition to these restrictions on the content of voluntary labeling, the FDA also noted that
manufacturers should be able to substantiate non-GM marketing
claims through such measures as “validated test methods,” “special
handling,” “appropriate recordkeeping,” “segregation procedures,” or
“certifications or affidavits from farmers, processors, and others in the
food production and distribution chain.”143
Given the Supreme Court’s skepticism of government bans on
truthful commercial information,144 the FDA could go only so far in its
effort to regulate non-GM claims by product marketers. Nevertheless,
taken together, the substantive and procedural requirements contained
in the FDA’s draft labeling policy seem to suggest that the Agency
would like to see food manufacturers refrain entirely from providing
consumers with information regarding genetic engineering processes.145
Having determined that GM food products are indistinguishable from
alternative products for purposes of risk assessment, the FDA also
seemed to assume that the products are indistinguishable for all other
purposes relevant to consumer markets.
3. The Looming Trade War with Europe. — Unlike the United
States, the European Union has established a regulatory program that
distinguishes GM products for special treatment based solely on the
fact of modification. Specifically, under recently finalized EU rules,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
142
143
144

Id.
Id.
The Court repeatedly has emphasized the paternalistic dangers of suppressing accurate
commercial information. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (noting that government restrictions on truthful, “nonmisleading” speech “usually rest solely on the
offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth”) (quoting Linmark
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977)); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 111 (1990) (“The Commission’s concern about the possibility of deception in hypothetical cases is not sufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption favoring disclosure over concealment.”); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328,
351 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a Puerto Rico ban on casino advertising constituted an effort to “manipulate private behavior by depriving citizens of truthful information concerning lawful activities”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
574–75 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (describing a commercial speech restriction as “a covert
attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct regulation, but by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choice”); Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (deeming a restriction on the advertisement of pharmaceuticals “highly paternalistic”); see also Wash. Legal Found.
v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 69–70 (D.D.C. 1998) (“If there is one fixed principle in the commercial speech arena, it is that ‘a State’s paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful,
nonmisleading commercial information unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it.’”) (quoting 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497).
145 See McGarity, supra note 45, at 463–64.
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before a GM product can be marketed, the European Food Safety Authority must assess its safety through an extensive risk assessment and
evaluation process that is open to public input and that does not include any shortcut approval mechanism akin to the United States’s
GRAS procedure.146 In addition, all genetically altered products, including animal feed, vegetable oils, seeds, and byproducts containing
more than 0.9% GM ingredients, must bear a label that notes: “This
product contains genetically modified organisms.”147 Finally, such
products must be “traceable” through the establishment and maintenance of an extensive informational network that tracks GM products
within the production and distribution chain.148
Member nations of the European Union considered these stringent
regulations necessary to mollify concerns associated with overturning
what had been a de facto ban on the importation, release, and marketing of any new GM products. Although in the early 1990s Europe had
authorized the release of eighteen GM organisms into the environment
and the marketing of food products derived from sixteen GM organisms, high-profile food scares later in the decade resulted in public demand for heightened government screening of food and food technologies.149 Thus, beginning in October of 1998, the European Union
suspended authorization of any new GM organisms for environmental
release or for marketing to consumers.150
Despite the fact that Europe was poised to supplant this de facto
moratorium with its new regulatory framework, the United States filed
a formal WTO trade complaint on May 13, 2003.151 The complaint
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
146 See Regulation 1829/2003 of 22 September 2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed,
2003 O.J. (L 268) 1; Regulation 178/2002 of 28 January 2002 Laying Down the General Principles
and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety Authority and Laying
Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety, 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1. For a brief overview of the new
regulations, see Brian P. Rafferty, Note, The Door Opens Slightly: Recent European Union Regulations on Genetically Modified Products and the Ongoing United States-European Union GM
Product Dispute, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2004).
147 See Regulation 1830/2003 of 22 September 2003 Concerning the Traceability and Labeling
of Genetically Modified Organisms and the Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced
from Genetically Modified Organisms and Amending Directive 2001/181EC, arts. 4, 7, 2003 O.J.
(L 268) 24, 26, 27.
148 See id. arts. 4, 5.
149 See Kim Brooks, History, Change and Policy: Factors Leading to Current Opposition to
Food Biotechnology, 5 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 153, 154–59 (2000) (describing the manner in which
highly publicized food scares led to the emergence of a “transformed” consumer in the United
Kingdom); Carter, supra note 89, at 626–28, 640–45 (1997) (noting the impact of the DES, E.Coli,
and mad cow disease controversies on European demands for food safety).
150 See Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities — Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/1 (May 20, 2003), available
at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114610.pdf.
151 See id.; see also Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Contests Europe’s Ban on Some Food, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2003, at C1.
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alleges that European regulation of biotechnology products is inconsistent with the GATT, the TBT Agreement, and the SPS Agreement,
and it therefore requests consultations with the European Communities to resolve the issues.152 In the words of U.S. Trade Representative
Robert B. Zoellick, the United States believes that European caution
with respect to GM agriculture is “Luddite” and “immoral,” reflecting
not only a failure to respect the findings of science but also a failure to
appreciate the powerful potential of genetic engineering to boost world
food production.153 Europe naturally contests this characterization
and has vowed to fight the complaint vigorously.154 At stake in the
dispute are a number of important unresolved questions of international law and, in a more abstract sense, the normative foundation of
the trading system itself.
To begin, the GM food products dispute brings to the fore longstanding uncertainties regarding the relationship between international
trade agreements and other multilateral instruments, particularly those
designed to protect the environment.155 As Jeffery Atik and David
Wirth note, although several multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs) appear on their face to conflict with international trading
rules, the conflicts have yet to be tested due to “the absence of any concrete disputes in which trade measures authorized by an MEA in fact
have been challenged.”156 The GM food controversy may present just
such a concrete dispute, given the apparent conflict between the position of the United States and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,157
an international agreement adopted pursuant to the Convention on
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
152 See Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities — Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra note 150. The complaint also
alleges that the E.U. regulatory regime violates the Agriculture Agreement. Id.
153 Lizette Alvarez, Consumers in Europe Resist Gene-Altered Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2003, at A3.
154 Cf. Thomas P. Redick, Stewardship for Biotech Crops: Strategies for Improving Global Consumer Confidence, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 5, 18 (2003) (quoting former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture
Dan Glickman as saying that the conflict over GM foods promises to be a “Battle Royale of the
21st Century” (quoting Reuters, U.S. Opposed to Segregation of Genetically Modified Crops, July
9, 1997, http://users.westnet.gr/~cgian/glick.htm) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
155 For a general discussion of the relationship between GATT/WTO jurisprudence and other
aspects of international law, see JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2003).
156 Jeffery Atik & David A. Wirth, Science and International Trade — Third Generation
Scholarship, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 171, 178 (2003). See generally Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841 (1996)
(discussing the conflicts between MEAs and the GATT). In 2001, WTO member nations committed as part of the most recent round of trade negotiations to consider the question of how MEAs
and trading rules interact. See Mungkalarungsi, supra note 58, at 362. Like many other aspects
of these negotiations, however, the discussions have not been fruitful.
157 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39
I.L.M. 1027 (2000).
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Biological Diversity and ratified by over fifty nations, including those
of the European Union.158 The Cartagena Protocol requires exporting
nations to obtain informed consent from importing nations before
shipping GM organisms and to label GM products that are intended
for animal or human consumption.159 Because the United States is
expected to argue that the EU labeling requirements constitute an impermissible trade restriction,160 and because the European Union
might well defend such requirements by pointing to its obligations under the Cartagena Protocol, one might say that the legality of the
Cartagena Protocol itself will be at issue.161
The GM food products dispute also may force clarification of how
certain GATT/WTO agreements relate to each other. Although both
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
158 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
(Montreal, 29 Janurary 2000): Status of Ratification and Entry into Force, at http://www.biodiv.
org/biosafety/signinglist.aspx?sts=rtf8ord=ctr (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
159 See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note
157, at arts. 7–12, 18. It is unclear whether the labeling requirement must be satisfied by notifying the ultimate consumer, as opposed to retailers, customs officials, or other agents earlier in the
distribution chain. See Michael P. Healy, Information Based Regulation and International Trade
in Genetically Modified Agricultural Products: An Evaluation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 205, 231 (2002). Regardless of the interpretation, it seems likely
that the negotiators of the Cartagena Protocol, a group consisting largely of environmental officials from participating nations, were aware of the importance of the GM labeling issue. Cf. Phillips & Kerr, supra note 58, at 69 (contending that the labeling provision of the Cartagena Protocol
represents “an attempt by those opposed to biotechnology to obtain the ability to inhibit international trade in GMOs through the back door when they have been unsuccessful in obtaining it at
the WTO”). Indeed, their actions may represent an example of what Kal Raustiala and David
Victor have called “strategic inconsistency” in international lawmaking. See Kal Raustiala &
David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 277, 301–02
(2004) (coining the term “strategic inconsistency” to refer to states’ efforts to force change by crafting rules in one regime that are incompatible with those in another).
160 The United States’s first submission in the dispute challenged only the EU’s de facto moratorium on new product approvals rather than the new regulatory regime itself. See First Submission of the United States, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 4, WT/DS291, 292, and 293 (Apr. 21, 2004), available at http://
www.genewatch.org/WTO/submissions/US_WTO_Submission.pdf. Nonetheless, commentators
expect future submissions and challenges from the United States to focus more specifically on the
adopted regulatory regime, including especially the requirements of labeling and traceability. Cf.
Joshi, supra note 68, at 83 (noting American opposition to mandatory GM labeling).
161 As if to highlight the confusion regarding this important question of treaty priority, the preamble to the Cartagena Protocol states both that “this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements”
and that “the [foregoing] recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international
agreements.” Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra
note 157, at 1027. Thus, although the European Union may describe its new regulatory regime
for GM products as consistent with the obligations of the Protocol, it is not at all clear that this
defense will suffice for purposes of international trade law. See Brett Grosko, Genetic Engineering and International Law: Conflict or Harmony? An Analysis of the Biosafety Protocol, GATT,
and the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 297–98 (2001);
John H. Barton, Note, Biotechnology, the Environment, and International Agricultural Trade, 9
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 95, 113–16 (1996).
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the TBT and SPS Agreements position the WTO as a sort of “global
meta-regulator,”162 the SPS Agreement, with its scientific basis requirements, is clearly the more stringent of the two.163 Despite the obvious importance of the question, however, there is a surprising degree
of uncertainty about how to determine which Agreement applies to a
given product standard.164 Some commentators appear to read the
SPS Agreement broadly, arguing that the Agreement applies so long as
the protection of human or animal health and safety at least partially
justifies the measure, irrespective of whether other nonscientific interests also might support it.165 Others seem to give nations more latitude to characterize the motivations behind a product measure and
therefore to determine whether it falls within the scope of the SPS
Agreement.166 For instance, on this reading, if the European Union
described its GM labeling regulation as a matter of consumer awareness rather than as one of health and safety protection, then the regu-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
162
163

Walker, supra note 86, at 255.
Indeed, the rigorous requirements of the SPS Agreement have been characterized by David
Wirth as even “more aggressive than what has generally been accepted in the [U.S.] domestic
regulatory reform debate.” Wirth, supra note 66, at 337.
164 SPS AGREEMENT, supra note 75, Annex A.1. Commentators have disagreed, for instance,
about whether Europe’s labeling regulations should be analyzed under the TBT or SPS Agreement. Compare Fiona Macmillan & Michael Blakeney, Genetically Modified Organisms and the
World Trade Organization, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93, 114 (2001) (suggesting that a GM
label dispute “falls most properly within the sphere of the TBT Agreement”), with John S. Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary Principle To Harmonize the Regulation
of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 237–39 (2001) (stating
that the SPS Agreement will likely be applied to evaluate GM label requirements); see also Michele M. Compton, Applying World Trade Organization Rules to the Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 359, 409 (2003) (noting that while it is unclear which agreement governs, “[t]he labeling schemes would likely not fall under the SPS Agreement”); Joanne
Scott, European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 213, 228–31 (2003) (noting that both the TBT and SPS Agreements are relevant to the GM label dispute).
165 See Healy, supra note 159, at 233 (opining that a nation would “undoubtedly violate the SPS
Agreement” if it imposed a labeling requirement while simultaneously determining that a GM
food product posed no articulable risk); cf. Alessandro Nucara, Precautionary Principle and
GMOs: Protection or Protectionism?, INT. TRADE L. & REG., Mar. 2003, 47, 50 (“Consumer concerns about the use of hormones or genetically modified products can no longer constitute a valid
reason for restrictions on the import of such products when these concerns are not backed by consistent scientific evidence.”).
166 See Mariëlle Matthee & Dominique Vermersch, The International Integration of European
Precautionary Measures on Biosafety, 10 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 183, 188 (2001) (noting that
“[w]hether the European labelling regulation is to be considered as a sanitary or phytosanitary
measure depends on its purpose” and that labeling might fall under the TBT Agreement if premised on the consumer’s right to know); Sara Pardo Quintillán, Free Trade, Public Health Protection and Consumer Information in the European and WTO Context — Hormone-Treated Beef and
Genetically Modified Organisms, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 147, 189 (1999) (arguing that precautionary
measures resting on consumer concern and the wider notion of risk embraced by the public
should be lawful, even when supported by little or no scientific evidence).
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lation might be analyzed under the TBT Agreement, not the SPS
Agreement.167
Much turns on this interpretive question. If a nation’s citizens demand the prohibition of both the importation and the domestic production of a certain good, but insufficient scientific evidence of health
or safety threats exists to support their opposition to the good, does the
ban nevertheless constitute a measure designed to “protect human or
animal life or health” subject to the dictates of the SPS Agreement, or
does it instead represent a nondiscriminatory consumer protection
measure governed by the TBT Agreement? Put concretely, could a
ban on GM food be considered similar to a ban on child pornography,
justified not by empirical evidence regarding harmful consequences of
its distribution but simply by the sovereign will of a nation’s citizens?168 What role, in other words, do consumer concern and moral
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
167 On its website, the WTO states that the SPS Agreement does not cover “[m]easures for environmental protection . . . , to protect consumer interests, or for the welfare of animals.” World
Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm (May 1998). When multiple considerations support a single regulatory measure, however, it may be difficult to classify the measure in the neat manner hypothesized by the WTO. For instance, when the WTO Appellate Body
reviewed the European Union’s ban on imports of hormone-treated beef, Europe defended itself
by pointing to scientific evidence that growth hormones are linked to cancer and other adverse
health consequences. The Appellate Body rejected this contention on the ground that Europe
was required to provide a risk assessment of the health threats specifically arising from hormonetreated beef rather than from growth hormones as a general matter. See Appellate Body Report,
EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), para. 200, WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC Hormones Report]. Given the high levels of anxiety over food safety among European consumers, however, Europe theoretically could have defended its import ban simply by invoking the need to respond to intense consumer concern. See
Carter, supra note 89, at 653 (describing proposals within Europe to treat “consumer preferences”
as a “fourth hurdle” that technologies must overcome in order to obtain regulatory approval).
Had Europe only invoked strong consumer opposition to hormone-treated beef in this manner, the
Appellate Body would have been forced to explicate the scope of the SPS Agreement in relation to
scientifically unsupported regulations that nevertheless respond to sincere consumer demands for
information. Cf. Alan O. Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 412 (2003)
(noting that if the policy behind the E.U. ban on the importation of hormone-treated beef “could
be restated as one of ensuring that consumers are protected against unwitting ingestion of hormone residues that they might prefer to avoid,” then labeling would provide a less traderestrictive means of accomplishing this goal). Presently, the European Union continues to ban
hormone-treated beef imports on the ground that scientific risk assessments conducted subsequent
to the Appellate Body decision establish a specific health risk from the ingestion of hormonetreated beef. See European Union, Hormones in Meat — Introduction, at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/food/food/chemicalsafety/contaminants/hormones/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
168 To turn the question around, must a ban on child pornography also be based on a purely
instrumentalist assessment of its harmful consequences? Although the SPS Agreement would not
apply to such a ban, the requirements of the TBT Agreement and GATT/WTO jurisprudence
more generally would. Thus, the question is not entirely academic. Cf. Robert Howse, The World
Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131,
143–44 (1999) (noting that a rigid process/product distinction might raise questions regarding the
permissibility under the GATT of a ban on pornography “made with children or involving (but
not necessarily depicting) involuntary acts of sex and other illegal violence”).
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objection play in international trade law when viewed separately from
empirical evidence that might or might not support the ban from a
purely instrumental perspective?169
As these questions indicate, the GM dispute challenges more than
simply the manner in which international treaties are interpreted.
Rather, as Richard Stewart has noted, the dispute poses fundamental
questions regarding the normative foundation and the institutional design of contemporary international trade.170 Many Europeans believe
that GM foods implicate not only scientific questions about the environment and human health and safety, but also important moral and
cultural questions regarding the production of food.171 Thus, through
the GM foods controversy, the WTO will find itself in the uncomfortable position of either, on the one hand, dismissing long-cherished aspects of European culture as insufficient bases for domestic regulation
or, on the other hand, accepting the legitimacy of Europe’s interests
while opening the door to a stream of moral or cultural justifications
for trade regulations that will be difficult for complaining nations to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
169 Under the TBT Agreement, product regulations must be no more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a “legitimate objective.” TBT AGREEMENT, supra note 76, art. 2.2. The Agreement, however, provides only a suggestive list of what counts as a “legitimate objective,” see id.
(“[L]egitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; prevention of deceptive
practices; the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.”), leaving one to wonder whether the satisfaction of consumer interest alone would constitute a sufficient purpose to support labeling regulations. Similarly, under the GATT, Article
XX(a) contains an exception for trade measures “necessary to protect public morals.” GATT, supra note 54, art. XX(a). However, as Steve Charnovitz notes in his exhaustive review of the history of morally based trade measures, the scope and significance of the exception is “uncharted in
trade jurisprudence.” Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L L.
689, 690 (1998). At least one commentator regards the public morals exception as an outdated
provision that should remain unused: “In the polyvalent society of the Global Market Place there
is, of course, small room for individual ethics. Ethics are not a permitted ground for restricting
trade pursuant to Article XX of GATT 1994.” Bentley, supra note 74, at 130.
170 Richard B. Stewart, The Challenge of GMOs to International Governance of Trade and
Environmental Regulation (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School library).
171 See Compton, supra note 164, at 383 (noting that the European Union requires labels “to
provide information to consumers, for health reasons, for ethical reasons and to prevent them
from being misled”) (footnotes omitted); Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the United States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525,
526 (1998) (“The culture and attitudes of European citizens have tended to favor traditional foods
and minimal processing, while being skeptical of new technologies.”); Drew L. Kershen, Innovations in Biotechnology — Public Perceptions and Cultural Attitudes: An American Viewpoint, 3
GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS 1, 13 (2003) (“Europeans, to a greater percentage than Americans, consider scientific evidence irrelevant. What is relevant is protecting the religious and ethical purity
of food.”); cf. Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,790, 10,798 (2001) (noting that opposition to GM foods “arises not merely from diverging interpretations of the limited empirical data,” but also from “[c]onflicting national and cultural values . . . including control over what we eat, and attitudes toward science, sovereignty, and capitalism”).
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falsify. In either case, the integrity of the modern trading regime will
be seriously strained.
C. Commercial Speech and “Mere Consumer Concern”
A final example of the process/product distinction appears in rudimentary form under the First Amendment. Recent commercial speech
litigation has generated a new free speech principle, according to
which the satisfaction of “consumer curiosity” is an insufficient state
interest to support laws that require manufacturers to provide consumers with process information through labeling or other means of
disclosure. Just as the international law of trade tends to view consumer interest alone as an insufficient basis for sustaining processbased trade measures, a well-known Second Circuit opinion in International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy172 regarded “mere consumer
concern” about “production methods” as an inadequate justification for
mandatory state disclosure rules.173 Additionally, litigants in the recent Nike, Inc. v. Kasky174 appeal attempted to push the process/product concept further, offering the distinction as a new test for
separating corporate publicity into commercial and core speech. Under this test, information concerning products would constitute commercial speech subject to traditional false advertising regulation, while
information concerning processes would constitute core speech entitled
to the full protection of the First Amendment.175 In combination,
these developments suggest a consumer marketplace in which process
information may become comparatively privileged against disclosure
and verification.
1. International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy: Mandatory Disclosure of Process Information. — In 1993, Monsanto Corporation’s synthetic bovine growth hormone, Posilac, became the first widely marketed agricultural product to be developed using modern
biotechnology.176 Formally known as recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST), Monsanto’s product boosts the milk production of cows by
mimicking the effects of naturally occurring bovine hormones.177
Monsanto contends, and the FDA agreed in its review of Posilac, that
no discernable differences exist between milk obtained from rbSTtreated cows and nontreated cows.178 Accordingly, the FDA approved
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
172
173
174
175
176

92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 73 n.1, 73–74.
123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (order dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted).
See infra pp. 576–77.
See David Aboulafia, Pushing RBST: How the Law and the Political Process Were Used To
Sell Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin to America, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 603, 605–06 (1998).
177 See id. at 604–05.
178 Id. at 615–16.
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the drug for commercial use despite a rash of controversy including
congressional investigations,179 intense public criticism,180 and internal
dissent within the Agency.181 In addition, consistent with its general
stance regarding the products of genetic engineering technologies, the
FDA issued labeling guidelines that not only failed to require milk
from rbST-treated cows to be labeled as such, but also cast doubt on
the ability of other retailers to identify their product as the milk of
nontreated cows.182
Given the uncertainty and controversy surrounding rbST, it was
only natural that disputes involving the product would spill over into
forums other than the FDA, including the courts. In the first lawsuit
involving rbST, a group of “American consumers of commercially sold
dairy products” challenged both the FDA’s decision to approve rbST
for general use and the Agency’s failure to require labeling of rbSTderived dairy products.183 Despite finding that rbST causes a number
of adverse health effects in cows and potentially poses health risks to
humans,184 the district court nevertheless concluded that the FDA did
not act arbitrarily or capriciously given the administrative record before the Agency at the time of rbST’s approval.185 Moreover, the court
found that although rbST may increase levels of a protein hormone
that has unknown long-term health consequences, this product difference, even if demonstrated, would not be “organoleptic” to the consumer — that is, it would not be “capable of being detected by a hu–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
179 See id. at 614–15, 621–24 (describing investigatory actions by the General Accounting Office
and congressional leaders during and after the FDA rbST approval process).
180 Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809, 865 (1995) (“No other recent legal
event in American agriculture . . . has provoked as much agrarian anger as the [FDA’s] decision to
permit the use of rbST in milk production.”).
181 See Aboulafia, supra note 176, at 623 (noting that “an anonymous letter, circulated by FDA
employees, . . . raised the issue of bias in the FDA approval process”).
182 To eliminate FDA concerns that an rbST-free label would mislead consumers, the Agency
told any producer choosing to label its milk as rbST-free to include on all product packages a contextual disclaimer such as: “No significant difference has been shown between milk derived from
rbST-treated cows and non–rbST-treated cows.” Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of
Milk and Milk Products from Cows That Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine
Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279, 6280 (Feb. 10, 1994). The guidelines also suggested that states
should impose a substantial record-keeping burden on any firm making an “rbST-free” claim,
stating that the firm might face administrative action “in the face of circumstantial evidence that
it is using rbST or selling milk from treated cows [despite claims to the contrary].” Id. Critics
were quick to point out that these guidelines were “strikingly similar” to language contained in a
Monsanto legal memorandum that the company had used to warn companies not to label their
products as “BGH free.” Aboulafia, supra note 176, at 617. Michael Taylor, a former Monsanto
attorney who had advised the company on food labeling issues, approved and signed the labeling
guidelines while serving as an FDA official. See Anne Miller, Time for Government To Get Moooving: Facing up to RbST Labeling Problem, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 503, 519 n.181 (1995).
183 Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
184 Id. at 1183–85.
185 Id. at 1190–93.
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man sense organ.”186 Absent such a detectable difference in the end
product itself, and irrespective of the degree of consumer demand for
information about the use of rbST, the court concluded that the FDA
was correct in its determination that it lacked authority to require labeling based merely on differences in production processes.187
Opponents of rbST have had more success on the state level. Following the FDA’s issuance of interim labeling guidelines, a number of
states moved to formalize voluntary programs for labeling dairy goods
that were produced from non–rbST-treated cows.188 One state, Vermont, adopted a mandatory labeling scheme under which retailers
were required to place a blue dot on products that contained or might
have contained milk from rbST-treated cows.189 In accordance with
the FDA interim guidelines, the Vermont labeling regulations required
a disclaimer that “the [FDA] has determined that there is no significant
difference between milk from treated and untreated cows.”190 In addition, however, the regulations also required notice that “[i]t is the law
of Vermont that products made from the milk of rbST-treated cows be
labeled to help consumers make informed shopping decisions.”191
A consortium of dairy manufacturers and food retailers challenged
the Vermont statute and regulatory scheme in International Dairy
Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy.192 The dairy producers argued that preliminarily enjoining operation of the labeling scheme was appropriate in
light of its likely impermissibility under the First Amendment. The
Second Circuit agreed, reasoning that because “neither consumers nor
scientists can distinguish rBST-derived milk from milk produced by an
untreated cow,”193 the only plausible state interest in support of the
Vermont labeling rule was “mere consumer concern”194 about “production methods.”195 In the court’s view, “consumer curiosity alone” could

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
186 Id. at 1193. For a discussion of evidence linking this hormone to the development of various cancers, see George Davey Smith et al., Cancer and Insulin-Like Growth Factor-I: A Potential
Mechanism Linking the Environment with Cancer Risk, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 847 (2000).
187 Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1193.
188 See Terence J. Centner & Kyle W. Lathrop, Labeling rbST-Derived Milk Products: State
Responses to Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 511, 535–50 (1997); Jennifer R. Thornley, Note, Got
“Hormone-Free” Milk?: Your State May Have Enough Interest To Let You Know, 76 IND. L.J.
785, 799–801 (2001).
189 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69–70 (2d Cir. 1996).
190 Id. at 70 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Adopted Rules: rBST Notification and Labeling Regulations Relating to Milk and Milk Products, Vt. Gov’t Reg. § 3.1b (1995)).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 67.
193 Id. at 73.
194 Id. at 73 n.1.
195 Id. at 74.
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not support a law that required manufacturers and retailers to disclose
“even an accurate, factual statement” against their will.196
In a stinging dissent, Judge Leval first chastised the majority for
failing to appreciate the full range of considerations behind the Vermont statute, which, on his reading of the record, included “concerns
about human health, cow health, biotechnology, and the survival of
small dairy farms.”197 According to Judge Leval, the majority’s attempt to distill these multifarious concerns into a single catchphrase —
“consumer curiosity” — seriously distorted the policy purposes behind
the Vermont legislation.198 Additionally, the dissent sharply criticized
the majority’s implicit presumption that an FDA failure to find any
“significant difference” between milk from treated and nontreated
cows eliminated entirely the possibility that health and safety concerns
might justify the statute.199 In the face of scientific uncertainty —
which inarguably characterized the rbST situation, at least regarding
long-term consequences for human and animal health — Judge Leval
reasoned that states might adopt a range of regulatory stances, some
more cautious and consumer-focused than the FDA’s.200
As the majority noted, however, Judge Leval’s dissent failed to distinguish between the interests that consumers might espouse in favor
of a state disclosure law and the interests that the state actually invokes. Significantly, when defending its regulatory scheme, Vermont
refused to take a position on whether rbST is safe for human consumption.201 Instead, Vermont simply argued that “its citizens are entitled to have information which assists them in making purchases
consistent with their beliefs on the appropriateness of rBST use.”202
Thus, the process/product distinction was presented in sharp relief to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
196
197

Id.
Id. at 76 (Leval, J., dissenting); see also id. at 75 (listing “concerns about FDA determinations about the product as regards health and safety or about recombinant gene technology, concerns about the effect of the product on bovine health; and concerns about the effect of the product on the existing surplus of milk and in the dairy farm industry’s economic status and wellbeing” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
198 Id. at 76.
199 See id. at 77 (“To suggest that a government agency’s failure to find a health risk in a shortterm study of a new genetic technology should bar a state from requiring simple disclosure of the
use of that technology where its citizens are concerned about such health risks would be unreasonable and dangerous.”).
200 Id. at 76–77.
201 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 92 F.3d at 73 n.1 (“Vermont takes no position on whether rBST is
beneficial or detrimental.” (quoting International Dairy Food Ass’n v. Amestoy, 898 F. Supp. 241,
252 (D. Vt. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Of course, the two required messages under the Vermont labeling regime — one espousing the FDA’s conclusion about health effects from
rbST and the other indicating Vermont’s desire that consumers have a basis for making “informed
shopping decisions” — seemed to carry the implicit message that, regardless of the FDA’s position,
Vermont believed its consumers should be concerned about the use of rbST.
202 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 898 F. Supp. at 252.
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the Second Circuit panel: Vermont consumers desired information regarding a process that, all parties agreed for purposes of litigation, did
not result in products that were tangibly different from those of competing process methods. In that regard, Judge Leval’s attempt to examine directly the grounds of “consumer curiosity” and to question the
empirical basis of the FDA’s “no significant difference” finding was an
attempt to resolve a different case than the one before the court.203
Although the International Dairy holding has yet to receive wide
reinforcement in constitutional caselaw, the process/product distinction
that it articulates has become a prominent argument raised by opponents of product labeling requirements.204 Additionally, Monsanto has
aggressively challenged voluntary labeling by producers of milk from
nontreated cows, claiming that such process information is misleading
to consumers unless accompanied by a statement that “[s]cientific stud–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
203 Judge Leval recognized the distinction and therefore urged Vermont to revise its stance on
remand to include more than “mere[] consumer curiosity” among its justifications for the mandatory labeling program. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 92 F.3d at 81 (Leval, J., dissenting). Perhaps in
recognition of the force of Judge Leval’s argument — binding facts to the contrary notwithstanding — the International Dairy majority expressed reluctance regarding its holding at several
points in its discussion. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 92 F.3d at 73 (“We do not doubt that Vermont’s asserted interest, the demand of its citizenry for such information, is genuine; reluctantly,
however, we conclude that it is inadequate.”); id. at 74 (“[T]he Court is sympathetic to the Vermont consumers who wish to know which products may derive from rBST-treated herds . . . .”).
Nevertheless, the court ultimately concluded that it would be unwise to allow “consumer interest
alone” to justify mandatory disclosure of information “about a production method that has no discernable impact on a final product,” reasoning that such disclosure obligations could multiply uncontrollably. Id. at 73–74. More recently, a Second Circuit panel upheld a Vermont statutory
scheme that required manufacturers to label certain products containing mercury in order to facilitate proper disposal of the products by consumers. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272
F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001). The court distinguished International Dairy on the ground that
Vermont’s interest went beyond merely satisfying “consumer curiosity” to affirmatively “protecting human health and the environment from mercury poisoning.” Id. at 115 n.6. Although the
court recognized that the state’s environmental goals were “inextricably intertwined with the goal
of increasing consumer awareness of the presence of mercury in a variety of products,” the statute
passed constitutional muster in part because Vermont did not defend it based solely on consumer
awareness for its own sake. Id. at 115.
204 For instance, a recent decision by the FDA to require that trans fatty acids be declared on
food and supplement nutrition labels was opposed on the ground that “the government cannot
compel speech when disclosures are not necessary to materially alleviate real consumer harm.”
Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health
Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434, 41,439 (July 11, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (noting
citations of International Dairy by commentators to support the quoted statement). Similarly, the
USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service’s mandatory labeling regulations for irradiated food
were challenged on the ground that “consumer desire to know how food was processed is not
alone sufficient to justify mandatory disclosure of the processing.” Irradiation of Meat Food
Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,150, 72,158 (Dec. 23, 1999) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 381, 424).
The Agency rejected this argument, not because it necessarily disagreed with the legal proposition, but because it found that the irradiation process can result in actual material alterations to
the treated products that are “not obvious to consumers in the absence of labeling.” Id. For further discussion and criticism of this reasoning, see infra pp. 591–92.
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ies conclude that the use of rBST to improve milk production does not
change the nutrition, taste, quality, or any other health or safety characteristics of milk.”205 Shortly after publication of the FDA labeling
guidelines, for instance, the company sued two dairies that used “rbSTfree” labels and wrote to over two thousand other producers, threatening legal action if they should do the same.206
More recently, Monsanto argued that the Maine Quality Trademark
for Milk and Milk Products, a voluntary program used to certify instate dairy producers who do not use rbST, constitutes misleading advertising and imposes an unlawful restriction on market access.207
When the Maine Attorney General rejected these arguments,208 Monsanto responded by suing a leading Maine dairy under the Lanham
Act in federal district court, charging that its product label (“Our
Farmers’ Pledge: No Artificial Growth Hormones”) constitutes a misleading representation of fact and indirectly disparages rbST.209 In its
suit, Monsanto contended that “[b]ecause there is no known way to tell
the difference between milk from cows supplemented with Posilac and
milk from other cows,” the marketing and sale of milk from cows that
have not been treated with rbST cannot constitute “any kind of legitimate marketing advantage.”210 This argument would seem to imply
that, in Monsanto’s view, consumers also cannot express any kind of
legitimate preference for the use of manufacturing processes that do
not result in identifiable physical differences in end products.
2. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: Voluntary Disclosure of Process Information. — While International Dairy suggests that process information
should be privileged against mandatory disclosure in the absence of
some demonstrated environmental, health, or safety effect, arguments
recently offered in Kasky211 suggest that process information also
should be insulated from false advertising regulation when manufacturers provide it voluntarily. To defend itself against charges of ex–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
205 Press Release, Monsanto Co., Monsanto Statement Regarding Oakhurst Dairy Inc. Filing,
available at http://www.monsantodairy.com/updates/OakhurstDairyInc.Filing.html (last visited
Nov. 14, 2004).
206 See Thornley, supra note 188, at 799.
207 See Letter from G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, State of Maine, to Joan Z. Bernstein,
Esquire (Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www.KeepMaineFree.org/AttorneyGeneral2.pdf.
208 See id.
209 See Complaint for an Injunction, Monsanto Co. v. Oakhurst Dairy Inc., No. 03-11273RCL
(D. Mass. filed July 3, 2003).
210 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Monsanto Company’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 13, Monsanto Co. v. Oakhurst Dairy Inc., No. 03-11273RCL (D. Mass. filed July 3,
2003). The parties ultimately settled the litigation when the Oakhurst Dairy agreed to add the
following disclaimer to its label: “FDA States: No significant difference in milk from cows treated
with artificial growth hormones.” Edward D. Murphy, Oakhurst To Alter Its Label, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, Dec. 25, 2003, at 1A, available at 2003 WL 58374343.
211 See 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003); 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
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ploitative labor practices, Nike conducted an extensive publicity campaign in the late 1990s that depicted the company as a socially responsible employer.212 Pursuant to an unusual state consumer protection
regime that at the time allowed “any person acting for the interests
of . . . the general public” to bring an action for equitable relief,213
California resident Marc Kasky challenged several of the factual
claims made by Nike as false and misleading. An important preliminary question for the California courts in assessing Kasky’s claims was
whether to characterize Nike’s statements as commercial or noncommercial speech.214 By portraying its publicity campaign as noncommercial speech, Nike sought the benefit of the heightened constitutional protection afforded to speech on matters of public concern, a
status that would render portions of the California consumer protection law constitutionally suspect.215
The California court rejected Nike’s argument, holding instead that
“when a corporation, to maintain and increase its sales and profits,
makes public statements defending labor practices and working conditions at factories where its products are made, those public statements
are commercial speech that may be regulated to prevent consumer deception.”216 To be sure, the court noted, Nike’s speech is protected to
the full extent of the First Amendment when it constitutes general discussion of issues such as the value of globalization or the status of developing world labor conditions.217 When, on the other hand, the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
212 Nike’s efforts included press statements, letters to newspaper editors, and letters to heads of
collegiate athletic programs. See Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2554 (2003).
213 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 1997). For the structure of the regime generally, see
Unfair Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–17210 (West 1997); and False Advertising Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500–17509 (West 1997). For a discussion of the California statute and the constitutional issues that it raises, see Trevor Morrison, Private Attorneys
General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
214 The Court has described the proposal of a commercial transaction as “the test for identifying commercial speech.” Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–74 (1989); see
also United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (noting that commercial speech
is “usually defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction”); City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993) (following the formula articulated
in Fox). In an earlier decision, the Court referred more vaguely to factors such as whether the
manufacturer conceded that its speech constituted advertising, whether it referred to a specific
product, and whether the manufacturer had an economic motivation for speaking. See Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).
215 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64–65 (“[T]he Constitution accords less protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression.”). Specifically, by casting
its communications as noncommercial speech, Nike hoped to benefit from the heightened scienter
standard that must be met prior to the imposition of tort liability for statements relating to matters of public concern. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66, 279–80 (1964); see
also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388–89
(1967).
216 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262.
217 Id. at 261.
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speech consists of “factual statements about how Nike makes its products”218 designed to appeal to a consumer audience, it is subject to the
less stringent level of scrutiny for commercial speech outlined by the
Supreme Court in its Central Hudson test.219 Notably, as part of its
conclusion that Nike’s speech was motivated by the prospect of economic gains, the California court observed that process information of
the type offered by Nike frequently constitutes an important criterion
for consumer decisionmaking.220 Indeed, by reading the Supreme
Court’s definition of commercial speech expansively to include, among
other things, “statements about the manner in which . . . products are
manufactured,” the court seemed specifically to reject any distinction
between processes and products for purposes of its analysis.221
Nike’s appeal from the California Supreme Court attracted thirtyone amicus briefs and widespread public attention.222 Much of the
discussion in the court filings centered on the distinction between corporate speech that concerns processes as opposed to products, with
Nike and its supporters advancing the argument that speech concerning process information is necessarily noncommercial speech, and
therefore entitled to full First Amendment protection. Nike’s brief, for
instance, argued that commercial speech should consist only of statements that relate to “the qualities of a product as such (like its price,
availability, or suitability).”223 Similarly, in its amicus filing, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce proposed a test for commercial speech that explicitly incorporated a process/product distinction: “only speech that in
some way advertises the attributes of products or services for sale
should be considered ‘commercial speech,’ and speech that merely re-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
218
219

Id.
Under the test set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electricity Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), a restriction on commercial speech may be upheld even when the
commercial speech “concern[s] lawful activity” and is not “misleading,” so long as “the asserted
governmental interest is substantial,” “the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted,” and the regulation is “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Id. at
566.
220 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262 (“For a significant segment of the buying public, labor practices
do matter in making consumer choices.”).
221 See id. at 257; see also Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 727–29 (9th
Cir. 1994) (concluding that merchants’ environmental representations constitute commercial
speech).
222 See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2560 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari).
223 Brief for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 898993, at *21 (emphasis
added). Nike’s phrasing in this sentence bears a striking resemblance to the language used by the
Tuna/Dolphin panel when it first announced the process/product distinction as part of
GATT/WTO jurisprudence. See supra p. 542.
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lates to business operations or other matters of public concern should
be accorded full First Amendment protection.”224
Nike also challenged the California Supreme Court’s acceptance of
the notion that consumers express preferences for processes as part of
their market behavior, arguing instead that “[t]here is only the most attenuated link between public statements on important social, political,
and moral issues — which generate heated responses and debate —
and consumer purchasing decisions.”225 To the extent that some consumers do appear to care about factors such as whether a good was
produced using sweatshop labor, unsustainable harvesting techniques,
animal cruelty, or other objectionable practices, Nike argued that such
consumers act “for non-economic reasons.”226 A brief filed by three
advertising trade groups seconded this view, asserting that “[t]he consumer’s concern is [only] about the price of the product and whether
the product works as it should.”227 Beyond those spare attributes, the
advertisers argued, consumers have no interest in corporate or processrelated information, at least not in their capacity as consumers.228
In contrast, supporters of the California court’s decision repeatedly
cited the importance of process information to consumer decisionmaking as evidence that Nike’s speech was primarily commercial in nature.229 As Erwin Chemerinsky wrote on behalf of several members of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
224 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Support of Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 835350, at *12; see also Reply Brief
for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 1922453, at *6 (arguing that the
category of commercial speech “encompasses product advertising, product labels, and other
statements touting the attributes of a product . . . such as its price, how it performs, or where it
may be purchased”); Brief Amici Curiae of Forty Leading Newspapers, Magazines, Broadcasters,
Wire-Services, and Media-Related Professional and Trade Associations in Support of Petitioners,
Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 835613, at *28 (“Accordingly, this Court should hold
here unequivocally that only speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction —
that is, speech that does no more than promote tangible qualities of a product or service in a traditional advertising format — may be treated as commercial speech and subjected to strict liability rules such as the California laws at issue here.”); Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil
Liberties Union and the ACLU of Northern California in Support of Petitioner, Kasky (No. 02575), available in 2003 WL 721563, at *13–14 (“The challenged statements do not concern the
price or safety of any Nike product, nor are they even alleged to provide any misleading information about the product’s essential purpose or function. Absent these considerations, there is no
justification for treating Nike’s statements as transaction driven speech.”).
225 Brief for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 898993, at *36.
226 Id. at *22.
227 Brief of Amici Curiae the Association of National Advertising, Inc., the American Advertising Federation, and the American Association of Advertising Agencies in Support of Petitioners,
Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 835112, at *22.
228 See id. (“To the extent that a consumer brings his or her own political views about the company into purchasing decisions, the consumer is taking the purchase out of the realm of commercial speech and into the realm of political, noncommercial speech.”).
229 Brief for Global Exchange as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Kasky (No. 02-575),
available in 2003 WL 1844651, at *14–15 (“Consumers have indicated that they value the character of the labor input into a product just as they would any other product attribute.”); Brief of
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Congress, “[t]he position taken by Nike and its amici fails to recognize
that consumers may care more about the conditions under which
goods are produced . . . than the price, ingredients, or caloric content.”230 Refusing to acknowledge these aspects of consumer preference, the respondent and its amici argued, leads to an unduly narrow
view of commercial speech and its role in contemporary market
society.
The Court dismissed certiorari in Kasky as improvidently
granted,231 and soon thereafter Nike settled the litigation by agreeing
to contribute $1.5 million to a workers’ rights organization.232 Nevertheless, the constitutional questions presented by the case will be
raised again. More than any speech case the Court has heard before,
Kasky illustrates the instability of the First Amendment divide between core and commercial speech.233 Because the Court previously
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Domini Social Investments LLC, KLD Research & Analytics, Inc., and Harrington Investments,
Inc., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL
1844598, at *2 (“Consumers and investors are increasingly taking social and environmental facts
into account in their purchasing and investment decisions, and thus these facts are properly understood as commercial speech.”); Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of
the United States Congress, Representatives Dennis J. Kucinich, Bernard Sanders, Corrine
Brown, and Bob Filner, Kasky (No. 02-575) [hereinafter Brief of U.S. Congressional Representatives], available in 2003 WL 1844684, at *9 (“Consumers have a variety of concerns when they
buy products, and concerns about the conditions under which products are made are entitled to
no less protection than concerns about price.”); Brief of Amici Curiae the States of California,
Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in Support of Respondent, Kasky (No. 02-575), available
in 2003 WL 1844750, at *8 (“A spokesperson from Reebok openly stated that ‘consumers today
hold companies accountable for the way products are made, not just the quality of the product
itself.’” (quoting Su-Ping Lu, Note, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human
Rights Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 603, 624 (2000))); Brief
of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 21012624, at *6 (“Labor practices, as with other intangible aspects of products, are an established basis of consumer
choice.”). Significantly, the United States also adopted this position, though it sided with Nike in
the dispute, arguing that the private attorney general aspect of California’s statutory scheme rendered it constitutionally infirm. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 899100, at *28 (“In today’s environment, the
means used to produce goods, no less than the quality of the goods themselves, have profound
significance for some consumers, who are willing to pay more to achieve desirable environmental
or social ends.”). The United States’s private attorney general argument is thoroughly critiqued
in Morrison, supra note 213 (manuscript at 54–61, 68–79, on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
230 Brief of U.S. Congressional Representatives, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL
1844684 at *3.
231 123 S. Ct. at 2554 (2003) (order dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted).
232 William McCall, Nike Free-Speech Case Settled for $1.5 Million, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 13,
2003, at C1.
233 Even before Kasky, the Court had recognized this instability. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (observing “the difficulty of drawing bright lines
that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “the borders of the
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has described commercial speech as “expression solely related to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience,”234 a critical focus
of the briefing in Kasky was how to characterize the interests that consumers have in receiving representations concerning a producer’s labor
practices: do such representations “shape[] moral conclusions in the
first instance and affect[] purchasing choices only secondarily, if at
all,”235 as Nike put it, or do they “provide consumers with information
about the circumstances under which goods are produced so that they
can rely on the information in their purchasing decisions,”236 as Kasky
put it? The answer, discussed in Part II, is naturally more complicated
than either of these depictions suggest.
II. THE REGULATION OF CONSUMER CHOICE
Despite the aspiration of market liberalism to avoid judging or interfering with the choices of individual actors, “[i]n many situations,
some organization or agent must make a choice that will affect the
choices of some other people.”237 Government regulation of the informational environment of consumers represents a strong example of
this kind of unavoidable paternalism. By influencing the amount of
information that must or may be disclosed to consumers regarding
product manufacturing practices, governments also influence the patterns of consumer preference that emerge following the regulatory decision.238 As the previous Part demonstrates, a particular vision of
consumer decisionmaking is being offered to policymakers who are
faced with these inevitably paternalistic decisions, a vision in which
consumers scrutinize price, performance, and safety characteristics of
products, but do not question or concern themselves in their role as
consumers with the broader economic, social, and environmental context within which products are manufactured.
The process/product distinction and related legal developments appear in response to a variety of overlapping concerns. For instance,
rather than allow nations to accommodate citizens’ process-related
demands through unchecked and potentially protectionist actions, the
law of international trade strives to ensure that domestic regulations
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
commercial speech category are not nearly as clear as the Court has assumed”). Moreover, Steven
Shiffrin argued well before these observations that the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy
displays insufficient sensitivity to the fact that “the commercial speech problem is in fact many
problems.” Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1216 (1983).
234 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
235 Brief for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 898993, at *36.
236 Brief for Respondent, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 1844849, at *33.
237 Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 175.
238 See infra pp. 628–32.
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rely on adequate scientific justification and do not appear to reach too
far beyond consumers’ immediate environments. Rather than subject
complex technologies such as genetic engineering to the potentially erratic market test of consumer choice, the substantial equivalence doctrine holds that most products of recombinant DNA techniques do not
differ significantly from their conventional counterparts and therefore
do not require special regulatory treatment or product labeling.
Rather than permit discovery and scrutiny of all aspects of a product’s
history by actors who may misconstrue, exploit, or chill the provision
of such information, commercial speech doctrine stands ready to narrow the circumstances under which states may mandate or regulate
corporate disclosure of process information. In short, the process/product distinction and its related developments function as ready devices
for determining when regulations are likely to have drifted beyond the
satisfaction of legitimate consumer interest into areas of disguised protectionism, unjustified alarm, or excessive encroachment onto competing interests.
This Part assesses the strength of the case for the process/product
distinction, both by reexamining the assumed content of process preferences and by evaluating those preferences within their domestic and
international regulatory contexts. Although proponents of the process/product distinction tend to view manufacturing processes as especially unreliable bases for consumer distinction, process preferences on
close examination appear to reflect coherent, well-grounded consumer
viewpoints, essentially indistinguishable from other aspects of preference that have been regarded as unassailable within the liberal market
framework. Moreover, although undoubtedly a partial and unsatisfactory substitute for more traditional forms of political activity, processbased consumer activities nevertheless resonate well with a variety of
forces that have combined to place the consumer and the market at the
center of twenty-first century culture and governance. Accordingly, in
the search for vehicles of public expression and social organization that
might help to close the “democracy deficits” created by the forces of
globalization,239 process preferences present an unlikely but promising
candidate.
A. Comprehending Preferences for Processes
To begin an assessment of the normative case in favor of the process/product distinction, this section asks an important preliminary
question that sometimes attracts only passing attention from proponents of the doctrine: why exactly is it that consumers seem to prefer
certain manufacturing processes in the absence of any tangible impact
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
239

See infra pp. 634–35.

2004]

PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES

581

from those processes on the product itself? Why, in other words, do
GM food products that are “substantially equivalent” to traditional
foods nevertheless spark boycotts, street protests, international trade
disputes, and enormous expenditures on organic alternatives? Why
are inexpensive textile imports greeted by some consumers with hesitation and discomfort, rather than with admiration (or indifference) at
the fact that modern trading has harnessed developing-world labor for
the convenience of Northern consumers?240
As will be seen, the answers to these questions significantly complicate the effort to resolve important policy debates through an imagined
distinction between products and processes. This section examines
three separate perspectives on process preferences. The first treats
consumer process preferences as most critics have: by examining the
essentially empirical question whether acting on such preferences will
achieve the apparent policy aim of the consumer or whether, instead,
consumers are especially likely to misjudge the effect of purchasing
goods for process-related reasons. It will be argued that critics of
process preferences often fail to account fully for the social, economic,
and environmental consequences of production processes, such that the
grounds of consumer attitudes with respect to those processes remain
insufficiently appreciated. Properly understood, these grounds diminish much of the force of the instrumental critique of consumer preferences for processes.
Moreover, there are important alternative ways of understanding
process preferences that do not depend so critically on debatable scientific and economic questions regarding the consequences of consumption. In particular, the two remaining accounts of consumer process
preferences provided in this section describe their expressive and ethical dimensions, seeking to understand such preferences from the viewpoint of the consumer herself, rather than from an accounting of their
impact on the external world. From these perspectives, it will be argued that process preferences exhibit many of the features that traditionally have defined an individual’s sphere of autonomy within the
liberal political framework. That is, in addition to whatever role they
may play as mechanisms for instrumental change, process-based purchases also represent a significant vehicle through which individuals
both project their public views and practice their core moral convictions. In those respects, there is little theoretical justification for denigrating process preferences in the manner that the process/product distinction implies.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
240 Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CAL. L. REV. 885, 892 (2003) (“[I]f one
is wholly unconcerned about the welfare of foreigners, foreign labor practices that reduce the cost
of production — no matter how abhorrent — are not a cause for concern.”).
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1. The Instrumental Account. — One notable exception to the
process/product distinction occurs in a federal labeling requirement for
products developed using chlorofluorocarbons and other ozonedepleting substances.241 Adopted as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, the requirement mandates inclusion by product manufacturers of “a clearly legible and conspicuous label stating: ‘Warning:
Manufactured with [insert name of substance], a substance which
harms public health and environment by destroying ozone in the upper
atmosphere.’”242 Thus, despite the fact that products manufactured
with ozone-depleting substances appear indistinguishable from substitute wares manufactured without such substances, and despite the fact
that end users may be harmed in only an indirect sense by ozonedepleting substances used to manufacture a particular product, Congress nevertheless felt that consumer awareness of this process information would aid the effort to resolve the international ozone crisis.243
In a world characterized by consumption practices with complex
and far-reaching consequences, actions of the sort taken by Congress
in the case of ozone-depleting substances may grow in significance.
Already, voluntary efforts to bridge the gap between products and
processes are proliferating. For instance, member organizations of the
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling
Alliance certify products from a diverse range of production processes,
including sustainable forestry (Forest Stewardship Council), sustainable fishing (Marine Stewardship Council), organic and sustainable agriculture (International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements,
International Organic Accreditation Service), and socially accountable
labor (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, Social Accountability International).244 In addition, websites such as behindthelabel.org, corpwatch.org, sweatshops.org, and responsibleshopper.org
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
241
242
243

See 42 U.S.C. § 7671j(d)(1) (2000).
Id.
Indeed, the EPA’s implementing regulations for the statute indicated strong awareness of
the possibility that labeling might spur the development and satisfaction of consumer process
preferences, which in turn might inspire changes in the environmental impact of production processes. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,166, 19,169 (proposed May 4, 1992)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (“The increased ability of consumers to express a preference for
products not using controlled substances would create a market-based incentive for manufacturers to find and utilize substitutes for ozone-depleting substances that reduce the overall risk to
human health and the environment.”). In practice, however, the labeling requirement turned out
to be less significant than anticipated, given the rapidity with which Class I ozone-depleting substances were phased out. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING ISSUES,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES WORLDWIDE B-162 (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/epp/
pubs/envlab/wwlabel3.pdf.
244 Int’l Soc. & Envtl. Accreditation & Labelling Alliance, ISEAL Members, at http://www.
isealalliance.org/membership/founding.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
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provide more detailed information regarding manufacturing practices
than the spare medium of a packaging label can provide.245
Such programs appear to be meeting with success. For instance,
spurred by increasing consumer awareness and the development of a
uniform federal labeling program, the organic food movement has expanded from a little-understood fringe element to the fastest growing
segment of American agriculture, with U.S. sales totaling $7.8 billion
in the year 2000.246 Demand for “fairly traded” coffee, chocolate, bananas, and other goods has grown to the point that Fairtrade Labelling
Organizations International, a leading certification body, now endorses
more than 800,000 producers in forty countries.247 Indeed, according
to the International Federation for Alternative Trade, sales of Fairtrade-labeled goods have increased anywhere from fifteen to forty-two
percent in each of the last five years, reaching an international total of
$260 million in 2002.248 Buoyed by such successes, delegates to the
World Summit of Sustainable Development in Johannesburg recently
called for action at all levels of government to “[d]evelop and
adopt . . . consumer information tools to provide information relating
to sustainable consumption and production.”249
As noted in the previous Part, however, the process/product distinction casts considerable doubt on the legality and desirability of these
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
245 A graduate student in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Media Lab took this
premise one step further by designing a bar code scanner that is linked to a database of information regarding product manufacturers’ labor practices and environmental records. See Will
Wade, A Good Corporate Citizen? This Scanner Can Tell, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at G5. In
that manner, detailed process information can be made available to the consumer at the point of
purchase.
246 See CAROLYN DIMITRI & CATHERINE GREENE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. INFO.
BULLETIN NO. 777, RECENT GROWTH PATTERNS IN THE U.S. ORGANIC FOODS MARKET 2
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib777/aib777.pdf. With respect to
organic food, it is difficult to separate consumers’ beliefs or desires about the processes lying behind the product from their perceptions about physical attributes of the product itself. Nevertheless, to many observers, demand for organic food encompasses not only a desire for reduced pesticide residues and other product-related characteristics, but also, and more fundamentally, a desire
to promote a particular vision of the human role within economic and biotic communities. On
this account, “[o]rganic food is not just about a product; it is a philosophy in which the process of
production is as important as the final result.” Peter Hoffman, Editorial, Going Organic, Clumsily, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at A23; see also INT’L FED’N OF ORGANIC AGRIC. MOVEMENTS,
IFOAM BASIC STANDARDS FOR ORGANIC PRODUCTION AND PROCESSING 9 (2002) (noting that
an aim of organic agriculture is “to support the establishment of an entire production, processing
and distribution chain which is both socially just and ecologically responsible”), available at http://
www.ifoam.org/standard/norms/ibs.pdf.
247 Fairtrade Labelling Orgs. Int’l, FLO: Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, at
http://www.fairtrade.net (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
248 Luuk Zonneveld, 2002–2003: The Year in Review: Labelled Fairtrade, at http://www.
fairtrade.net/sites/news/onetonine/two.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
249 Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20
(2002).
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efforts to downstream process information to consumers. This section
challenges the case for the process/product distinction, arguing that
consumers frequently are not irrational or misguided in their preferences for processes, but rather are expressing different levels of risk
aversion and a wider set of relevant considerations than are regulators.250 This conclusion has significant implications for the variety of
legal disputes that the process/product distinction has been employed
to resolve, including the controversial and uncertain status of processbased trade measures within the international economic system.
(a) Sovereignty of Consumers. — The very structure of market
economies ensures that consumer choices exert an extraordinary level
of influence over the activities of producers. It is not immediately obvious, therefore, why the sphere of influence entrusted to consumers
should be artificially confined to the physical dimensions of the product, excluding all aspects of the product’s processing history that do
not directly bear on price, safety, or functionality. When economist
William Hutt coined the term “consumer sovereignty,” he referred
broadly to “the controlling power exercised by free individuals, in
choosing between ends, over the custodians of the community’s resources,”251 a conception that easily accommodates consumer desires
regarding the conditions of production. Indeed, Hutt regarded this
self-consciously political aspect of consumption as a vital element of
the normative case in favor of capitalism. He wrote: “The consumer is
sovereign when, in his role of citizen, he has not delegated to political
institutions for authoritarian use the power which he can exercise socially through his power to demand (or to refrain from demanding).”252
Hutt’s vision long has been reflected in actual market behavior.
Indeed, almost from its outset, the age of mass production and marketing of consumer goods has generated episodes of consumer activism
designed to catalyze changes in labor standards, factory conditions,
and other processes by which products are made. According to historian Kathryn Kish Sklar, for instance, “[d]uring the first two decades of
the twentieth century the National Consumers’ League . . . constituted
the single most powerful lobbying group for the enactment of labor
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
250 Cf. Franz Xaver Perrez, The Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of Sovereignty, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 515, 527–38 (1998) (describing a variety of externalities that
might foster states’ interest in process information, even when the production processes do not
affect the physical characteristics of products themselves).
251 W.H. Hutt, The Concept of Consumers’ Sovereignty, 50 ECON. J. 66, 66 (1940); cf. Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (“So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure
will be made through numerous private economic decisions.”).
252 W.H. HUTT, ECONOMISTS AND THE PUBLIC: A STUDY OF COMPETITION AND OPINION 257
(1936).
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legislation to protect nonunionized, unskilled workers.”253 An essential
component of this group’s advocacy came in the form of a “Consumers’ White Label Campaign,” which ran from 1898 to 1918 and which
served to “moralize the relationship between consumers and producers” by identifying whether particular goods were manufactured under
sweatshop conditions.254 At its peak, the Consumers’ White Label
Campaign certified goods from sixty producers, including the emerging
retailing giant Wanamaker,255 and helped encourage consumers not
only to support improved labor standards through their purchasing
decisions, but also to begin to think of themselves and their activities
in a public-regarding fashion.256
In a similar manner, sit-ins, boycotts, affirmative purchasing campaigns, and other episodes of commercial activism proved essential to
the success of the civil rights movement throughout the twentieth cen-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
253 Kathryn Kish Sklar, The Consumers’ White Label Campaign of the National Consumers’
League, 1898–1918, in GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONSUMER
SOCIETIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17, 17 (Susan Strasser et al. eds., 1998).
254 Id. at 17–18. Specifically, the Consumers’ White Label Campaign assured that garments
bearing its mark were “made under clean and healthful conditions” in accordance with all applicable state manufacturing laws and without the use of overtime or child labor. Id. at 18 (all capitalization omitted). An important predecessor to the labeling campaign consisted of “White Lists”
and “We Don’t Patronize” lists issued by labor unions and women’s consumer groups that enabled
members to purchase products only from union-friendly manufacturers and merchants. See id. at
21–22; MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS: EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH THE
MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA 39 (1999).
255 Sklar, supra note 253, at 24. Wanamaker not only proudly advertised its National Consumers’ League certification, but also set up traveling exhibits with pictures of sweatshop labor juxtaposed against pictures of Wanamaker workers. See id. at 31.
256 See id. at 24–25 (noting that “consumers supporting the White Label campaign became the
vehicle whereby the National Consumers’ League emerged as the single most politically effective
organization of middle-class women in the decades before World War I”). The leader of the National Consumers’ League, Florence Kelley, vowed to continue the campaign until it created nothing less than an entire nation of citizen-consumers practicing ethical consumption. See id. at 27.
Although Kelley’s grandiose vision never materialized, the White Label Campaign did generate a
foundation of support for the National Consumers’ League that ultimately enabled the organization to play a key role in many Progressive Era labor reforms. The League spearheaded litigation
that led to the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the constitutional validity of maximum workday
legislation for female workers in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Id. at 423. Indeed, according to Sklar, Josephine Goldmark, Justice Brandeis’s sister-in-law and a member of the
League, authored the famous Brandeis Brief that heavily influenced the Court’s decision in Muller and that forever changed the role of social science evidence in constitutional advocacy. See
Sklar, supra note 253, at 32; see also LANDON R.Y. STORRS, CIVILIZING CAPITALISM: THE
NATIONAL CONSUMERS’ LEAGUE, WOMEN’S ACTIVISM, AND LABOR STANDARDS IN THE NEW
DEAL ERA 44–46 (2000). Additionally, the League campaigned for minimum wage legislation that
eventually became the basis for the minimum wage provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. As Sklar argues, these political achievements were made possible in no small
part by the League’s earlier success at mobilizing thousands of consumers through the White Label Campaign. See Sklar, supra note 253, at 32–34.
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tury.257 Unquestionably, participants viewed these campaigns as a
means of reforming the economic and moral character of market processes. Black leaders in Lynchburg, Virginia, for instance, sparked an
early boycott of segregated trolley cars by urging consumers: “touch to
the quick of the white man’s pocket” by withholding patronage, for
“’[t]is there his conscience often lies.”258 Throughout Northern cities in
the late 1920s and 1930s, consumer protests sought to widen options
for African-American laborers by appealing, “Don’t Buy Where You
Can’t Work,” or “Spend Your Money Where You Can Work.”259 Activist Ella Baker later worked to solidify this concept of “organizing at
the point of consumption” as a key element of the overall civil rights
movement, a strategy that proved essential to the movement throughout the remainder of the century260 and that ultimately received constitutional recognition from the Supreme Court.261
As these examples demonstrate,262 process-oriented consumer activism enjoys a long pedigree in the United States. The contemporary
critique of process preferences, however, tends to ignore this history by
attributing such preferences to ill-informed personal fears or the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
257 As historian Lizabeth Cohen notes, it is not coincidental that, in addition to the female-led
National Consumers’ League, African Americans were the other major socioeconomic group to
use consumer activism prominently and successfully in pursuit of political goals during the twentieth century. Denied access to traditional avenues of political expression and authority, both
groups “seized upon the citizen consumer role as a new way of upholding the public interest.”
COHEN, supra note 2, at 13.
258 August Meier & Elliott Rudwick, The Boycott Movement Against Jim Crow Streetcars in
the South, 1900–1906, 55 J. AM. HIST. 756, 761 (1969) (quoting LYNCHBURG NEWS, June 9, 1906).
259 COHEN, supra note 2, at 44. Similarly, ministers began to speak of the “Double Duty Dollar,” whereby consumers not only could satisfy their personal needs and desires through purchases, but also could help to improve the economic prospects of African Americans by patronizing black-owned or black-employing businesses. Id. at 48.
260 Id. at 50. Indeed, Cohen contends that, in no small measure, “[m]ass consumption begot a
mass civil rights movement.” Id. at 190.
261 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982) (“In sum, the boycott
clearly involved constitutionally protected activity. The established elements of speech, assembly,
association, and petition, though not identical, are inseparable. Through exercise of these First
Amendment rights, petitioners sought to bring about political, social, and economic change.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally Michael C. Harper, The Consumer’s Emerging Right To Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and Its Implications for
American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409 (1984) (providing a thorough analysis of the Claiborne
Hardware decision and the possibility of a more general constitutional right to boycott).
262 Other notable examples of consumer behavior aimed at altering production processes include the grape boycotts of the late 1960s led by Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 254, at 47–49; the long-running campaign of international activists against Nestlé Corporation in protest of its infant formula marketing
practices in developing nations, see id. at 176–78; the consumer boycott of the 1980s that, in conjunction with other aspects of the anti-Apartheid movement, ultimately led more than 160 U.S.
corporations to cease operations in South Africa, see id. at 172–73; and the early 1990s boycott of
the Cracker Barrel restaurant chain in protest of the company’s anti-gay and -lesbian employment
policy, see id. at 149–50.
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machinations of interest groups. In the past, regulators could not have
convincingly dismissed the Consumers’ White Label Campaign or the
civil rights boycotts as irrational or misled, given that those campaigns
targeted the unequivocally normative goals of economic and political
equality. The process/product distinction, on the other hand, portrays
process preferences as almost inherently illegitimate, in that it confines
the acceptable scope of consumer interest merely to verifiable claims
about physical consequences that are manifest in the end product itself
and that impact the consumer directly.263 Absent such tangible effects,
the consumer’s demand for information regarding processes appears
by definition to be unfounded, and therefore subject to paternalistic
discounting rather than governmental acknowledgment and support.
Consider in this regard the preference of some consumers and
states for small or family-owned producers. To proponents of the
process/product distinction, such preferences are understood as barely
disguised efforts to subsidize or otherwise protect inefficient industries,264 generally with harmful consequences to both domestic consumers and foreign producers.265 Consistent with this view, a GATT
dispute panel ruled in 1992 that certain excise tax credits provided by
the state of Minnesota to small breweries would have been inconsistent
with Article III of the GATT, even if the state had offered such credits
to foreign and domestic breweries on a nondiscriminatory basis.266
The panel rested its ruling on a formalistic determination that brewery
size does not affect beer as a product — foreshadowing the process/product distinction that would be adopted in Tuna/Dolphin I

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
263 See, e.g., Kurt Buechle, The Great, Global Promise of Genetically Modified Organisms:
Overcoming Fear, Misconceptions, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 283, 311 (2001) (contending that labels are more “helpful” to consumers when the
labeled product expresses traits that affect the product’s end uses); Healy, supra note 159, at 239–
40 (stating that “[o]nce the government has determined that a product poses no risks, it is incoherent to require a label that would allow individual decisionmaking based on concerns about the
product that have no basis in fact”).
264 For example, state labeling requirements for rbST-treated milk have been critiqued in this
fashion. See Chen, supra note 180, at 866 (describing state efforts to require or promote rbST labeling and concluding that “[t]he pungent odor of producer protectionism permeates the legislative air”); see also Jim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157, 201–04
(2000) (arguing that, “[i]f anything, smallness and family ownership bear a negative correlation to
environmental protection”).
265 Too often, for instance, measures turn out in practice to direct resources to (nominally) unintended beneficiaries, thereby harming consumers and foreign competitors through artificially inflated prices while simultaneously failing to achieve the very wealth transfer that provided the
publicly avowed purpose for the measure’s passage. Cf. Chen, supra note 264, at 201 (“Farmsector lobbyists readily bamboozle agriculturally illiterate consumers and policymakers . . . .”).
266 United States Measures Affecting Alcohol and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 275 (1993) [hereinafter Beer II].
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shortly thereafter.267 The panel’s underlying concern, however, seemed
to center on the fact that, at the time of the dispute, Canada was home
to few or no microbreweries that would qualify for the Minnesota tax
credit. To the dispute panel, therefore, Minnesota’s policy appeared to
be an unfair attempt to support local producers through a cleverly designed tax scheme that, although facially neutral, excluded nearly all of
an important trading partner’s breweries.268
As this example reveals, dispute panelists and trade scholars have
especially sensitive antennae when it comes to detecting disguised protectionism.269 Although their sensitivity is not without some justification, it should be tempered by a healthy measure of respect for the
preferences of citizens and consumers, who may have legitimate motivations for adopting even those process-based policy measures that
commentators believe are most subject to abuse. Minnesota, for instance, seems to have been sincere in its desire to support a nascent
“microbrew revolution” at a time when industry concentration had depleted levels of both brewery employment and consumer choice.270
Furthermore, nothing prevented the development of a microbrewery
industry in Canada that would have been eligible for Minnesota’s
preferential tax treatment.271 Without any obvious impediments to
such a development, the GATT panel was unjustified in leaping to its
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
267 The link between the panel’s ruling and Tuna/Dolphin I should not be overstated. As Sanford Gaines points out, the Beer II panel interpreted “like products” under Article III:2 of the
GATT, a provision that “offers limited guidance on the interpretation of Article III:4.” Gaines,
supra note 62, at 413.
268 A celebrated example of such disguised protectionism concerned an effort by Germany to
grant a tariff reduction to Switzerland without affording similar benefits to its other trading partners. Accordingly, the measure was drafted to cover only “large dappled mountain cattle or
brown cattle reared at a spot at least 300 meters above sea level and which have at least one
month’s grazing each year at a spot at least 800 meters above sea level.” Charnovitz, The Law of
Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, supra note 58, at 68 (quoting Memorandum on Discriminatory Tariff Classifications, League of Nations Doc. C.E.C.P. 96, at
8 (1927)).
269 Perhaps this sensitivity is explained by the fact that many panelists and scholars spent their
former lives in national trade offices, carefully manipulating tariff schedules around product descriptions to accomplish just this kind of protectionism. See Hudec, supra note 54, at 110–11 (describing such efforts and stating that “[m]ost observers have their own anecdotal evidence to support this generalization about tariff practice”).
270 See, e.g., BILL YENNE, THE AMERICAN BREWERY: FROM COLONIAL EVOLUTION TO
MICROBREW REVOLUTION 115–48 (2003).
271 Indeed, in subsequent years, a microbrewery industry emerged in Canada, aided, somewhat
ironically, by tax breaks from provincial governments. See, e.g., Kelly Louiseize, Tax Breaks on
Tap for Breweries, N. ONTARIO BUS., May 1, 2003, at 10 (describing a tax concession scheme for
small brewers in Ontario), available at 2003 WL 12121647; David Kuxhaus, NDP Pours Tax Relief into Microbreweries: Reduction To Help Local Producers Compete, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS,
Apr. 19, 2001, at B7 (describing a similar program in Manitoba), available at 2001 WL 16235499.
In the celebrated mountain cattle example, by contrast, Germany utilized more permanent geographical conditions to confer its disguised tariff concession on Switzerland without opening up
eligibility to other nations. See supra note 268.
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skeptical conclusion about the state’s motivation for adopting a policy
preference in favor of small producers.272
This tendency toward skepticism is further exemplified in the international trade context by the SPS Agreement, which requires that
certain trade measures rest on scientific risk assessments in order to
withstand WTO scrutiny. As Alan Sykes notes, the premise of the SPS
Agreement’s evidentiary requirements is simple:
If a regulation that is ostensibly aimed at protecting health, safety, or the
environment nevertheless has the effect of restricting trade, and there is no
scientific evidence of any danger to be avoided or of any reduction in risk
as a result of the regulation, then the suspicion arises that the regulation is
disguised protectionism.273

The shortcoming of this approach, however, is its implicit assumption
that regulations that appear aimed at preventing environmental,
health, or safety risks can be adequately understood and evaluated
outside of the cultural context within which they originate. As sociologist Dorothy Nelkin observes, “controversies over science and technology [often] are struggles over meaning and morality, over the distribution of resources, and over the locus of power and control” in a
society.274 By demanding that regulatory actions be “based on an assessment . . . of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health,”275
the SPS Agreement relegates such nontechnical meanings of risk to a
second tier of legitimacy, able to be invoked by nations in defense of
regulatory measures only after a “sufficiently specific” risk assessment
has identified an “ascertainable” threat.276
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
272 The panel was perhaps impaired in its analysis by the failure of the United States to defend
Minnesota’s scheme seriously. See Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 263.
273 Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A
Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 354 (2002). Note, however, that it is not necessary to
demonstrate that the restrictive measures have had discriminatory effects in order to invoke the
SPS Agreement. See supra pp. 550–51.
274 Dorothy Nelkin, Science Controversies: The Dynamics of Public Disputes in the United
States, in HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 444, 445 (Sheila Jasanoff et al.
eds., 1995); see also Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 209 (1972)
(coining the term “trans-science” to describe controversies that may be framed within the discourse of science, but cannot be resolved within it). A large body of psychological evidence, for
instance, suggests that individuals infuse risks with a variety of social meanings, many of which
escape the comparatively sterile methodologies of scientific risk assessment. See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1763–66 (2003) (summarizing
studies that suggest that “risk is a complex, textured assessment of numerous variables that surround a given environmental, health, or safety hazard . . . such as whether a risk is voluntarily
confronted by the victim, whether its potential harm is equitably distributed among the population, whether it poses a particularly dreaded form of death or illness, whether it threatens future
generations, and whether the perceived source of the risk is believed to be a trustworthy actor”).
275 SPS AGREEMENT, supra note 75, at art. 5(1).
276 See EC Hormones Report, supra note 167, paras. 186–87. Thus, while the EC Hormones
Report indicated that consumer concerns could be considered in selecting the appropriate level of
protection once a scientific risk assessment had established a basis for taking precautions, such
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A similar excision of meaning occurs in the U.S. regulation of GM
technologies. By parceling government authority in piecemeal fashion
among USDA, FDA, and EPA regulators, the Reagan Administration
ensured that no single government decisionmaker would take a comprehensive look at the variety of risks and benefits posed by GM agriculture.277 Consumers, however, are not similarly compartmentalized
in their evaluation of GM food products. Thus, in addition to capturing concern over long-term consequences for human health and safety,
consumer suspicion of GM foods also reflects disapproval of the impact that GM agriculture may have on nontarget animal and insect
species, on ecosystem integrity, on the viability of organic farming, and
on a host of more general ethical and cultural considerations.278 Failure to label GM foods therefore invites the alteration of fundamental
agricultural, economic, and cultural aspects of the food supply without
input from consumers. This exclusion is defended on the basis that
consumers are incapable of comprehending the complex set of tradeoffs posed by biotechnology. A fair review of the evidence, however,
suggests that much of the opposition to GM food products is both reasoned and, at least partially, substantiated. Indeed, given that consumers are, in some sense, the only decisionmakers in a position to
evaluate new technologies such as GM agriculture in their totality, one
might think that consumer views merit special credence, rather than
special efforts at suppression.279
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
concerns could not enter the first stage of the analysis. Id. para. 245. As Jeffery Atik describes,
these science-based aspects of the SPS Agreement may “lead to a new kind of international discourse, where certain moves are excluded.” Jeffery Atik, Science and International Regulatory
Convergence, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 736, 758 (1996–1997); see also Marc L. Miller, NIS, WTO,
SPS, WIR: Does the WTO Substantially Limit the Ability of Countries to Regulate Harmful Nonindigenous Species?, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1059, 1089 (2003) (“‘Science’ is an important aspect
of rational decisionmaking, but the limits of the scientific paradigm and its role in a larger sphere
of choice should be recognized, not only for questions that seem largely scientific but also for
those that reflect reasoned choices about what environment — ecological and cultural — we
would like.”).
277 See Applegate, supra note 164, at 233 (noting that the Coordinated Framework for regulating GM products assumes that GM organisms “pose no social complications that are sufficiently
serious to include in the regulatory evaluation”); Bratspies, supra note 95, at 310 (“Rather than
having a single agency responsible for regulating biotechnology, . . . the United States doles out
administrative responsibilities piecemeal to various federal agencies.”). As William Buzbee has
noted, such “regulatory gaps” can be thought of as arising almost inevitably from “predictable incentives in complex, multi-layered political-legal contexts for social ills not to be overregulated,
but to remain unaddressed,” an incentive deficit that Buzbee refers to as the “regulatory commons
problem.” William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5 (2003).
278 See supra pp. 554–56.
279 For instance, because regulators from various agencies address GM agriculture in piecemeal
fashion, they might demonstrate a form of group-choice paradox in which each agency approves
GM agriculture with respect to their issue or issues of concern, even though they might reject it
on a holistic evaluation. See LEWIS A. KORNHAUSER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, THE MANY AS
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Other uses of the process/product distinction also overlook important grounds for consumer preference. In the case of rbST-derived
milk, for instance, consumers have expressed concern not only over the
types of risk that accompany genetically engineered products more
generally, but also over the threat of painful and potentially dangerous
effects of rbST treatment on dairy cows. Indeed, Canada refused to
authorize the use of rbST on animal welfare grounds alone, citing potentially increased levels of lameness and infection among treated
cows, as well as reduced livestock lifespans due to increased herd culling.280 Similarly, the “compositional analysis method” proposed by the
USDA to analyze the risks of cloned livestock distinguishes between
cloned and conventional food products only on physical dimensions.
Consumers, however, might desire labeling due to a variety of ethical
and religious concerns regarding the cloning process itself, including
the fact that cloning may pose health risks to surrogate livestock and
result in a high frequency of nonviable offspring.281 In short, by assuming likeness between novel and conventional organisms based
solely on physical makeup, both the substantial equivalence doctrine
and the compositional analysis method invite policymakers to ignore
the full complexity of the issues raised by new technological processes
such as genetic engineering and livestock cloning.
Finally, the limits of the process/product distinction as a conceptual
device are also apparent in the FDA’s labeling determination with regard to food products that have been treated with irradiation. In this
context, in contrast to its decisions on GM food and rbST, the FDA
chose to require disclosure of the process of irradiation because of its
potential impact on certain physical properties of the treated product
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
ONE: INTEGRITY AND GROUP CHOICE IN PARADOXICAL CASES (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Research
Paper No. 68, 2003; Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 55, 2003), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID441466_code030915570.pdf?abstractid=441466&mirid
=1; Bruce Chapman, More Easily Done than Said: Rules, Reasons and Rational Social Choice, 18
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 293, 312–16 (1998). Consider in this respect the experience of Switzerland, which in 1992 established the contours of its regulatory framework for GM foods through an
elaborate public discussion and national referendum process. See Franz Xaver Perrez, Taking
Consumers Seriously: The Swiss Regulatory Approach to Genetically Modified Food, 8 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 585, 590–91 (2000). Reflecting the diversity of individual concerns regarding genetic
engineering, the resulting constitutional amendment required Swiss regulators to “consider not
only the safety of humans, animals, and the environment, but also the ‘dignity of creation’ when
regulating genetic engineering and GMOs.” Id. at 591 (citation omitted).
280 See Thornley, supra note 188, at 790–91; Press Release, Health Canada, Health Canada Rejects Bovine Growth Hormone in Canada (Jan. 14, 1999), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/
english/media/releases/1999/99_03e.htm. A post-approval monitoring program conducted by
Monsanto scientists confirmed the increased risk of hoof disorders associated with rbST treatment, but found no evidence of elevated levels of mastitis infections. See R.J. Collier et al., Effects of Sustained Release Bovine Somatotropin (Sometribove) on Animal Health in Commercial
Dairy Herds, 84 J. DAIRY SCI. 1098, 1098 (2001).
281 See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., supra note 116, at 11.
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such as shelf life or nutritional content.282 To the consumer, however,
such undetectable physical alterations in the end product only scratch
the surface of concerns over food irradiation. As in the GM food and
rbST contexts, consumer demand for labeling of irradiated foods stems
from a variety of social, economic, and environmental objections regarding the consequences of the process itself, rather than merely concern over the personal health and safety risks of treated goods.283 For
example, given that irradiation enables meat and produce to be
shipped across greater distances than current handling and processing
technologies allow, some opponents fear that irradiation will further
the erosion of local agricultural production and regional food
security.284
In many respects contemporary process-related controversies continue the tradition of publicly oriented consumer activity exemplified
by Progressive Era campaigns and the civil rights movement. In each
of the cases examined in this subsection, consumers appear to be expressing preferences not merely for the goods that they wish to purchase, but also for the technological and socioeconomic characteristics
that they wish to encourage in the economy’s productive sphere. Most
notably, consumer concerns seem premised on a recognition that, as
Wendell Berry puts it, “how we eat determines, to a considerable extent, how the world is used.”285 To that extent, dismissing consumer
preferences wholesale simply because they pertain to process characteristics seems as unwarranted today as it would have been during earlier periods of consumer activism. Instead, consistent with the premises of a liberal market democracy, the default response of the
government to purportedly unreliable process preferences should not
be to suppress process information, but rather to expose it to scrutiny
and counterargument.286
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
282
283

See 21 C.F.R. § 179.26(c) (2004); 51 Fed. Reg. 13,376 (Apr. 18, 1986).
Cf. Fred H. Degnan, Biotechnology and the Food Label: A Legal Perspective, 55 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 301, 306 (2000) (arguing that the FDA “went to rather great lengths to craft a rationale
for the required disclosure that fell within the literal confines of the agency’s traditional application” of its labeling authority, and that other interests surely were at play in the Agency’s irradiation decision).
284 See The Food Commission, Position Statement of The Food Commission, Food Irradiation
— The Problems and Concerns, http://www.foodcomm.org.uk/irradiation_probs.htm (July, 2002)
(observing that “[i]rradiation supports greater globalisation of food production and supply, threatening local farmers and food processors”).
285 WENDELL BERRY, The Pleasures of Eating, in WHAT ARE PEOPLE FOR? 145, 149 (1990).
286 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)
(arguing that government actors should “assume that [commercial] information is not in itself
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed,
and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them”). Consistent with this approach, biotechnology advocates in recent years have pursued
various public confidence-building measures for GM food products and other genetic engineering
technologies — in contrast to the industry’s earlier approach, which sought to suppress informa-
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To restore this traditional liberal view, several changes are necessary. First, rather than rely on an overinclusive proxy for protectionism such as the process/product distinction, WTO dispute panels
should investigate directly the policy purposes driving challenged
product regulations, accepting those regulations whose nondiscriminatory purpose satisfies some variant of a means-ends rationality test and
rejecting only those that do not.287 The once-prominent “aims and effects” test essentially followed this approach.288 Its recent explication
and attempted revival by Donald Regan should therefore be welcomed
as an effort to combat the problem of disguised protectionism without
simultaneously eviscerating a nation’s ability to respond to the firmly
held convictions of its consumer-citizens.289 Similarly, WTO member
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
tion out of concern that consumers would not comprehend the mix of costs and benefits offered by
GM agriculture. See generally Anne R. Kapuscinski et al., Making ‘Safety First’ a Reality for
Biotechnology Products, 21 NATURE BIOTECH. 599 (2003) (describing a public-private “consultative and transparent process to incorporate scientific, technical, social and governmental considerations in developing environmental and human health safety standards for genetically engineered products”); Gary E. Marchant, Introduction, 44 JURIMETRICS 1 (2003) (introducing
symposium issue on the subject).
287 See William J. Snape III & Naomi B. Lefkovitz, Searching for GATT’s Environmental
Miranda: Are “Process Standards” Getting “Due Process?”, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 777, 796
(1994); see also Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 32, 32 (1998) (including a simple means-end rationality test within a typology of “trade-off devices” that dispute panels may employ when faced with a conflict between the
reduction of trade barriers and the effectuations of other social or environmental interests).
288 See Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 268; Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National
Regulation, supra note 58, at 626–29.
289 See Donald H. Regan, Further Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory Purpose Under Article
III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Tribute to Bob Hudec, 37 J. WORLD TRADE
737 (2003). After an extensive textual and functional analysis, Regan concludes that products
should be regarded as “like” for purposes of Article III under the GATT only if “(a) they are in a
competitive relationship, and (b) they are not distinguished by any non-protectionist policy which
actually underlies the challenged regulation.” Id. at 752; see also Amelia Porges & Joel P. Trachtman, Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Resurrection of Aim and Effects, 37 J. WORLD
TRADE 783, 794–97 (2003) (arguing that the “aim and effects” test may have been revived by the
Appellate Body Asbestos Report in the context of deciding whether a measure is applied “so as to
afford protection” or to confer “less favourable treatment” within the meaning of Article III (quoting Appellate Body Report, Korea — Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Beef para. 100, WT/DS161/AB/R (Jan. 10, 2001)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). A less deferential approach, but one still superior to the process/product distinction, would require that the
nondiscriminatory regulation adopt the least trade-restrictive means available to achieve its purpose. See Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (excluding from the definition of regulatory protectionism any “nondiscriminatory” regulation for which “no less restrictive alternative is available”). The limitation of
such an approach, however, is the fact that hypothetical alternative regulations often are constrained only by the panelists’ imaginations, rather than by the full complexity of political and
economic reality. See Robert Howse, Managing the Interface Between International Trade Law
and the Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW, supra note 54, at 139–40 (“A legal
economist can always imagine a hypothetical welfare-maximizing regulatory instrument that

594

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:525

nations should clarify the SPS Agreement to ensure that its scientific
basis requirements are not imposed on regulatory measures that seek
to effectuate consumer interests other than (or in addition to) concerns
about the type of health and safety risks that scientific risk assessments can verify.290 For instance, although U.S. opponents of mandatory labeling requirements for GM foods argue that such regulations
are “not scientifically defensible,”291 it should be understood that this
argument targets only one factor in the evaluation of process-based
regulations and that Europe remains free to posit other interests in defense of its labeling regime.
Second, the FDA should abandon the restrictive interpretation of
its FFDCA labeling authority, which the Agency adopted only amidst
the politically charged debate over GM regulation and which departed
significantly from the FDA’s own longstanding practice of requiring
labeling in a variety of appropriate contexts to aid consumer decisionmaking.292 More generally, the FDA and other relevant authorities in
the GM context should reaffirm that the “substantial equivalence” doctrine serves merely as a temporary heuristic device for assessing certain types of physical risks that might be presented by novel technology. Moreover, these agencies must acknowledge that employing the
doctrine (or related concepts such as the compositional analysis
method) beyond this sphere of application risks the incidental exclusion of numerous ethical, cultural, and environmental concerns simply
as a matter of definition, rather than as a result of reasoned analysis.
Finally, the presumption that “mere consumer concern” about “production methods” is an insufficient basis for state action — a presumption expressed both in the beliefs of many international trade commen–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
achieves a public purpose without resort to trade restrictions.”). For this reason, among others,
John McGinnis and Mark Movsesian argue in favor of a test that focuses on procedural features
of the domestic decisionmaking process that led to adoption of the measure. See McGinnis &
Movsesian, supra note 44, at 572–83; see also Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to the Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 363–75
(2002) (proposing an approach to evaluating environmental and human health and safety trade
measures that focuses similarly on procedures). McGinnis and Movsesian argue that their “procedure-oriented jurisprudence . . . would allow the WTO to invalidate covertly protectionist
measures without supplanting the substance of national regulatory policies.” McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 44, at 580; see also Bohanes, supra, at 365 (noting that under a procedural approach, “a national trade-impeding health regulation unsupported by science could be ‘purified by
a bona fide public risk perception’ and pass muster under WTO dispute settlement” (footnote
omitted)).
290 A separate question concerns the extent to which the SPS Agreement acknowledges the precautionary principle as a legitimate basis for adopting protective regulation pending development
of a stronger scientific understanding of health and safety risks. See Walker, supra note 86, at
255–63.
291 See Recent Developments in Regulation of Genetically Modified Crops, 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 55 (2004).
292 See supra p. 560.
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tators regarding GATT/WTO law293 and in the International Dairy
opinion294 — should be rejected. By deeming process preferences presumptively illegitimate, policymakers aim to root out protectionist or
otherwise ill-founded legislation, yet they neglect to consider the many
ways in which consumer preferences reflect normatively coherent demands for change with respect to the myriad consequences of production. Indeed, even when consumer process preferences do reflect scientifically unfounded fears, the rejection of “mere consumer concern” as
a legitimate state interest overlooks both the potentially significant
welfare effects of fear itself,295 and the more abstract notion that, as
Martha Nussbaum observes, “there is a distinctive human good expressed in the freedom we give our fellow citizens to make choices that
we ourselves may hold to be profoundly wrong.”296
In sum, the process/product distinction exacts too dear a price in
exchange for its promised exclusion of socially harmful legislation.
This price becomes all the more burdensome when it is recalled that
proponents of regulatory cost-benefit analysis believe government policies should derive from the preferences that individuals “reveal” while
acting in their role as private market actors — the same role that the
process/product distinction constructs as essentially apolitical and unworthy of informational enrichment, except to the extent that consumer products might threaten direct personal harm. In essence, individuals who are motivated to participate in public debates become
subjected to a double bind, denied on the one hand an informational
basis for seeking to incentivize changes through their market behavior,
yet expected on the other hand to reveal their “vote” in favor of public
goods while acting in that very capacity. As this subsection has argued, attempts to justify these seemingly contradictory policy positions
with reference to instrumentalist arguments understate the meanings
of modern technology and its role in a consumer society. Consumers
may make ill-informed or otherwise erroneous decisions, but they may
also make decisions that exhibit a richer value structure than proponents of the process/product distinction generally suppose.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
293 See, e.g., Grant E. Isaac & William A. Kerr, Genetically Modified Organisms and Trade
Rules: Identifying Important Challenges for the WTO, 26 WORLD ECON. 29, 39 (2003) (“[A]ccording to the WTO, there are no legitimate uses of mandatory labelling standards based on the
consumers’ right to know about non–safety-related and non–product-related [processes].”).
294 See supra pp. 571–72.
295 See MATTHEW D. ADLER, FEAR ASSESSMENT: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE
PRICING OF FEAR AND ANXIETY 1 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working
Paper No. 03-12, 2003) (observing the cognitive reality of fear and arguing in favor of attempts to
incorporate “fear assessment” into regulatory cost-benefit analysis).
296 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Good As Discipline, the Good As Freedom, in ETHICS OF
CONSUMPTION: THE GOOD LIFE, JUSTICE, AND GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP 312, 336 (David A.
Crocker & Toby Linden eds., 1998).
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(b) Sovereignty of Nations. — Both critics and defenders of process-based trade measures tend to assume that the primary, if not the
exclusive, purpose of such measures is to inspire actual changes in
production methods or conditions.297 In that sense, process-based
trade measures appear not only to risk codifying scientific ignorance or
disguised protectionism, but also to interfere with the sovereignty of
foreign producer nations.298 After all, “[w]hy should one country be
able to use its trade laws . . . to enforce its own view of how plant or
animal life in the oceans beyond its jurisdictional limits of the territorial sea are treated, or how tropical hardwoods are harvested?”299
These concerns are reflected in the Shrimp/Turtle rulings, which require process-related trade measures to demonstrate a “sufficient
nexus” between the regulating nation and the targeted practice.300
Such concerns also underwrite the views of dispute panelists301 and
academic commentators302 who argue that a prerequisite to the use of
process-based trade measures should be a demonstration by the regulating nation that it has pursued multilateral solutions to the problem
targeted by its trade measure. By treating nondiscriminatory processbased trade measures differently from product-based measures in this
fashion, the process/product distinction serves not only to deter disguised protectionism and other means of trade discrimination, but also

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
297 See, e.g., Bartenhagen, supra note 74, at 52–53 (“While ecolabeling programs vary widely,
they all use market incentives to promote ‘green’ products with the ultimate goal of influencing
behavior among both consumers and producers.”); Schoenbaum, supra note 66, at 294 (“The theory behind eco-labels is that if consumers are informed, the market and consumer choice can be
relied on to stimulate the production and consumption of environmentally friendly products.”).
298 As John Jackson notes, “[t]he term eco-imperialism has been coined for this problem.” John
H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, in TRADE
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 58, at 219, 226–27.
299 Id. at 226.
300 See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 64, para. 133 (avoiding “the question of whether there is an
implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g)” by noting that “in the specific circumstances of
the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine populations involved and the United States” because the “species here at stake . . . are all known to
occur in waters over which the United States exercises jurisdiction”).
301 See, e.g., id. para. 166 (noting that the United States failed to engage “in serious, across-theboard negotiations” with other countries before imposing its import ban); Tuna/Dolphin I, supra
note 46, at 199–200 (same); see also Andrea Bianchi, The Impact of International Trade Law on
Environmental Law and Process, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 105, 114–16 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001) (noting that “[r]estraints imposed by international trade law on the use of unilateral environmental measures . . . may occasionally act as a
catalyst for the development of multilateral regimes for the conservation of resources”).
302 See, e.g., Cameron & Campbell, supra note 58, at 41–42 (arguing that “if there are global or
transboundary effects to a PPM, the best response will be international cooperation, the development of multilateral agreements, or harmonization”).
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to eliminate certain effects of trade policy and consumer preference
that are perceived to be inappropriately coercive.303
Developing countries in particular have stressed the perceived
threat to their sovereignty posed by process-based trade measures.
Accordingly, they have argued strenuously against the legality and appropriateness of such measures, including even voluntary, nongovernmental product labeling programs.304 Unlike the instrumental argument described in the previous subsection, which depicts consumers as
scientifically naïve,305 the argument of the developing nations depicts
consumers as morally naïve. It would be nice, they argue, if sweatshop labor could be expunged from the global economy so that no one
suffers the “moral taint”306 of purchasing an item produced under exploitative conditions. Until that utopia arrives, however, these nations
maintain that it is unduly provincial to condition a foreign manufacturer’s access to product markets or to government-conferred competitive advantages on its compliance with domestic labor and environmental standards.307 Assuming that the failure to meet such standards
tangibly impacts only the workers and environment of the exporting
nation, greater tolerance of such harm in the developing nation should
be treated no differently than any other aspect of comparative
advantage. Indeed, some might argue that the global trading system
exists precisely in order to take advantage of such disparities in pro-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
303 See David M. Driesen, What Is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and
Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 312–29 (2001) (distinguishing between nondiscrimination and noncoercion and arguing that the WTO is most competent as an institution to pursue
the former).
304 The concerns of developing nations certainly are not without merit. The complexities involved in crafting, satisfying, and enforcing process-based trade measures often mean that such
measures discriminate in practice against producers who lack the technical expertise and institutional resources necessary to achieve compliance with process standards. See Gaines, supra note
62, at 427 (describing the “vociferous opposition by developing countries to PPM-based measures
and analogous ‘product’ requirements such as environmental packaging and eco-labeling”);
Veenha Jha & Simonetta Zarrilli, Eco-Labelling Initiatives As Potential Barriers to Trade: A
Viewpoint from Developing Countries, in ECO-LABELLING, supra note 39, at 277 (discussing the
concerns of developing nations with respect to product labeling programs); Joshi, supra note 68, at
72 (detailing market-access complaints of developing nations); René Vossenaar, Eco-Labelling and
International Trade: The Main Issues, in ECO-LABELLING, supra note 39, at 21, 23–24 (cataloging
ways in which environmental labeling schemes might practically disadvantage producers in developing nations).
305 See supra pp. 589–95.
306 See Howse, supra note 168, at 160 (describing social labeling of products as a way to “enable individual consumers to avoid the moral ‘taint’ of themselves consuming [a morally objectionable] product”); see also Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 65 (1st Cir. 1999)
(describing Massachusetts’s effort to avoid the “moral taint” of associating with entities that do
business in Burma).
307 Cf. sources cited supra note 41.
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duction costs and capabilities.308 From this perspective, the process
preferences of affluent Western consumers do indeed seem egregiously
puritan.
Naturally, however, there is an opposite extreme: On April 28,
1939, in an address to the Reichstag, Adolf Hitler criticized a boycott
of German goods by U.S. consumers in language that is remarkably
similar to contemporary criticisms of process-based trade measures.309
Specifically, the Nazi dictator argued that “[i]t is . . . an unbearable
burden for world economic relations that it should be possible in some
countries for some ideological reason or other to let loose a wild boycott of agitation against other countries and their goods and so practically to eliminate them from the market.”310 This example is not, by
any means, intended to equate current process-related concerns with
the concerns that motivated U.S. consumer boycotts during the Holocaust. It is instead intended to demonstrate a spectrum of moral objections to extraterritorial conditions, none of which tangibly impact a
domestic nation’s environment or threaten physical harm to its citizens, but many of which might viscerally impact the willingness of
consumers in that nation to accept imported goods. Obviously, not all
of these objections can or should be dismissed as “moral militancy.”311
The view that regards process preferences as extrajurisdictional in
orientation312 follows naturally from geographically bound, Westphalian notions of sovereignty.313 It does not, however, adequately reflect
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
308 See Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 283–84 (arguing that, apart from the use of slave labor and child labor, most labor standards issues are primarily local and redistributive in nature
and are therefore better understood as aspects of comparative advantage rather than issues that
should properly concern domestic consumers).
309 See Adolf Hitler, Address to the Reichstag (Apr. 28, 1939), quoted in FRIEDMAN, supra note
254, at 137.
310 Id. Hitler continued by urging President Roosevelt to squelch the boycotts as an essential
precondition to productive international relations:
For it is my conviction that if the leaders of nations are not even capable . . . of removing boycotts pursued for ideological reasons which can damage trade relations between countries to so great an extent, there is much less prospect of achieving by means
of international agreements any really fruitful step toward improvement of economic
relations.
Id.
311 The phrase “moral militancy” was coined by Jagdish Bhagwati, a noted trade scholar and
critic of process-based trade measures. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The
False Conflict?, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 58, at 159, 170. Bhagwati does
acknowledge the existence of some international norms in defense of which process-based trade
measures might be justified. Jagdish Bhagwati, The WTO: What Next, Twenty-Fourth Wincott
Memorial Lecture 26–27 (Oct. 25, 1994) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“[T]here
will be nearly universal agreement that if slavery produces competitive advantage, that advantage
is illegitimate and ought to be rejected.”).
312 See, e.g., McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 44, at 587.
313 See Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Market-Based Remedies for International Human Rights Violations?, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 103, 107 (2004) (noting that the
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consumers’ sense of concern and responsibility in a global economy.314
To the contrary, consumers who express process preferences typically
care about the nature of the harm being avoided, not the locus of that
harm. Thus, the question whether a domestic trade measure seeks to
alter domestic or extraterritorial conditions is misplaced: “[E]ven if the
physical effects of the disfavoured processing method occur entirely
outside the importing country, the importing country may be concerned to avoid the moral discredit . . . of . . . encouraging harm or
wickedness — and the moral discredit occurs within the importing
country, regardless of where the physical harm occurs.”315 Any contrary view perpetuates the untenable fiction, critiqued by Philip Allott,
that individuals adhere to wholly separate domestic and international
ethics systems, in which “one set of moral judgments . . . within our
own national society” stands in stark contrast to “another set [imposed
by international law] for everything that happens beyond the frontiers
of our national society.”316
The question then becomes how the international community
should regulate trade measures that support potentially legitimate consumer process preferences. As Anne-Marie Slaughter has documented,
the crafters of the Bretton Woods institutions originally expected the
trade-liberalizing effects of the GATT to occur in conjunction with a
package of institutions that would promote “economic and social cooperation.”317 When the linchpin of that package — the International
Trade Organization — failed to materialize, however, the GATT survived in a peculiar and potentially dangerous state, “removed from its
intended context of global social and economic regulation.”318 The
questions left unanswered by that failure now confront trade scholars
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Westphalian model depicts “states as isolated from each other and as the princip[al] object of loyalty of their subjects”).
314 See BECK, supra note 11, at 67 (“Just like poverty or profits, compassion is also becoming
global.”).
315 Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 279 (emphasis omitted); see also, e.g., Richard L. Revesz,
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the European Union and the International Community, 83 VA. L. REV. 1331, 1344 (1997) (analogizing the psychological disutility
caused by extraterritorial environmental harms to “physical spillovers”).
316 See Philip Allott, The Josephine Onoh Memorial Lecture (Feb. 21, 1989), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE WORLD 16
(1989). But see Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. ECON.
LIT. 113, 115 (1997) (contending that trade is no more or less beneficial for an importing nation as
a consequence of labor or environmental conditions abroad).
317 See Anne-Marie Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the
Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY
AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM 125, 135–39 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993).
318 Robert Howse, Managing the Interface Between International Trade Law and the Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the
United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW, supra note 54, at 139, 143.
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with unmistakable clarity: What are the appropriate bounds of social
and moral concern within a global trading system that lacks a mechanism comparable in scope and strength to the GATT/WTO legal apparatus for expressing and evaluating noneconomic interests? In the absence of a more comprehensive scheme of social regulation to
complement the international economic regime, what are the analytical
guideposts for distinguishing an acceptable aspect of comparative advantage from an objectionable practice that an importing country can
properly subject to compensatory trade measures?319 What are the
risks of promoting a multilateral trading organization that is vigorously committed to the notion of anticoercion when no adequately
empowered international agencies exist to take up the role presently
played, however clumsily, by “coercive” process-based trade measures?320
Even the dramatically evolved WTO, with its numerous substantive agreements and robust adjudicatory procedures, is ill-equipped to
resolve issues as complex and significant as environmentally or socially
motivated trade measures.321 These limitations are especially evident
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
319 Howse and Regan, for instance, attempt to distinguish between competitive advantages that
are legitimate and those that are better characterized as negative externalities. Compare Howse &
Regan, supra note 58, at 283 (stating that greater tolerance of the aesthetic blights caused by strip
mining operations constitutes a genuine comparative advantage in that consumers should not care
about the appearance of foreign abandoned strip mines), with id. at 281 (stating that “turtleunfriendly” fishing poses externalities that affect the global population of turtles). But see John
H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction, 11 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 303, 307 (2000) (noting the difficulty of determining “the extent to which a country can force
another country to internalize ‘externalities’ that the other country may not think are ‘externalities’”).
320 In part because of this lack of strong international regulatory institutions, numerous scholars have argued that unilateral trade measures can play a constructive role in international decisionmaking under appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., ESTY, supra note 59, at 144 (“The intrinsic difficulty of multilateral decision making and the lack of existing institutional structures for
effective international environmental policymaking . . . makes unilateral action a necessary, if unfortunate, policy option in some circumstances.”); David A. Wirth & Douglas J. Caldwell, Unilateral Trade-Based Measures for Protection of the Marine Environment, in VALUES AT SEA: ETHICS
FOR THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 147, 160–67 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 2003) (describing a
variety of policy attributes of unilateral trade-based measures and concluding that such measures
“are almost always understood as a second-best alternative to bilateral or multilateral cooperation
but [are] at the same time desirable or necessary as an interim juncture in a policy trajectory designed to stimulate greater international cooperation”). The actual practical significance of unilateral trade measures in the environmental context is the subject of much dispute, however. Compare Parker, supra note 44, at 25–26 (2001) (“[B]ehind almost any strong, truly effective,
international environmental agreement . . . in the world today . . . you are likely to find — at
some key juncture in its past or present — the credible threat of unilateral or small group economic leverage.”), with Gaines, supra note 62, at 419–21 (arguing that the actual role of processbased trade measures in furthering environmental policy thus far has been limited).
321 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 240, at 887 (“The relationship between trade and labor is exactly the sort of policy issue that is ill-suited to the [WTO Appellate Body].”); see also Andrew T.
Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303, 305 (2004) (arguing that
“[t]he WTO . . . must eventually either move forward by finding a way to incorporate more regulatory issues within its mandate or move backward and retreat to a narrower focus on trade, leav-
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in the WTO’s continuing, albeit more limited, reliance on the process/product distinction. By subjecting process-based trade measures to
different, more strict scrutiny than product-based measures, the distinction seeks to deter disguised protectionism and territorial overreaching. Rather than clarifying discussions about the likelihood of
disguised protectionism or the appropriateness of unilateral action,
however, the formalistic — and nearly outcome-determinative — process/product distinction prevents such discussions from even occurring.322 To be sure, abandoning the process/product distinction in favor of less exacting tests for trade discrimination323 leaves the separate
question of territorial overreaching largely beyond the purview of the
WTO.324 However, as noted above, restricting the focus of the WTO
dispute settlement process in this manner may actually be helpful not
only for furthering consumer sovereignty within the international economic system, but also for protecting the embattled WTO itself.325
The process/product distinction’s contrary approach of requiring nondiscriminatory, origin-neutral product regulations to be justified within
the narrow and demanding confines of Article XX simply because
they pertain to processes may be both textually unjustified326 and, in
the long run, politically unsustainable.
2. The Expressive Account. — Extensive evidence indicates that
consumers are willing to pay a premium for goods derived from certain production processes, even in the absence of appreciable differences in the resulting products. Among other items, such preferences
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
ing controversial topics such as the environment outside of its influence”). Precisely for this reason, a number of prominent commentators have advocated the creation of new international institutions to take on regulatory roles complementary to the WTO’s deregulatory agenda. See Sanford E. Gaines, The Problem of Enforcing Environmental Norms in the WTO and What To Do
About It, 26 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 342–51 (2003) (providing an overview and an
enlightened critique of various proposals for a new global environmental regulatory organization).
322 Cf. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation, supra note 58, at 626 (noting
that under the process/product distinction, “governments must meet . . . high standards to justify
‘origin-neutral’ regulatory measures which are guilty of nothing more than transgressing certain
abstract notions of ‘likeness’”).
323 For a description of several alternative tests for discrimination and protectionism that do
not sweep as broadly as the process/product distinction, see pp. 593–95 and sources cited supra
note 287.
324 For an argument that customary international law regarding the extent of jurisdictional authority should be used to resolve charges of territorial overreaching, see Lorand Bartels, Article
XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction — The Case of Trade Measures for
the Protection of Human Rights, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 353 (2002).
325 See supra pp. 568–69.
326 See Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy — And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 102 (2002) (noting that “there was no textual basis
in Article XX . . . that provided a territorial or jurisdictional limitation on the policies or rationales for intervention that could be justified under the individual heads of that article”).
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have been demonstrated for non-GM foods,327 sustainably harvested
timber,328 and fairly traded goods.329 These findings create something
of a puzzle for the instrumental account of consumer process preferences. On that account, the goal of consumer activists is to generate a
sufficient level of collective demand to change production processes in
pursuit of shared goals such as the improvement of occupational safety
or the elimination of racial discrimination. Process preferences therefore resemble a public good in that individual consumers may free ride
on the altruistic expenditures of others, leading ultimately to an un–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
327 See Gregory A. Baker & Thomas A. Burnham, Consumer Response to Genetically Modified
Foods: Market Segment Analysis and Implications for Producers and Policy Makers, 26 J. AGRIC.
& RESOURCE ECON. 387, 400 (2001) (finding that the presence of GM ingredients was an important concern for approximately 30% of respondents in a study); Wen S. Chern et al., Consumer
Acceptance and Willingness To Pay for Genetically Modified Vegetable Oil and Salmon: A Multiple-Country Assessment, 5 AGBIOFORUM 105, 108 (2002) (reporting survey evidence of willingness
to pay price premiums for non-GM vegetable oil ranging from 55–69% premiums for Norwegian
respondents, 50–62% for American respondents, 33–40% for Japanese respondents, and 17–21%
for Taiwanese respondents); JILL J. MCCLUSKEY ET AL., CONSUMER RESPONSE TO GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD PRODUCTS IN JAPAN 18 (Wash. State Univ., Research Paper TWP-2001101, Sept. 21, 2001) (finding that consumers in Japan are willing to pay a premium of approximately 60% for non-GM noodles and tofu), available at http://impact.wsu.edu/research/twp/01101.pdf; Catherine A. Mendenhall & Robert E. Evenson, Estimates of Willingness To Pay a Premium for Non-GM Foods: A Survey, in MARKET DEVELOPMENT FOR GENETICALLY MODIFIED
FOODS 55, 58 (Vittorio Santaniello et al. eds., 2002) (reporting that 50% of survey respondents
stated that they were very likely or somewhat likely to purchase non-GM foods at a premium of
up to 20%); Charles Noussair et al., Do Consumers Really Refuse To Buy Genetically Modified
Food?, 114 ECON. J. 102, 112, 117–18 (2004) (reporting that 35% of French consumers are unwilling to purchase GM foods and that 42% demand a price reduction in order to be willing to purchase GM foods); Matthew Rousu et al., Are United States Consumers Tolerant of Genetically
Modified Foods?, 26 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 19 (2004) (finding reduced consumer willingness to pay
for food containing genetically modified material); Abebayehu Tegene et al., The Effects of Information on Consumer Demand for Biotech Foods: Evidence from Experimental Auctions, USDA
TECHNICAL BULL. NO. 1903, at 24 (Mar. 2003) (finding that American consumers discount their
willingness to pay for GM-labeled foods by up to 14% under a variety of information settings).
328 See, e.g., Rachel Crossley et al., Is There a Commercial Case for Tropical Timber Certification?, in ECO-LABELLING, supra note 39, at 228, 237–38 (summarizing evidence of consumers’
willingness to pay price premiums to obtain environmentally friendly timber); Markku Simula,
Timber Certification Initiatives and Their Implications for Developing Countries, in ECOLABELLING, supra note 39, at 206, 220–21 (describing a study in which 68% of consumers expressed a willingness to pay 1–15% price premiums for furniture made from sustainably harvested timber).
329 See KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, WHITE HATS OR DON QUIXOTES?
HUMAN RIGHTS VIGILANTES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3–4, 41 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8102, 2001) (reporting that 81% of consumers were willing to pay
more for an item if it was made under “good conditions”); Univ. of Md., Program on International
Policy Attitudes, Americans on Globalization: A Study of US Public Attitudes, http://www.pipa.
org/OnlineReports/Globalization/global_rep.html (Mar. 28, 2000) (reporting that 76% of respondents indicated willingness to pay a $5.00 premium for shirts made in a “safe and healthy” working environment over shirts made in a “harsh and unsafe” working environment); PATRICK DE
PELSMACKER ET AL., ARE FAIR TRADE LABELS GOOD BUSINESS? ETHICS AND COFFEE BUYING
INTENTIONS 9 (Universiteit Gent, Working Paper No. 2003/165, 2003) (reporting that survey respondents on average were willing to pay a 10% premium for fairly traded coffee).
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derprovision of the desired incentives to change production processes.330 If the instrumental account is to explain consumers’ preferences for processes, the question then arises: why is there such strong
evidence of consumer willingness to act on process preferences despite
the free rider problem? Why, for instance, did sales of organically
produced dairy items — which, under organic certification guidelines,
cannot be derived from rbST-treated cows — grow by more than five
hundred percent from 1994 to 1999, reaching a total of $600 million in
the year 2000?331
One simple answer is that, contrary to the predictions of the selfinterested rational actor model underlying the free rider account, individuals frequently do exhibit concern for the welfare of others, just as
consumers appear to do through their demand for goods manufactured
without the use of processes believed to harm workers, animals, or the
environment.332 Within cognitive psychology and experimental economics, the clearest demonstration of such regard for others comes
from the Dictator Game, in which one experimental subject (the “proposer”) allocates as he sees fit an endowment between himself and another individual (the “receiver”).333 Despite the clear ability to allocate
all of the gains to themselves in these experiments, individuals in the
proposer position almost always allocate a nontrivial amount of money
to the receiver, often an amount equal to their own share.334 In a similar fashion, consumers who choose to purchase goods according to
production processes may do so because they affirmatively desire to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
330 See Guzman, supra note 240, at 893 n.31 (noting that “[t]he individual consumer has an incentive to purchase lower priced goods produced under poor labor conditions, relying on other
consumers to bear the cost of the higher priced goods produced under core labor standards”);
Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade–Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labor, and the
Environment, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 61, 72 (1996) (discussing the collective action problem
created by process-labeled goods and concluding that “[u]nless she can be sure that most other
consumers will do likewise, the individual consumer may well not consider it rational to avoid
buying the product in question”).
331 DIMITRI & GREENE, supra note 246, at 2–3. Again, it bears noting that organic agriculture
preferences likely represent a cluster of consumer concerns, some of which are product-related
and others of which focus on process characteristics. See supra note 246.
332 See, e.g., Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in
15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73, 77 (2001) (noting, based on experiments conducted in societies representing a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions, that “the canonical model of the self-interested material payoff-maximizing actor is systematically violated”).
But see infra p. 628 (describing the view of scholars who believe that other-regarding behavior
confers a “warm glow” benefit on donors sufficient to render their behavior consistent with the
predictions of a self-interested utility maximization model).
333 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1312–13 (2003).
334 In one classic experiment, for instance, proposers were offered a binary choice between an
inequitable split ($18, $2) and an even split ($10, $10). More than three-quarters of the subjects
chose the even split, despite the apparent sacrifice of self-interest entailed by their choice. Daniel
Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285, S290–91 (1986).
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improve the welfare of individual producers or otherwise influence
manufacturing processes, even at the expense of their own economic
interest and even if the goods that they purchase are physically indistinguishable from substitute offerings.
This explanation is consistent with the instrumental account described in the previous section, in which consumers’ preferences for
processes appear explicable and evaluable only with regard to the impact that such preferences have on actual conditions in relevant markets. An alternative hypothesis explored in this section is that, to the
extent that consumers believe certain processes provide or support a
particular public good — if, for instance, consumers believe that
shade-grown coffee production helps to protect migratory birds335 —
then process-labeled products provide consumers with a vehicle for
expressing their belief in the overall public policy significance of the
public good. Utility for the consumer on this account is not necessarily
derived from effecting change in the world — from actually saving
migratory birds — but from participating in a process whereby one is
able to express a “vote” in favor of such change, whether or not it actually occurs. Support for this hypothesis comes from an extensive
empirical literature on the importance of procedural characteristics to
an individual’s evaluation of outcomes and the institutional structures
within which they occur.336 More generally, this hypothesis is consistent with Lawrence Friedman’s claim that the postwar industrialized
world is characterized by a strong cultural commitment to “expressive
individualism.”337 From either perspective, the observed demand for
process-labeled goods reflects in part the value that individuals place
on the ability to express their moral and political views through the
medium of conscientious consumption.
(a) The Utility of Process. — Psychologists repeatedly have found
that the characteristics of adjudicatory processes influence participants’ willingness to accept the desirability and legitimacy of judgments that result from those processes.338 Other things being equal,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
335 See Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values,
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 263 (2003) (noting the North American Commission on Environmental
Cooperation’s proposal to label appropriately produced coffee “bird-friendly”).
336 For an important early exposition of the theoretical view underlying later empirical work
that emphasizes the importance of procedural characteristics of institutions “not only as a means
to good results, but also as a means of implementing or serving process values such as participatory governance, procedural rationality, and humaneness,” see Robert S. Summers, Evaluating
and Improving Legal Processes — A Plea for “Process Values”, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (1974).
337 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE
2–3, 35–47 (1990).
338 See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 66–76 (1988) (arguing that individuals value certain procedures not only for their influence over outcomes, but also for their intrinsic desirability as fair procedures); JOHN THIBAUT &
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 13–14, 117–24 (1975)
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researchers have found that people are more likely to accept a decision
as normatively desirable and legitimate if they perceive that they had
an opportunity to express their viewpoint,339 that their input was
meaningfully considered prior to adoption of the decision,340 that the
decisionmaker treated them on an even-handed basis vis-à-vis other
interested parties,341 and that the decisionmaker treated them with
dignity and respect.342 Individuals apparently value these procedural
characteristics both because they may afford an avenue for influencing
the ultimate decision and, more importantly for present purposes, because they confer their own independent benefit on participants, irrespective of outcome.343 Although some scholars have expressed skepticism about this latter possibility,344 such doubts are mitigated in part
by studies finding that individuals prefer outcomes in which they are
allowed to voice an opinion on the disputed issue even when they
know that their opinion will not affect the outcome345 and, indeed,
even when they know that their opinion will be offered only after the
decision already has been made.346 In short, “[t]he consistent message
of this work is that individuals have an independent taste for fair pro–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(arguing that individuals express preferences for processes that they can control over processes
controlled by a third party). Outside of psychology, Amartya Sen has been a leading proponent of
the view that policymakers must pay attention to the desirability of procedures in addition to the
outcomes that flow from them. See Amartya Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice, 65
ECONOMETRICA 745, 750–63, 769–73 (1997); Amartya Sen, Rationality and Social Choice, 85 AM.
ECON. REV. 1, 11–12 (1995). With regard to distributive equity, for instance, Sen notes that “it is
hard to be convinced that we can plausibly judge any given utility distribution ignoring altogether
the process that led to that distribution (attaching, for example, no intrinsic importance whatever
to whether a particular utility redistribution is caused by charity, or taxation, or torture).” Id. at
12.
339 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 338, at 101–04.
340 See id. at 236.
341 See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive
and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850, 853–54 (1994).
342 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 338, at 214; E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF
JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 66 (1989).
343 See E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in
EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177, 189–92 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
344 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
1212–14 n.613 (2001).
345 See Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the
Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 80 (1985).
346 See E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 957
(1990). Of course, these studies do not adequately respond to Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s
complaint that “most prior empirical work does not seem to have been designed in a manner that
could . . . quantify actual tastes for procedures.” Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 344, at 1212 n.613.
Further empirical work responding to this practical objection is desirable. For purposes of the
argument made in this Article, it is sufficient to assume that the value of procedural utility is large
enough to render the process/product distinction unreliable as an assumption about the determinants of consumer welfare.
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cedures, which is primarily defined as having a voice in the decisionmaking process.”347
Further evidence of procedural utility exists in behavioral economic
investigations of fairness norms in market interactions. Researchers
have demonstrated, for instance, that individuals are far less likely to
accept price increases that they perceive to be exploitative, such as
those that occur during hurricanes, snowstorms, or other excess demand situations.348 Richard Thaler provides an especially elegant example of such fairness norms: individuals are willing to pay more to
have their “favorite brand of beer” brought to them on the beach by a
friend when they perceive the beer to originate from a “fancy resort
hotel,” as opposed to a “run-down grocery store.”349 This study suggests that identical bottles of beer have different values for individuals
depending on the bottles’ perceived origin, even when the individuals
themselves have no experiential connection with that origin.350 In addition, procedural characteristics also appear to affect worker wellbeing; for instance, researchers have shown that self-employed people
report higher satisfaction from their work than employed laborers,
holding constant other important variables such as income and
hours.351 Similarly, job satisfaction among a nationally representative
sample of over 28,000 British employees correlates significantly with
the existence and frequency of opportunities for workers to express
their views on compensation issues to superiors.352
Finally, evidence of procedural utility has been found in people’s
reactions to political institutions, particularly with regard to the scope
and nature of possibilities for individual participation in collective decisionmaking. As a recent literature review summarizes, “[c]itizens
may gain procedural utility from such participation rights over and
above the outcome generated in the political process, because they
provide a feeling of being involved and having political influence, as

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
347 David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and
Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 384 (2002).
348 See Kahneman et al., supra note 334, at S297–98. A formal model that incorporates individuals’ concern for the manner in which other market participants treat them is available in
Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV.
1281 (1993).
349 See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 31–32 (1992).
350 See id.
351 See BRUNO S. FREY & MATTHIAS BENZ, BEING INDEPENDENT IS A GREAT THING:
SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND HIERARCHY (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 135, 2003).
352 See MATTHIAS BENZ & ALOIS STUTZER, DO WORKERS ENJOY PROCEDURAL UTILITY?
(Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 127, 2002).
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well as a notion of inclusion, identity and self-determination.”353 In
one revealing study, Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer surveyed 6000 residents of Switzerland whose opportunities for political involvement
varied considerably among the country’s twenty-six cantons, which are
subnational government districts with significant legislative authority.354 Controlling for a large number of determinants and correlates
of subjective well-being, the researchers found that political participation rights, separate from any effect such rights entailed for desired political outcomes, had a significant effect on reported well-being.355
The lesson from this research for the process/product distinction
seems plain: just as people derive utility from feeling as if they participate in certain types of labor or political decisionmaking processes, so
too might consumers derive utility from participating in a marketplace
that is rich with information about the consequences of consumption.
Such a marketplace enables consumers to feel as if their purchasing
behavior expresses a viewpoint on critical aspects of the global economy, even apart from consideration of any instrumental impact that
such purchasing behavior might have on manufacturing processes.356
From this perspective, the determinative question for the process/product distinction is no longer simply whether consumer process
preferences are ill-informed or misguided. Instead, theorists also must
consider the existence and magnitude of procedural utility that consumers might derive from participating in a marketplace that affords

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
353 BRUNO S. FREY ET AL., INTRODUCING PROCEDURAL UTILITY: NOT ONLY WHAT, BUT
ALSO HOW MATTERS 13–14 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 10, 2003).
354 See BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, BEYOND OUTCOMES: MEASURING PROCEDURAL
UTILITY (Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 63, 2002).
355 The researchers found that subjective well-being was higher in districts that afforded more
substantial political participation rights. This positive effect occurred among both Swiss citizens
and, to a smaller extent, foreign residents. Because foreign residents cannot avail themselves of
participation rights, the researchers surmised that the disparity in the size of the positive impact
reflected two different components of procedural utility: “People may have a preference for participation as an activity as well as a characteristic of an institution.” Id. at 16. In other words,
for noncitizens — who could not value participation rights as an activity — the difference in perceived well-being must reflect in large part simply the value of living within a highly participatory political structure. See BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS:
HOW THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT WELL-BEING 153–67 (2002) (providing an extensive analysis of this issue and related research).
356 Cf. Alan Strudler & Eleonora Curlo, Consumption As Culture: A Desert Example, in ETHICS
OF CONSUMPTION: THE GOOD LIFE, JUSTICE, AND GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP, supra note 296, at
269, 277 (claiming “first, that the expressive function of goods is often important for understanding their appeal; second, that this expressive function is partly determined by the commercial
process, which helps fix the images that we associate with goods; and third, that the expressive
function of a good is ordinarily tied to its history”).
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the opportunity to “vote” through private consumption on important
matters of public policy.357
Despite its departure from conventional understandings, this account of process preferences may capture important aspects of consumer behavior: after all, an explanation similar to this one provides
the best account of experimentally derived estimates of individual demand for public goods, including the type of environmental and social
goods that frequently are threatened by harmful production processes
and that motivate consumer process preferences. Beginning in the late
1970s, economists pioneered a contingent valuation method for pricing
public goods in which survey respondents are asked to state their willingness to pay to preserve an increment of a public good, such as annual protection for one population of migratory birds.358 As Ilana Ritov and Daniel Kahneman note, however, the estimates derived from
such surveys are best understood as expressing an attitude regarding
“the perceived severity of an unsolved problem or unsatisfied need,”
rather than actually being “motivated by the good that is to be acquired.”359 That is, individuals seem to adopt a voting mentality
within the market medium of the contingent valuation survey. In a
similar fashion, consumers who purchase shade-grown coffee may do
so not because they are revealing their willingness to pay for the public
good of migratory bird protection, but rather because they are at–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
357 Cf. Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the
World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329, 2333 (2000) (“[I]f citizens place a value on the
capacity for self-government, paternalistic or technocratic responses even to admitted defects in
the democratic process may well not result in overall gains to democratic welfare.”).
358 See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 315–20
(1989). For overviews of the contingent valuation methodology, see ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH
STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES: A MANUAL (Ian J. Bateman et al. eds., 2002); and ROBERT
CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE
CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1989).
359 Ilana Ritov & Daniel Kahneman, How People Value the Environment: Attitudes Versus
Economic Values, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BEHAVIOR 33, 37–39 (Max H. Bazerman et al.
eds., 1997); see also HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A
THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982) (arguing that individual contributions to public goods provide
utility through the act of contribution, not through benefits flowing as a consequence of the contribution as in the case of an ordinary consumer purchase); Daniel Kahneman & Jack Knetsch,
Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 57
(1992) (concluding that contributions to public goods provide a sense of moral satisfaction, rather
than more tangible benefits to the contributor); Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of
Stated Willingness To Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994) (finding that willingness to pay for public goods correlates with other responses, including moral satisfaction, judgments of the importance of a public issue, and statements of political support for government action). But see David A. Dana, Existence Value and
Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 368–72 (2004) (describing methodological advances in contingent valuation research that attempt to overcome earlier identified
limitations).
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tempting to express the strength of their conviction that such protection constitutes sound public policy.360
Somewhat ironically, an FDA research team discovered the importance of this procedural interest to consumers after informing focus
group participants about the full extent of the use of GM ingredients
in the U.S. food market. According to the researchers, “[t]he typical
reaction of participants was not one of great concern about the immediate health and safety effects of unknowingly eating bioengineered
foods, but rather outrage that such a change in the food supply could
happen without them knowing about it.”361 The FDA researchers
found that “[v]irtually all participants” desired mandatory labeling of
GM food products not because of any “compositional effect of the
process on the food product,” but rather because of the simple fact of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
360 In this respect, the expressive account of process preferences may suggest important new
data sources for theorists who seek monetary measures of willingness to pay for public goods.
Because consumers act on process preferences within a marketplace context that forces comparison of their expenditures to an enormous range of possible alternative uses of funds, the “vote”
revealed by their behavior seems to avoid some of the chief conceptual complaints that have been
raised against contingent valuation studies and other hypothetical means by which individuals are
asked to translate their views into dollar amounts for policymaking purposes. See Murray B.
Rutherford et al., Assessing Environmental Losses: Judgments of Importance and Damage Schedules, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 63–69 (1998) (providing an overview of limitations of conventional economic measurement techniques for valuing environmental goods); MATTHEW D. ADLER,
FEAR ASSESSMENT: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE PRICING OF FEAR AND ANXIETY 46
(AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 03-12, 2003) (describing the
occasional anomalous finding in the contingent valuation literature that survey responses are insensitive to scope, such that individuals express nearly identical willingness-to-pay valuations regardless of the amount or size of the public good being acquired); cf. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1167–70 (2002) (noting a “translation
problem” whereby individuals have difficulty predictably translating “the intention to punish
. . . onto a scale that can be used by the legal system, such as dollars of fine or months in jail”).
Moreover, unlike most revealed-preference valuation methodologies, which attempt to infer the
value that individuals place on nonmarketed goods from behavior that is merely assumed to include consideration of the good at issue, see Kysar, supra note 10, at 574–78 (noting that many
observers have questioned the empirical foundation of wage-risk premium studies that attempt to
provide an indirect measure of the monetary amount by which workers are voluntarily willing to
risk their lives), process-distinguished goods make social or environmental policy goals an explicit
and integral component of the purchasing decision. Cf. Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90
GEO. L.J. 2311, 2311–12 (2002) (suggesting that market evidence of willingness to pay for clean
water could be inferred from the strong consumer rejection of Perrier bottled water following
disclosure of benzene contamination in a shipment of the company’s products). Thus, to the
extent that one seeks market expressions of individuals’ commitment to public goods, process
preferences may represent an underutilized but promising source of evidence. See, e.g., infra
p. 635 (describing a study by EPA economists that utilized organic food purchasing behavior as
an indirect measure of parents’ willingness to invest resources in the prevention of harm to their
children).
361 ALAN S. LEVY & BRENDA M. DERBY, OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS & SUPPORT, FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, REPORT ON CONSUMER
FOCUS GROUPS ON BIOTECHNOLOGY (emphasis added), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/biorpt.
html (Oct. 20, 2000).
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GM processing itself.362 Seemingly puzzled by this response, the researchers later learned from participants that “[t]hey felt [GM product]
labeling gave them an opportunity to register their view about the
wisdom of food biotechnology, i.e., to support or not support the dissemination of the technology, apart from their views about the health
and safety characteristics of the individual product.”363 In the focus
group participants’ words, they wanted to “send a message” to biotechnology companies.364
(b) The Market for Expression. — The foregoing account of consumer process preferences sheds some light on the important constitutional questions presented by the Kasky litigation. Specifically, it
demonstrates that when producers make process information available
to consumers for use in their purchasing decisions, the transactions
implicate the speech interests of both producers and consumers — and
not merely as speaker and listener, but as speakers both. On the surface, Nike appears to be the only party speaking about significant public issues, such as developing-world labor standards, through its relevant advertisements and other communications. If one accepts the
expressive account of process preferences, however, then Nike’s statements appear designed in significant part to attract consumers with
process preferences and, as a result, to provide consumers with an opportunity to engage in purposeful, expressive activity through the medium of conscientious consumption.365 By purchasing sweatshop-free
clothing or cruelty-free cosmetics, consumers signal that they are willing to expend resources to project an opinion or belief about the merits
of certain production processes, even if the clothing or cosmetics that
they acquire are otherwise indistinguishable from substitute wares.
Manufacturers of process-distinguished goods, in essence, are selling
consumers a voice.
Cultural studies accounts of consumer behavior hold that most
modern consumption in wealthy industrialized nations serves this
communicative function.366 Thus, just as the Nike “swoosh” logo is
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
362
363
364
365

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575),
available in 2003 WL 1922453, at *7–8 (“[A]lthough a purchasing decision that reflects an ethical
assessment of the seller based on the seller’s speech results in ‘commerce,’ what such speech induces is, in essence, further speech by the consumer about the entities with which he or she wishes
to associate and the activities of which he or she wishes to signal approval or disapproval . . . .”);
cf. Harper, supra note 261, at 415 (“A refusal to buy non-union [products] gains significance as
self-definition, as well as expression, when that decision is associated with the decisions of others.”).
366 See, e.g., JEAN BAUDRILLARD, Consumer Society, in JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED
WRITINGS 32, 49 (Mark Poster ed., 2d ed. 2001) (“Consumer behavior, which appears to be focused and directed at the object and at pleasure, in fact responds to quite different objectives: the
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understood to signify an identity that consumers acquire by purchasing
Nike products,367 process representations may signify political, social,
or environmental viewpoints that consumers can express by buying,
wearing, and using the represented goods. In that respect, process representations by manufacturers function quite similarly to trademarks,
logos, brands, and other conventional product emblems that typically
do not affect the compositional features of the product, but that nevertheless exert great influence over consumer decisionmaking.368 Significantly, scholars have long recognized that trademarks and other identity claims are difficult for consumers to verify and that, consequently,
governments can help to maintain the integrity of the trademark’s signaling function by preventing unauthorized trademark use.369 By policing the accuracy of manufacturer process representations, governments similarly can help to preserve the integrity of consumer “voting”
in a marketplace where such claims would be equally, if not more, difficult for consumers to verify.
From this perspective, the asymmetric constitutional framework
that attracted Nike’s complaint — that is, a framework in which consumers receive core First Amendment protection but manufacturers do
not, even when both are discussing issues related to manufacturing
processes370 — may be more defensible than it initially appears. The
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
metaphoric or displaced expression of desire, and the production of a code of social values
through the use of differentiating signs.”).
367 See, e.g., PETER K. LUNT & SONIA M. LIVINGSTONE, MASS CONSUMPTION AND PERSONAL
IDENTITY: EVERYDAY ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE 166–71 (1992).
368 The precise factors motivating consumer interest in product marks are subject to continuing
debate. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621
(2004) (arguing that a semiotic analysis of trademark function provides more robust analysis than
an economic analysis). In contrast to cultural studies depictions, economists believe that consumer responsiveness to brands reflects a rational choice by consumers to use manufacturer identity as a proxy for product quality or other salient product features that otherwise would entail
significant search costs. See Kysar, supra note 274, at 1755–56. Both the cultural studies and
economic accounts of trademark function are supported by Justice Harlan’s consideration of the
legitimacy of price premiums commanded by a product, Clorox Bleach, that was chemically indistinguishable from nonbranded alternatives. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 572
(1967). Justice Harlan rejected the FTC’s argument that such premiums constituted strong evidence of anticompetitive behavior in the market for household goods, reasoning that brand names
such as Clorox might serve legitimate functions that the FTC had failed to recognize and that
such functions could justify price premiums even for physically indistinguishable products. As
Justice Harlan wrote, “[i]t is not the [government’s] function to decide which lawful elements of
the ‘product’ offered the consumer should be considered useful and which should be considered
the symptoms of industrial ‘sickness.’ It is the consumer who must make that election through
the exercise of his purchasing power.” Id. at 604 (Harlan, J., concurring).
369 Indeed, laws against such unauthorized use date back to the Middle Ages. See Sidney A.
Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265, 277–80 (1975).
370 See Brief for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 898993, at *28 (“If
the full protections of the First Amendment apply to the allegations of [Nike’s critics], so too they
apply when Nike responds to those allegations.” (internal citations omitted)); Reply Brief for the
Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 1922453, at *7 (describing the California
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reason to monitor corporate process speech through false and deceptive advertising regulation is to ensure that misleading corporate representations do not subvert the consumers’ free speech and associational interests. Importantly, it is not necessary to categorize the
respective activities of manufacturers and consumers within these
transactions as both commercial or both noncommercial speech.371 Instead, goods that are labeled or advertised according to their manufacturing characteristics may simultaneously implicate commercial speech
activities by product makers, and core expressive and associational activities by product purchasers.372 On this view, the government’s
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
consumer protection scheme as “underinclusive . . . because it excludes accusations calculated to
discourage consumers from purchasing a particular manufacturer’s products”).
371 The Court has acknowledged that the First Amendment’s protections extend “to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). The Court also has noted that “component parts of
a single speech [may be] inextricably intertwined.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, Inc., 487
U.S. 781, 796 (1988). It has not, however, entertained in depth the possibility that the same transaction or activity could implicate different categories of speech depending on who is identified as
the relevant speaker.
372 Indeed, assuming that it abides by corporate law duties of fidelity to shareholder welfare,
the corporation arguably must speak only in pursuit of the commercial goal of economic profit
maximization. As Daniel Greenwood has written, “[w]hile real people must balance competing
values, compare their own needs and those of others important to them, and make difficult
choices between various aspects of our too-finite lives, corporations (or the role-constrained managers who decide for them) just maximize shareholder value.” Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential
Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1049 (1998). In light of this
qualitative difference between corporate and noncorporate speech, Greenwood argues that the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech should give way to a distinction between deliberative, volitional speakers and those speakers whose ends are predetermined by the
dictates of corporate and agency law. See id. at 1055–66; see also Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 738–39 (1995) (arguing that abstracted speech that has no
speaker, including commercial speech, should be conceived of as “institutional speech” rather than
speech flowing from a human agent); Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’
Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981) (exploring in depth the institutional
features of corporate speakers and arguing that states should have constitutional latitude to condition certain kinds of corporate speech on shareholder consent); Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech
and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1227, 1259–61 (1986) (noting distinctions between “corporate speech” and “human speech”).
In many respects, Greenwood’s analysis follows an earlier suggestion by Steven Shiffrin that
C. Edwin Baker’s prominent argument against the constitutional protection of commercial speech
could be improved through an emphasis on “the structure of the corporation rather than the market structure in which the corporation participates.” Shiffrin, supra note 233, at 1246; see C.
EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 219 (1989) (asserting that corporate
speech cannot “be attributed to the choice of a free agent”); C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech:
A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) (arguing that “unlike the broad
categories of protected speech, commercial speech does not represent an attempt to create or affect
the world in a way which can be expected to represent anyone’s private or personal wishes”); C.
Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish’s The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 652 (1982) (arguing that political speech by corporations “[does] not derive from the values or political commitments of any individuals”). In contrast
to Greenwood, Baker, and other commentators, Martin Redish and Howard Wasserman argue
that, “[v]iewed from [a] more complete social and economic perspective, the corporate form per-
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monitoring of the accuracy of process representations would impinge
only on the commercial speech of product manufacturers, and it would
do so only in order to enable and support fundamental First Amendment activity by consumers.373
Acknowledging this state interest complicates significantly the effort to create a process/product distinction within commercial speech
doctrine. A central pillar of Nike’s support for such a distinction was
the claim that, in the absence of heightened constitutional protection
from liability, product manufacturers would be reluctant to divulge information regarding labor conditions and other processes voluntarily.374 This chilling argument, however, must be weighed against the
complementary chilling of consumer demand that would occur if individuals no longer could depend on the veracity of process representations in a heavily manipulated marketplace. If individuals came to regard the process representations of manufacturers with substantial
cynicism and distrust, such that their willingness to pay premiums for
process-labeled goods diminished, then the economic motivation for
manufacturers such as Nike to disclose process information would diminish as well.375 In that sense, it is not merely a question whether
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
forms an important democratic function in facilitating the personal self-realization of the individuals who have made the voluntary choice to make use of it.” Martin H. Redish & Howard M.
Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 237 (1998); see also The Supreme Court, 1977 Term—Leading
Cases, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 165 (1978) (“[C]orporate political expression should be protected as
the speech and associational activity of the individual owners.”).
373 From this perspective, the International Dairy court similarly should have respected Vermont’s attempt to effectuate the expressive and associational interests that consumers hold in being able to choose among controversial dairy processes. After all, the Supreme Court has observed that “because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s
interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, ‘warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately
required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.’” Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (alterations in original) (quoting In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)). When such disclosure requirements are seen as being deployed
in service of an affirmative speech interest on the part of consumers, the case for disclosure becomes stronger.
374 Indeed, in a possibly strategic illustration of this point, Nike refused to issue the company’s
social responsibility report during the pendency of the Kasky appeal, citing concerns about potential lawsuits. See Allan Jenkins, What Would You Do? Nike v. Kasky Case Puts Public Relations
Campaigns Under New Scrutiny, 20 COMM. WORLD, Apr.–May 2003, at 14; see also Reply Brief
for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 1922453, at *14 (objecting to “the
profound chilling effect” of the California court’s decision and noting that “consumers might
‘care’ about virtually every aspect of corporate operations — however divorced from the qualities
of the products being sold”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 899100, at *25–26 (arguing that substantial monetary
liability “may cause even a company of Nike’s size to refrain from presenting its side of the story,
or to do so only in vague — and far less informative — generalities”).
375 See infra pp. 625–27 (describing the classic economic justification for government regulation
of “lemons markets” to prevent market unraveling when consumers lack ready means to verify
product claims).
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the threat of deceptive advertising liability would deter manufacturer
disclosure of process information, but whether the threat of liability
would have a more pronounced effect than the drying-up of consumer
demand that would be wrought by a marketplace rife with false and
deceptive process claims.376
Regardless of how this question is resolved, the Court at a minimum should acknowledge the expressive and associational interests
that consumers exert through the act of purchasing products based on
process characteristics.377 To do so, the Court must modify its untenable view that, on the one hand, companies “enjoy the full panoply of
First Amendment protections for their direct comments on public issues,”378 while, on the other hand, “advertising which ‘links a product
to a current public debate’ is not thereby entitled to the constitutional
protection afforded noncommercial speech.”379 In the case of easily
recognizable consumer product firms such as Nike, these simultaneous
contentions cannot stand: speech by consumer product firms is qualitatively different from other speech in that it comes paired with a steady
flow of retail offerings whose social meanings are inextricably bound
up with the identity and communications of the firm that offers
them.380 Thus, the most significant question raised by a case such as
Kasky may not be whether corporate process claims concern a commercial or a noncommercial subject, but instead whether they are accompanied by a trademark, brand, or similar signifier that is indelibly
linked to specific commercial products in the mind of the consumer
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
376 In this respect, it may be highly relevant that the Court in previous cases has described advertising as especially durable. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977) (“Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.”); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
772 n.24 (1976) (“[T]he greater . . . hardiness of commercial speech[] may make it less necessary to
tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.”).
377 The Court has emphasized that “[a]dvertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry
information of import to significant issues of the day.” Bates, 433 U.S. at 364. Beyond these spare
statements, however, the Court has not examined in depth the specific consumer interests served
by advertising and marketing.
378 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980) (citing
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)).
379 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 n.7 (1985) (quoting Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5).
380 Compare the Court’s famous assertion that “[t]he inherent worth of . . . speech in terms of
its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
777 (1978); see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193–94
(1999) (noting that “[e]ven under the degree of scrutiny that we have applied in commercial speech
cases, decisions that select among speakers conveying virtually identical messages are in serious
tension with the principles undergirding the First Amendment”). For an examination of how the
Court’s acceptance of corporate identity as a relevant distinguishing feature in electoral speech
cases might have been incorporated into an analysis of Kasky had the case not been dismissed, see
Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2289–90 (2004).
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and that becomes a part of her effort to shape and project images,
ideas, and attitudes through purposeful consumption choices.
3. The Ethical Account. — Just as food products made from GM
ingredients have permeated the U.S. market without widespread consumer awareness, an unknown but potentially substantial percentage
of chocolate purchased in the United States derives from cocoa beans
harvested by enslaved children in West Africa.381 Growing numbers of
consumers and activist organizations are seeking to raise awareness of
this connection between the chocolate trade and child slavery, as well
as to identify alternative confectionary manufacturers that do not obtain cocoa beans from farms using exploited child labor.382 Individuals
who seek to avoid purchasing or consuming “slavery chocolate” in this
manner (or “conflict diamonds,”383 to take another salient example)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
381 See Brian S. Woods & Kate Blewett, Slavery: The Ivory Coast, West Africa, 17 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 869, 872 (2001) (speculating based on interviews with West African cocoa producers
that “the hands of slaves have touched almost half the world’s chocolate”). In its 2001 human
rights report, the U.S. State Department cited an international agency’s estimate that some 15,000
children between the ages of nine and twelve had been sold into forced labor in the Ivory Coast.
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 1 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2001, at
209 (2002), available at http://www.house.gov/international_relations/107/78290b/pdf. A subsequent study by the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture found that, although the majority of children working in West African cocoa plantations were either paid by or related to farmers, up to 12,000 remaining children were at high risk of forced labor. See INT’L INST. OF
TROPICAL AGRIC., CHILD LABOR IN THE COCOA SECTOR OF WEST AFRICA: A SYNTHESIS OF
FINDINGS IN CAMEROON, CÔTE D’IVOIRE, GHANA, AND NIGERIA (Aug. 2002), available at
http://www.iita.org/news/cocoa.pdf. For an analysis of the complexities posed by child labor
within international trade law, including the difficulty of defining forced labor, see Federico
Lenzerini, International Trade and Child Labour Standards, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 301, at 287, 290–95. For a discussion of slave labor in
the global economy generally, see Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2002).
382 See Encouraging Sustainable, Responsible Cocoa Farming, at http://www.fhidc.com/cocoa/
index.asp (last modified July 9, 2003). Their efforts have resulted in media coverage and, more
importantly, an industry-wide commitment to eliminate child slavery and other abuses of child
laborers from the global chocolate trade by the year 2005. Id. In addition, the Sanders Amendment, an appropriations rider adopted in 1997, forbids border officials from allowing importation
of products made by forced or indentured child labor. See Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-61, § 634, 111 Stat. 1272, 1316 (1997). The International Labor Rights Fund filed a petition with the U.S. Customs Service on May 30, 2002, charging that customs officials were failing to prohibit the importation of cocoa harvested by enslaved
children. See Int’l Labor Rights Fund, Child Labor in the Cocoa Industry, at http://www.
laborrights.org/projects/childlab/cocoa.htm (June 2003). In 2003, after officials had failed to act
on the petition, the group brought suit in federal court along with two fair trade organizations as
additional named plaintiffs. See First Amended Complaint, Int’l Labor Rights Fund v. Bush,
Civ. No. 03-1316 (D.D.C. July 2003), available at http://www.laborrights.org/projects/childlab/
cocoa%20complaint%20amended.pdf. The complaint was dismissed in 2004 on the ground that
the Court of International Trade held exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy. See Int’l Labor
Rights Fund v. Bush, Civ. No. 03-1316 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2004).
383 See Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations,
and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 1 (2003) (“At the hands of rebels,
dictators, and terrorists, diamonds have crystallized into a source of financing for conflict and
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may do so because they actively desire to aid child laborers or simply
because they wish to project an opinion or belief through their purchasing behavior about this lamentable aspect of the global economy.
On the other hand, consumers may accept that their actions —
whether understood instrumentally or expressively — can exert only
limited influence in a world of six billion individuals, but nevertheless
seek resigned solace in the knowledge that they are not complicit with
practices that they regard as immoral. As Howse and Regan observe,
“[s]ome people do not want to benefit from or be associated with what
they regard as wickedness even if they are unable to prevent it.”384
This inward orientation of process preferences is particularly welldemonstrated by consumers of kosher products, whose aim is not to
avoid complicity with evil but to promote association with good. By
seeking out kosher food products, observant individuals are not attempting to influence changes in the way that food is produced or even
to express an attitude about kosher food as a public matter. Rather,
their behavior seems directed toward personal moral practice: “[E]ating
only kosher food is seen as a way of elevating oneself spiritually.”385 In
a similar fashion, the coalition of litigants who challenged the FDA’s
decision not to label GM food products included individuals who simply “believe that their religion forbids consumption of foods produced
through rDNA technology.”386 Vegetarian consumers likewise have
expressed concern over their inability, in the absence of mandatory labeling, to discern whether genetic material derived from animals has
been inserted into GM plants.387 In addition, although still fairly early
in its development, the process of cloning livestock for human con-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
civil wars, which have caused the deaths of more than two million people.”). In May 2003, the
WTO granted a waiver allowing nations that are participating in the Kimberley Certification
Scheme — a multilateral attempt to eliminate the trade in conflict diamonds — to impose trade
restrictions on nonparticipating nations. As Joost Pauwelyn notes, the WTO’s grant of a “waiver”
carries the negative implication that other process-based trade measures, including even those
adopted multilaterally, are suspect under the GATT. See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or
Superiority Complex?: What To Make of the WTO Waiver for “Conflict Diamonds”, 24 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1177, 1198–99 (2003).
384 Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 275; see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 709 (2003) (“People
suffering from moral taint are not blamed for the conduct that produced it . . . because they had
no control over the conduct . . . . But people often feel shame, and are stigmatized by others, as a
result of their association with the wrongful conduct.”).
385 Benjamin N. Gutman, Ethical Eating: Applying the Kosher Food Regulatory Regime to Organic Food, 108 YALE L.J. 2351, 2363 (1999).
386 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170 (D.D.C. 2000).
387 See Kim JoDene Donat, Note, Engineering Akerlof Lemons: Information Asymmetry, Externalities, and Market Intervention in the Genetically Modified Food Market, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 417, 427 (2003).
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sumption is likely to attract a considerable degree of religious and
ethical objection if it becomes significantly commercialized.388
As these examples demonstrate, consumer process preferences can
be understood not from the standpoint of their effect on the external
world or their utility as mechanisms for public expression, but rather
simply from the premise that consumption often is an intensely personal activity with significant moral consequences. As Eric Freyfogle
notes: “To buy a product is inevitably to become tied to its history and
to accept a level of responsibility for its future.”389 Many consumers
seem to share this view, such that their own sense of moral well-being
is affected by the nature and degree of knowledge that they hold regarding product processes, irrespective of the impact that such processes, or indeed their own behavior, may have. Like the expressive account of consumer process preferences, this ethical account provides an
independent basis for regarding such preferences as worthy of respect
by policymakers. That is, even if instrumental concerns do not justify
support of process preferences according to a regulator’s technical or
scientific assessment, one still must acknowledge the intrinsically personal nature of the act of purchasing and the conventional liberal refusal to scrutinize or judge such inwardly directed behaviors.390
Some forms of liberalism, however, deny the legitimacy of process
preferences on the basis that they are not purely internal, but rather
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
388 See Alexandra Hawkins, Protecting Human Dignity and Individuality: The Need for Uniformity in International Cloning Legislation, 14 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 243, 255–56, 268–80 (2001)
(describing the process of livestock cloning and providing an overview of legal and political responses to the controversy provoked by cloning technologies).
389 ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
GOOD 194 (2003).
390 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 55 (1980) (noting
that the liberal principle of neutrality “does not distinguish the merits of competing conceptions of
the good”); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985) (“[Liberalism] supposes that
political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular conception of the
good life, or of what gives value to life.”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–
73 (1977) (observing that the liberal conception of equality mandates that government “must not
constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen’s conception of the good life of one group is nobler
or superior to another’s”); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 303–04 (1993) (“A crucial assumption of liberalism is that equal citizens have different and indeed incommensurable and irreconcilable conceptions of the good. . . . [L]iberalism . . . tries to show both that a plurality of
conceptions of the good is desirable and how a regime of liberty can accommodate this plurality
so as to achieve the many benefits of human diversity.”). Of course, the coherence and desirability
of this traditional liberal view has been the subject of much debate. See, e.g., Larry Alexander,
Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 793 (1993) (arguing that liberals who endorse neutrality overlook the fact that “no neutral principle for selecting
the baseline that defines neutrality has been established”); Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1993) (noting that “[a]lthough
liberalism is sometimes associated with neutrality regarding alternative conceptions of the good
. . . the status of neutrality as a defining characteristic of liberalism is quite contestable — even
among liberals”).
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frequently hinge on the characteristics or conditions of other individuals.391 Of particular concern is the possibility that individuals will act
on process information in ways that serve discriminatory purposes,
such as avoiding goods because of a producer’s support for civil
rights392 or even using nominally neutral process-based distinctions to
further racially prejudicial aims.393 In part for this reason, some view
the process/product distinction itself as an important component of the
liberal market’s approach to combating prejudice. As Gail Heriot
writes, “liberalism postulates a preference structure in its citizens that
may or may not exist: that citizens generally derive utility from the
physical properties of the goods they purchase, not from the religious
preference or any other private data about the producer or vendor.”394
Even the economist William Hutt, whose expansive view of consumer
sovereignty provides an important element of the normative case in
favor of market liberalism,395 nevertheless believed that the impersonality of market relations was essential to the attainment of liberty and
tolerance.396
The danger that process information may serve discriminatory or
otherwise illicit purposes is, of course, real. Thus, like the various
GATT/WTO tools that attempt to ferret out disguised discrimination
against nations, legal controls still must ensure that process preferences
do not discriminate against producers based on a protected status, as
opposed to a social or environmental production decision that the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
391 Many scholars, for instance, have argued that it is difficult to exclude sadistic or otherwise
antisocial preferences once one admits any form of other-regarding preference. Cf. Hausman &
McPherson, supra note 22, at 690 n.31 (noting that “[t]he satisfaction of some preferences . . .
seem[s] to have nothing to do with an individual’s own well-being” and that many have argued
that these preferences should be excluded from one’s understanding of individual well-being).
But see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 344, at 1339–50 (arguing in principle against the notion of
excluding other-regarding preferences from welfare analysis, but concluding that many objectionable other-regarding preferences will in practice be denied satisfaction under such an analysis);
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1681–83 (2003) (describing the attempt to exclude objectionable preferences
in this manner and concluding that “[i]t seems both impossible and undesirable to separate between self-regarding and other-regarding preferences”).
392 For instance, during the civil rights struggle, white supremacists greeted black consumer
campaigns with commercial activism of their own: “By the mid-1960s white supremacists were
countering black consumer boycotts with ‘buy-ins’ designed to support spurned merchants and
their own boycotts of white retail businesses owned by those considered race traitors.” COHEN,
supra note 2, at 187–88.
393 See Marion Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1313, 1322 (2002) (describing
use of union-made labeling campaigns to exclude and harm nonwhite workers).
394 Gail L. Heriot, The New Feudalism: The Unintended Destination of Contemporary Trends
in Employment Law, 28 GA. L. REV. 167, 181–82 (1993).
395 See supra p. 584.
396 See Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: Consumer Sovereignty, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 183, 187–88
(1993).
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manufacturer has made and — significantly — can unmake.397 However, it bears stating the obvious point that racially discriminatory
preferences are objectionable not because they concern processes, but
because they concern race. In that sense, the process/product distinction sweeps too broadly as a tool for tolerance, threatening to undermine not only discriminatory behavior, but also longstanding and
firmly held practices of ethical consumption. For instance, kosher food
standards include process-based rules concerning acceptable handlers,
methods of preparation, and other practices that do not affect the nutrition, taste, or other tangible aspects of the food products themselves.398 Thus, in a legal environment that fully embraced the process/product distinction, government efforts to support kosher
certification programs399 would become vulnerable to challenge on
grounds in addition to the Establishment Clause complaints that have
proven formidable thus far.400
Moreover, many observers believe that the liberating anonymity of
product markets has become too liberating in the present global era.
Transnational production chains shield individuals from far more than
merely the demographic identity of producers. They also shield individuals from much of the social and environmental impact of private
consumer decisionmaking, fostering an “institutionalized ignorance”401
within the product marketplace at the very moment that government
officials are urging individuals to regard consumer expenditure as their
central function as citizens and, moreover, that proponents of costbenefit analysis are urging regulators to rely on individual market behavior in order to infer the determinants of public policy. Proponents
of labeling and other efforts to ensure consumer access to process information seek to counterbalance this constitutive anonymity of markets by making transparent to consumers the relationships that their
decisions have with distant actors and distant places. These proponents seek to recontextualize consumption within specific communities
and ecologies, hoping ultimately that individual purchasing decisions
will begin to approximate the conceptual and rhetorical significance
that “voting with one’s dollars” has been given within the framework
of market liberalism.402
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
397 See Harper, supra note 261, at 426–34 (providing a detailed analysis of the appropriate limits of a consumer’s right to boycott).
398 See Gutman, supra note 385, at 2363–65.
399 See id. at 2369 (“At least twenty-two states have statutes prohibiting the fraudulent representation of non-kosher food as kosher.”).
400 See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 416 (2d Cir. 2002);
Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1337 (4th Cir. 1995); RanDav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1353 (N.J. 1992).
401 See supra p. 536.
402 See supra p. 527.
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In addition to associating process preferences with class- or statusbased distinctions, proponents of the process/product distinction also
more directly attack contemporary process preferences by attempting
to discredit or trivialize their basis as ethically coherent and significant
actions. For instance, a federal district court described the FDA’s failure to require GM food labeling as merely a “potential inconvenience”403 to “religious leaders” who feared that their anti-GM convictions would become impossible to maintain in a marketplace saturated
with unlabeled GM ingredients.404 More subtly, prominent consumer
law commentator Howard Beales discounts the interest of vegetarians
in GM labeling by arguing that a plant modified to include genetic
material from animals “does not acquire ‘animal-like’ characteristics
any more than a plant fertilized with manure does.”405 He neglects to
consider, however, the fact that animals undoubtedly were bred, caged,
and handled during development of the genetically altered product —
a fact that may matter significantly to vegetarians who are motivated
by animal welfare concerns. More fundamentally, by resting the definition of “animal” purely on functional characteristics of the modified
organism, Beales usurps the authority of individuals to determine for
themselves how newly extant life forms should be treated for religious
and moral purposes.
Other critics charge that process preferences do not reflect an ethically defensible vision of consumer behavior when viewed in light of
the diversity of values and conditions that prevail among foreign nations. Robert Hudec, for instance, notes that accepting the legitimacy
of process preferences within international trade law might allow
product regulation to be overcome by “an excess of zeal” from the “essentially moral claims” of consumers.406 Other scholars more strongly
regard advocates of linking consumption to process characteristics as
“irrational moral fanatics, prepared to sacrifice global economic wel-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
403 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 181 (D.D.C. 2000) (“While the
Court recognizes the potential inconvenience the lack of labeling presents for Plaintiffs, Defendant’s decision [not] to mandate labeling of genetically modified foods does not ‘substantially’
burden Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.”).
404 Id. at 170.
405 Beales, supra note 36, at 110. Less credible individuals also have attempted to discredit the
ethical basis of process preferences. A spokesperson for the American Forest and Paper Association, for instance, described consumer demand for sustainably harvested timber products as
“blackmail” and an “extortion campaign.” Greg Winter, Timber Company Reduces Cutting of OldGrowth Trees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at A14.
406 Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against Foreign
Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE
TRADE? 95, 149 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
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fare and the pressing needs of the developing countries for trivial, elusive, or purely sentimental goals.”407
One frequent version of this concern holds that, by seeking to avoid
the fruits of exploited labor, consumers may contribute to market dynamics that ultimately leave developing world workers with an even
worse fate than they currently endure.408 In part for this reason, Lawrence Summers questions the desire of consumers to avoid purchasing
sweatshop goods:
[M]any believe that it is wrong to buy imported products produced by
workers who are paid less than a specified minimum wage of some sort.
We all deplore the conditions in which so many on this planet work and
the paltry compensation they receive. And yet there is surely some moral
force to the concern that as long as the workers are voluntarily employed,
they have chosen to work because they are working to their best alternative. Is narrowing an individual’s set of choices an act of respect, of charity, even of concern?409

Summers strikes upon an insightful way of posing the ethical dilemmas created by a world of great economic integration and inequity.
The difficulty, however, is that by eliminating a consumer’s informational basis for evaluating these complex dynamics and deciding for
herself, the process/product distinction also narrows an individual’s set
of choices. By itself, the aim of maximizing individual choice simply
will not resolve these dilemmas.410
Moreover, despite the potential unintended consequences of process-based purchasing decisions, individual consumers can maintain
consistency in their moral selfhood by simultaneously supporting foreign aid, human rights treaties, international labor agreements, and
other mechanisms whereby the lives of workers in the developing
world are improved. Critics of process preferences instead try to force
on consumers an unwarranted catch-22: either purchase a product
whose production processes consumers oppose, or implicitly adopt a
position that they equally abhor. The dichotomy is misleading because
it conflates the individual consumer’s ethical responsibility with the
variety of historical, political, and economic circumstances that have
combined to place developing world laborers in a position of great
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
407 Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 330, at 61 (characterizing critiques of the connection between free trade and environmental and labor interests).
408 See sources cited supra note 41; see also BROWN ET AL., supra note 41, at 41–51 (observing
that multinational firms tend to provide higher wages and better working conditions in developing nations than local counterpart firms).
409 Economics and Moral Questions, HARV. MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 63, 64.
410 Cf. Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 157
(1970) (using other-regarding preferences to demonstrate a fundamental inconsistency between
certain notions of individual freedom of choice and the welfare-maximizing paradigm of Pareto
optimality).
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need and vulnerability. Yet consumers do not adopt anemic foreign
assistance programs; nations do. Thus, individual consumers may seek
to avoid slavery-tainted chocolate even as they support multilateral action to stop the trade in children and the conditions of abject poverty
that give rise to it. Compelling consumers instead to purchase slavery
chocolate on pain of abandoning children to starvation charges consumers with consequences that they neither condone nor support. It
stretches the bounds of complicity beyond fact or reason.411
When, on the other hand, individual consumers’ ethical preferences
are reflected in national policies, such as through unilateral trade
measures, a further moral objection must be addressed. Specifically,
noted trade scholar Jagdish Bhagwati argues that if developed nations
and their consumers insist on “impos[ing] [their] ethical preferences on
other communities and nations”412 through mandatory process-based
trade measures, then they generally should pay compensation to the
affected producers: “[i]f it is right in the Christian tradition to buy indulgences to pay for one’s vice, perhaps one should not object to a
proposal to pay for one’s virtue.”413 Despite its appeal, Bhagwati’s argument confuses the obligation to aid poor nations with an obligation
to do so specifically by importing goods from poor nations. If there
were an independent duty to purchase cocoa from West Africa, then
consumers might be under an obligation to pay producers for the right
to avoid eating slavery chocolate, as Bhagwati suggests.414 Such a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
411 Similarly misleading is the United States’s attempt to convert the GM food dispute into a
binary choice between accepting GM products and relegating billions to poverty and starvation.
See supra p. 564. Currently, experts generally agree that there is enough agricultural capacity to
feed the world without GM food technologies, and that hunger and malnourishment are instead
primarily attributable to poverty, dislocation, corruption, and other political and economic causes.
See, e.g., Ellen Messer, Food Systems and Dietary Perspective: Are Genetically Modified Organisms the Best Way To Ensure Nutritionally Adequate Food?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 65,
68 (2001). Thus, a decision to avoid supporting GM foods is not necessarily tantamount to a decision to prolong starvation, particularly if the consumer seeks to support the elimination of world
hunger through other means.
412 Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?, supra note 311, at 170, 174–75;
see also JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 157–58 (2004) (arguing that “the
rich and powerful countries that wish to propagate their moral preferences, whether widely held
or idiosyncratic, should proceed to subsidize the PPMs that they advocate . . . , putting their own
resources where they claim their moral preferences are”).
413 Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?, supra note 311, at 175.
414 Bhagwati’s argument parallels the view of trade scholars who regard the GATT as creating
a general right of market access, as opposed to a negative right to be free from discriminatory
treatment. Compare Bartels, supra note 324, at 383 (positing that “under the law of the WTO
there is a right to trade”) with Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 276 (defending the view that
“[s]o far as its general purpose and structure are concerned, GATT creates only a negative right of
non-discrimination”). Reflecting the former conception, Michael Strauss argues in an unpublished
paper that process-based trade measures may constitute “efficient breaches,” whereby nations intentionally violate their contractual commitments under GATT in order to promote welfaremaximizing internalization of the social and environmental externalities of production. Strauss
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conception, however, upsets the normative argument in favor of free
trade, which, after all, presumes that consumers make purchases in
order to improve their welfare and that expanding opportunities for
such trading in turn will increase overall welfare. Bhagwati’s argument instead turns the trading system into a wealth transfer device
in which consumers must make resource contributions to developing
nations in order to avoid purchasing products that they regard as
objectionable.415
As this section has attempted to demonstrate, often lurking within
process-related disputes are personal convictions of a nature and magnitude that liberal societies traditionally have regarded as sacrosanct.
Moreover, notwithstanding the occasional critiques advanced by proponents of the process/product distinction, the ethical coherence and
legitimacy of these grounds for process preferences are not easily discredited. Therefore, particularly at a time when consumption occupies
such a strong position of influence over culture and identity,416 analysts should be hesitant to discount the importance of religious or ethical grounds for consumer decisionmaking. To be sure, as proponents
of the process/product distinction sometimes press, the historical progression from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft417 did help to obscure a variety of racial, ethnic, and religious characteristics of producers that
now are recognized as inappropriate bases for consumer distinction.418
Nevertheless, the anonymity of today’s global product markets also
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
argues that such breaches should be accompanied by compensation to the developing nation, at
least until multilateral consensus is achieved that the externality is indeed a cost or a market failure that should be redressed through regulation rather than regarded as a legitimate aspect of
comparative advantage. See Strauss, supra note 63 (manuscript at 35–37); see also Candice Stevens, Trade and the Environment: The PPMs Debate, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 246–47 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995) (proposing a compensation principle
by which regulating nations must pair unilateral process-based trade measures with technical and
financial assistance to help ensure compliance by developing nations).
415 Moreover, as Howard Chang notes, such an approach might create perverse incentives for
nations to increase their level of an offensive activity in order to maximize the payments that they
receive. See Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures To Protect the Global
Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2154–56 (1995); Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 309, 314 (1997) (noting that states may adopt bad
policies to extract concessions).
416 Cf. Bruce Ledewitz, Corporate Advertising’s Democracy, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 460
(2003) (“The great American debate of the twenty-first century . . . is going to be about the relationship of our consumption lifestyle to everything else — nature, population, wealth, our own
happiness, and the divine.”).
417 See FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY & SOCIETY 33–35 (Charles P. Loomis ed. & trans.,
Mich. State Univ. Press 1957) (1887) (describing the transition from traditional agrarian “Gemeinschaft” to modern industrialized “Gesellschaft”).
418 See Heriot, supra note 394, at 182 (noting that the “multiplicity of relationships [in modern
market societies] makes it a bit easier to buy into the liberal notion that one should be indifferent
to the religious or other private preferences of the persons from whom one purchases otherwise
identical goods”).
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threatens to exclude any basis for expressing communal awareness or
concern through consumer action, an exclusion that will become ever
more glaring as individuals are urged to define and assert themselves
nearly exclusively through the market.
B. Process Preferences in Global Civil Society
Rather than being scientifically unfounded, nakedly protectionist,
or ethically inconsistent, consumer process preferences instead offer an
important vehicle through which individuals influence the world, express their views on public issues, and fashion their moral identity in
an era of extraordinary interconnectedness, complexity, and dynamism
in the market. Although consumers undoubtedly suffer from some informational deficiencies with regard to the meaning and significance of
various manufacturing practices, the case for wholesale irrationality or
unreliability of process preferences is unpersuasive. Policymakers
therefore should grapple with purportedly unreliable preferences by
seeking to inform and educate consumers openly, rather than by categorically eliminating processes as a basis for consumer distinction or
regulatory decisionmaking. Similarly, although the reality of building
political constituencies frequently means that process-based trade restrictions are fashioned or implemented in discriminatory ways, international trade law should combat such efforts by examining trade restrictions for discriminatory aims and effects directly, not by using a
restriction’s focus on manufacturing processes as a rudimentary proxy
for protectionism. The process/product distinction, in short, should be
discarded as a conceptual device within law and policy.
Jettisoning the process/product distinction, however, does not resolve underlying questions regarding the proper role of process preferences within policymaking, particularly at the international level. As a
theoretical matter, such preferences do not fit comfortably within the
framework of market liberalism, which tends to assume that consumer
desires are private and self-interested. In contrast, process preferences
often appear both public and other-regarding. Nor do process preferences enter smoothly into the project of regulatory cost-benefit analysis, which seeks to replace valuations that occur through collective
processes with information gleaned from the privately undertaken
tradeoffs of market actors. Unlike the traditional view, which holds
that “[m]arket processes evoke self-interested choices whereas political
processes encourage other-regarding ones,”419 process preferences instead implicate all four categories: the market, politics, consumerism,

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
419

Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 4, at 382.
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and citizenship all are present when athletic shoe purchases raise salient issues of economic justice and human rights.420
Instead of denying this convergence through an artificial distinction
between processes and products, policymakers should grapple directly
with the interests at stake in process-related disputes. Toward that
end, this section begins by describing the standard framework for justifying and evaluating government intervention in the market for consumer information. Through an analogy to an ingenious recent study
of altruistic preferences, it then argues that consumer process preferences are highly context-dependent. Regulation of process information
therefore cannot be a straightforward effort to maximize existing preferences, but rather must reflect a choice between competing preference
orderings that exist within many individuals and that, at least in part,
can be enabled or disabled by alteration of the relevant decisionmaking context. This section concludes by arguing in favor of respecting,
rather than suppressing, preferences that evince concern for other
populations, other generations, and other life forms.421 The case for
such process preferences is based not on their simplistic veneer of virtue,422 but rather on the belief that process preferences capture the
displaced moral and political sentiments of individuals acting in a
world fixated on consumption.
1. The Inevitability of Regulation. — In its rejection of Vermont’s
effort to ensure consumer access to information regarding the use of
rbST by dairy producers, the International Dairy court argued that
“those consumers interested in such information should exercise the
power of their purses by buying products from manufacturers who
voluntarily reveal it.”423 Although rhetorically powerful, the court’s
viewpoint overlooks the conventional economic explanation for product labeling regulation, which emphasizes the fact that manufacturers
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
420 Cf. Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by Any Other Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1635–39 (1989)
(noting the theoretical limitations of a citizen/consumer dichotomy that rigidly associates publicregarding and private-regarding preferences, respectively, with the two categories).
421 In a context analogous to the regulator’s choice of whether to encourage process preferences,
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue in favor of “libertarian benevolence” by regulators in the
construction of choice settings that impact the welfare of third parties. Specifically, Thaler and
Sunstein detail wide differences in organ donation rates depending on whether nations adopt
“opt-in” or “opt-out” donation schemes, and argue that policymakers “can often deliver significant
benefits to third parties simply by switching the default rule.” Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1192–93 (2003).
422 See supra pp. 617–18 (describing moral arguments against recognition of other-regarding
preferences).
423 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). Similarly, by endorsing
the United States’s labeling guidelines while simultaneously rejecting the MMPA import ban, the
Tuna/Dolphin panel seemed to endorse the view that the market activity of consumers provides a
more legitimate source of influence over foreign production practices than the political activity of
citizens and their representatives. See supra pp. 540–47.
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often lack strong incentives to make such voluntary product-related
disclosures424 and that consumers often do not have sufficient means to
verify manufacturer claims that are made.425 As George Akerlof famously demonstrated, under such conditions a market unraveling may
occur in which consumer doubt over manufacturer claims leads to
suboptimal product standards.426 Government regulation can effectively respond to such situations by mandating minimum product
quality levels or policing the veracity of manufacturer disclosures.427
When demand is sufficiently high, voluntary third-party certification schemes may develop to guarantee the accuracy of manufacturer
processing claims, as was the case with organic labeling prior to the
promulgation of federal standards.428 Economic modeling suggests,
however, that voluntary disclosure schemes along these lines will not
be forthcoming when an insufficient proportion of consumers comprehend the significance of the disclosed information,429 a market structure that may be likely to accompany the early reception by consumers
of goods with technologically complex characteristics. On the other
hand, where consumer interest is sufficiently widespread to spur the
development of voluntary certification schemes, the very proliferation
of such schemes may give rise to conflicting standards and consumer

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
424 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to
Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 325 (2000) (describing market conditions under which manufacturers might not disclose product information that consumers would
desire to know).
425 See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 781–85 (2d ed.
1995) (noting that “[o]ne of the rationales for market failure is that consumers do not have perfect
information regarding the safety of the products they purchase,” and that product labeling regulations can play a constructive role in remedying information deficits). For this reason, economists
refer to products that express nonverifiable attributes as “credence goods.” See Russell Korobkin,
The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1999).
426 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488–90 (1970).
427 VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 425, at 781–83. For instance, environmental marketing guidelines issued by the Federal Trade Commission were designed to respond to consumer complaints
that product manufacturers were making dubious environmental claims. In essence, the market
for environmentally benign production processes had become one of Akerlof’s “lemons markets,”
characterized not by legitimate, accurate process information, but rather by rampant environmental “greenwash.” See David Hoch & Robert Franz, Eco-Porn Versus the Constitution: Commercial Speech and the Regulation of Environmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REV. 441, 441–44
(1994).
428 See Elise Golan et al., Economics of Food Labeling, 24 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 117, 161–62
(2001).
429 See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in
Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 45 (2003).
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confusion, ultimately raising a new ground for government intervention, as was the case, again, with respect to organic agriculture.430
Even in a situation where these types of market failures justify
government regulation as a theoretical matter, one still may ask
whether the benefits of labeling outweigh its administrative and other
costs. Consumer advocates tend to think of labeling as an essentially
costless alternative to more elaborate means of product regulation. In
actuality, however, labeling entails significant costs, both direct431 and
indirect.432 Indeed, in light of the magnitude of such costs and the
purported absence of health or safety dangers from processes such as
genetic engineering, some commentators have described process labeling as simply a matter of wealth distribution between concerned and
nonconcerned consumers.
On this account, mandatory labeling
schemes provide an implicit subsidy to concerned consumers because
all market participants share labeling costs, rather than only consumers who express a preference for labeling. “With voluntary labeling,”
in contrast, “consumers who value the information are the ones who
must pay the costs associated with it.”433
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
430 See Golan et al., supra note 428, at 162 (describing support for federal organic standards
among organic food producers and processors in light of potentially conflicting third-party
standards).
431 For instance, according to a meta-analysis of cost studies conducted by the European Commission, mandatory segregation and labeling of GM food products might increase the cost of grain
by 6–17%. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS ON THE AGRI-FOOD SECTOR: A FIRST REVIEW 82
(2000). For that reason, a major plank of the United States’s argument against Europe’s GM
regulations has been that the labeling requirement would cost U.S. companies an estimated four
billion dollars per year. See Michelle K. McDonald, Note, International Trade Law and the U.S.EU GMO Debate: Can Africa Weather This Storm?, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 501, 508 (2004).
432 A principal indirect cost of labeling is the risk that additional labeling requirements will
undermine the effectiveness of existing product warnings and instructions. See Noah, supra note
35, at 314 (suggesting that “[p]erhaps public education campaigns should be used in instances
where consumers need to understand the environmental consequences of their choices,” rather
than mandatory imposition of product labels that might interfere with more traditional types of
product warnings); W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 661–66 (1996) (classifying such problems under the
headings of “label clutter,” in which a single product bears an excessive amount of warnings and
information, and “label proliferation,” in which labels of varying severity and importance appear
on numerous products). The risk of such problems in the context of process preferences may be
especially strong given that, as the court in International Dairy emphasized, “there is no end to
the information that states could require manufacturers to disclose about their production methods.” Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). It seems more likely,
however, that states would require disclosure only of information in which consumers had expressed sufficient interest to galvanize public support for mandatory labeling legislation. The
view that such laws would differ significantly in scope from the class of disclosure requirements
that could be defended by states on traditional police power grounds presumes that consumer
concerns are especially likely to be scientifically unfounded or to be manipulated by interest
groups for socially harmful purposes. As section II.A argued, however, the case for the categorical
unreliability of process preferences is unpersuasive.
433 Beales, supra note 36, at 112–13.
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The problem with this analysis is that it treats concerned and nonconcerned citizens as ossified categories, rather than as categories that
are partially constituted by the very governmental decision whether to
require labeling. If consumers do not have stable preferences for processes — if, for instance, consumer choices are partially contingent on
prior labeling decisions by regulators — then costs and benefits alone
will not determine whether to mandate labeling. Recent experimental
work in psychology suggests that this may well be the case. As noted
above, consumer willingness to differentiate among products based
solely on processes seems consistent both with the view that consumers
are attempting to shift resources to an “other” that is affected by the
relevant process,434 and with the view that consumers are attempting
to express the strength of their viewpoint or attitude regarding the
process-related issue through the medium of consumption.435 In a
parallel fashion, researchers have disagreed whether observed altruistic
behavior in psychological experiments truly stems from a regard for
others or whether individuals obtain a psychological benefit from
giving that is of sufficient magnitude to render their behavior consistent with the predictions of self-interested utility maximization.436 To
theorists of the latter viewpoint, altruism is best understood as simply
another consumption good from which individuals derive utility,
rather than as a violation of the premise that individuals seek to
maximize their personal welfare by satisfying well-behaved, selfinterested preferences.437
A fascinating recent study, however, seriously challenges the notion
that individuals have stable preferences for either fairness or “warm
glow” sentimentality.438 The study used new variations of the Dictator
Game439 to demonstrate that individuals’ propensity to engage in altruistic behavior is context-dependent and, critically, seems to be a
function of how directly and unambiguously their actions are related
to the welfare of others.440 In classic Dictator Game experiments, in–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
434
435
436

See supra section II.A.1, pp. 582–601.
See supra section II.A.2, pp. 601–14.
See James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of WarmGlow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464–65 (1990) (contrasting “pure altruism” that is motivated only
by a desire to alter another’s outcomes with “warm glow” altruism that is motivated in part by
psychological effects from giving); Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 187, 192 (1988) (describing “impure altruism” as a “satisfaction of conscience, or of noninstrumental ethical mandates”).
437 See James Andreoni & John Miller, Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the
Consistency of Preferences for Altruism, 70 ECONOMETRICA 737, 737 (2002).
438 See Jason Dana et al., Exploiting Moral Wriggle Room: Behavior Inconsistent with a Preference for Fair Outcomes (June 24, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law
School Library), available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/dellavigna/e218_f03/Fair.pdf.
439 See supra pp. 603–04.
440 See Dana et al., supra note 438, at 5.
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dividuals in the role of proposer know that the split chosen will affect
the outcome experienced by the receiver because the payments are
known and immediate. In the new experiments, however, researchers
introduced uncertainty regarding outcomes in order to demonstrate
that people’s willingness to engage in altruistic behavior is related to
their ability to avoid apparent responsibility for the well-being of others, a cognitive outlet that the researchers aptly term “moral wriggle
room.”441
In one experimental variation, for instance, subjects faced with a
binary choice between equitable and inequitable divisions behaved
consistently with previous results (almost three-quarters selected the
equitable division).442 Additional subjects, however, were presented
with a choice setting in which only their own payoffs and not those of
the receiver were revealed.443 Experimenters told subjects that the
payoff choice they faced would either match the classic condition (a
choice between $6 for themselves and $1 for the receiver, or $5 for
both the proposer and the receiver), or would be a reversal of the standard receiver payoffs such that the $6 proposer payoff became strictly
dominant (($6, $5) or ($5, $1)).444 Given this uncertainty about the receiver’s payoff, subjects in the partially blind condition did not know
whether selecting $5 for themselves would lead to an equitable result.
The catch, however, was that subjects could reveal the receiver’s payoffs simply by pressing a computer button.445 In other words, subjects
could — without cost — place themselves in the position of knowing
whether their choice would lead to equity or inequity.
Consistent with the researchers’ hypothesis that significant numbers of individuals would take advantage of this “moral wriggle room”
to behave self-interestedly, nearly half of the subjects chose to remain
ignorant of the payoffs they faced.446 Of those subjects who chose to
reveal the payoffs, behavior was consistent with the levels of altruism
demonstrated in classic Dictator Games (seventy-five percent chose the
equitable payoff as between ($6, $1) and ($5, $5)).447 Of those who
chose to remain ignorant, however, subjects overwhelmingly selected
the self-interested allocation.448 Even when viewed together, the revealing and nonrevealing subjects demonstrated a significantly lower
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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443
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446
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448

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 12.
See id. at 12, 13 tbl.2.
See id. at 13 tbl.2.
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willingness to engage in altruistic behavior than subjects in the classic
choice setting.449
This study has important implications for the process/product discussion. First, it helps to explain why the delivery and control of
process information has become such a contested issue in domestic and
international product regulation. Absent some bridging device such as
labeling, the degree of attenuation between acts and consequences in
modern consumer product settings is typically severe. For the ordinary consumer, “[a]s commodity chains grow longer and more complex, and production systems more dynamic, it becomes harder to contextualize production in terms of its social and ecological
ramifications.”450 Therefore, even if consumers know on some level
that their purchases might contribute to a social or environmental outcome that they do not desire, the consumer marketplace generously offers them a cognitive alibi by obscuring such information from immediate view.451 Vermont’s blue dot labeling scheme sought to eliminate
precisely this kind of “moral wriggle room” by making salient — at the
point of purchase — the connection between consumer choice and the
welfare of animals and small dairy producers.452
The second, and related, lesson of the recent Dictator Game study
is that policymakers cannot choose the degree of process information
to make available to consumer decisionmakers by examining existing
preferences, for such preferences cannot be evaluated without reference to some prior specification of consumers’ informational context.
Importantly, without adopting normative criteria beyond the maxim of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
449
450

See id. at 14.
Ken Conca, Consumption and Environment in a Global Economy, in CONFRONTING
CONSUMPTION 133, 145 (Thomas Princen et al. eds., 2002).
451 See MATTHEW RABIN, MORAL PREFERENCES, MORAL CONSTRAINTS, AND SELF-SERVING
BIASES 3 (Berkeley Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 95-241, Aug. 16, 1995) (noting that consumers may avoid even costless knowledge acquisition regarding worker conditions to avoid being
put in a position of moral constraint: “[w]hen her beliefs tell her it is morally okay to engage in an
enjoyable activity, an agent will avoid gathering further information that might jeapordize [sic]
her moral green light”), available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/rabin/Moral.Preferences.pdf.
452 Conversely, the biotech industry may correctly fear that mandatory labeling would spell the
end of GM food products. See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Delays Suing Europe over Ban on Modified Food, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at A6 (quoting the U.S. Agriculture Department undersecretary for food safety as stating that labeling “implies that there is something wrong with genetically
modified food”); Elizabeth Becker & David Barboza, Battle over Biotechnology Intensifies Trade
War, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2003, at C1 (quoting a spokesperson for the American Soybean Association as saying that labeling is “the equivalent of putting a skull and crossbones on the packages, saying these things are bad”); Paul Elias, Labels for Genetically Modified Food Are a Political Hot Potato in the U.S., MIAMI HERALD, July 5, 2003, at 6B (quoting spokesperson for the
Grocery Manufacturers of America as viewing required GM ingredient disclosure as “a black label”). In one study of European consumers, for instance, willingness to pay for GM foods declined by approximately 30% when subjects’ attention was drawn to a product ingredient list disclosing the use of GM ingredients. See Charles Noussair et al., Do Consumers Not Care About
Biotech Foods or Do They Just Not Read the Labels?, 75 ECON. LETTERS 47, 48 (2002).
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individual utility maximization, policymakers have no agreed-upon
method for making these analytically prior decisions.453 The process/product distinction has been offered as a bright line rule for limiting the consumer’s information set exclusively to product-related characteristics that threaten personal harm to the consumer, but such
personal physical and economic risks hardly exhaust the universe of
information about which consumers express strong interest. Nor can
scientific evidence requirements of the sort contained in the SPS
Agreement454 provide an adequate decisionmaking tool, given that
consumer demand for process information encompasses a much wider
and richer range of considerations than merely those consequences of
consumption that are scientifically demonstrable.
These lessons are not lost on participants in process-related disputes. By discrediting process information as a legitimate ground for
consumer decisionmaking, proponents of the process/product distinction advocate a marketplace in which consumers satisfy their personal
interests unimpeded by concern for the welfare of others.455 In contrast, by downstreaming process information, environmentalists, labor
activists, and other “availability entrepreneurs”456 advocate a marketplace in which consumers behave in accordance with the altruistic ideals that the entrepreneurs themselves hold and that consumers also ex–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
453 Thus, governments cannot easily follow the suggestion of two international trade scholars
that, in order to comply with GATT Article III, process-based trade measures should be adopted
only when “market perception comes first,” such that “government regulation cannot be deemed
to anticipate or guide consumer perceptions.” Marco Bronckers & Natalie McNelis, Rethinking
the “Like Product” Definition in GATT 1994: Anti-Dumping and Environmental Protection, in
REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW
345, 376 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000); see also Frieder Roessler, Beyond the
Ostensible: A Tribute to Professor Robert Hudec’s Insights on the Determination of the Likeness of
Products Under the National Treatment Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
37 J. WORLD TRADE 771, 776–777 (2003) (arguing that the WTO’s Appellate Body Asbestos Report, supra note 54, permits nontangible product characteristics to enter into GATT Article III
analysis only if the market differentiates products on the basis of these characteristics in the absence of government regulation).
454 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
455 This aim need not be viewed as anti-welfarist, given the discomfort that some individuals
appear to experience from being put in a position of explicit moral responsibility. In fact, one
reading of the psychological experiments described in this section is that many individuals experience greater well-being when they avoid cognitive awareness of the implications of their choices
for others. Supporting this reading, a subsequent study found that individuals were willing to
incur an immediate cost in order to avoid the position of proposer in a Dictator Game. Subjects
were given a choice between distributing $10 betweeen themselves and a receiver or “exiting” the
game and receiving $9, in which case the receiver would never know that there was a game being
played. Thirty percent of subjects chose to accept this $9 offer in order to avoid making a choice,
despite the fact that a rational self-interested actor would have stayed in the game to capture all
$10. See JASON DANA ET AL., WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW WON’T HURT ME: COSTLY (BUT
QUIET) EXIT IN DICTATOR GAMES 9 (Carnegie Mellon Univ. Dep’t of Social and Decision Sci.,
Working Paper, Aug. 24, 2004).
456 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 43, at 687–88.

632

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:525

press in alternative choice settings. Neither set of behaviors can be
said to reveal “true” preferences; rather, the capacity to behave in altruistic ways is a function of context and the degree to which decisionmaking environments make it clear that consumers’ choices will
impact the well-being of others. When regulating process information,
therefore, policymakers must make openly normative judgments about
the types of consumer behavior that they wish to inspire.457 In essence, they must choose between encouraging consumers to behave as
purely self-interested purchasers or, as the next section describes, as
citizen-consumers who approach their role with the burdens of the
world in mind.
2. The Heroic Consumer. — Any society of a sufficient magnitude
must confront the following three basic tasks: allocating resources
among competing uses, distributing wealth among citizens, and setting
an aggregate level or scale of human impact within the environment.458 Economists and political scientists acknowledge the fundamental nature of the first two tasks. The third, however, typically is
disaggregated into a host of technical market failure concepts such as
public goods problems, negative externalities, information asymmetries, and so on. Such concepts in the environmental context essentially function as surrogates for the more basic question that tends not
to be asked directly: how much of the ecological superstructure upon
which all life and activity depends does a society wish to divert for
human use?459 The international salience of the concept of sustainability indicates that this scale aspect of collective governance is becoming more widely recognized and appreciated. A society that maintains a sustainable scale is understood to be one that does not threaten
the welfare of future generations by excessively drawing down natural
resource stocks, by overtaxing the assimilative capacity of pollution
sinks, or by otherwise impairing the viability of ecological support systems.460
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
457 Cf. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 876 (concluding that contemporary political debates should
focus “on the underlying question of which individuals and what kinds of communities our markets should be structured to protect and to benefit”).
458 See HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 50–51 (1996) (“The term ‘scale’ is shorthand for ‘the physical scale or size of the
human presence in the ecosystem . . . .’”).
459 One also may think of the scale question as posing unique distributional questions —
namely, how should natural resources be distributed to other life forms and other generations?
Indeed, it is primarily this aspect of the scale question that prevents conventional concepts of
market failure from adequately fulfilling the role served by the concept of scale. See Douglas A.
Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 688–91 (2003); Douglas A. Kysar,
Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 40–44
(2001) [hereinafter Kysar, Sustainability].
460 See DALY, supra note 458, at 52 (“Sustainability is probably the characteristic of optimal
scale on which there is most consensus.”).
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In simplified terms, the post–World War II policy consensus in
America has been to focus government effort on the maximization of
allocative efficiency and the support of economic growth.461 This policy is thought to reduce pressure on the government to engage in largescale redistributive efforts because individuals have the opportunity of
upward mobility in a constantly burgeoning economy.462 By implication, therefore, the optimal scale of the economy has always been
taken to be “bigger.”463 Through a steady drumbeat of market rhetoric
and defining episodes such as the 1959 “kitchen” debate between Richard Nixon and Nikita Khruschev, this consensus eventually acquired
more than a purely instrumentalist cast. As historian Lizabeth Cohen
describes, “[f]aith in a mass consumption postwar economy . . . stood
for an elaborate, integrated ideal of economic abundance and democratic political freedom, both equitably distributed, that became almost
a national civil religion from the late 1940s into the 1970s.”464 Charles
McGovern locates the emergence of this “civil religion” even earlier,
arguing that by 1940 “American people fitfully but firmly [had come]
to equate the consumer with the citizen, a consumer standard of living
with democracy, and the full participation in such an economy of
spending and accumulation with being an American.”465
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
461 See COHEN, supra note 2, at 11 (using the term “Consumers’ Republic” to describe “a strategy that emerged after the Second World War for reconstructing the nation’s economy and reaffirming its democratic values through promoting the expansion of mass consumption”).
462 See Lizabeth Cohen, The New Deal State and the Making of Citizen Consumers, in
GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONSUMER SOCIETIES IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 253, at 111, 123 (noting that “the participation of the mass of
Americans in purchasing goods not only became the ideal route to capitalist prosperity for the
nation, but also seemed to promise a citizenry of economic equals, without necessitating a direct
attack on inequality”).
463 For a classic exception, see E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: A STUDY OF
ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 17–18 (1973).
464 COHEN, supra note 2, at 127. The consumer movement of the 1970s did not change this
basic outlook, but instead reinforced it by continuing a trend away from public-regarding aspects
of consumer behavior, such as concern for the welfare of workers, and toward more private issues,
such as product safety and fair pricing. See id. at 359. Nor did the civil rights movement ultimately threaten the premises of the postwar consensus: “Despite the radical potential of consumer
organizing appreciated by the Ella Bakers of the civil rights movement, attention to democratizing the marketplace reinforced the Consumers’ Republic’s orientation toward ‘expanding the pie’
to make it larger and more encompassing, and disinterest in redistributing economic resources to
achieve more fundamental socioeconomic equity.” Id. at 190.
465 Charles McGovern, Consumption and Citizenship in the United States, 1900–1940, in
GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONSUMER SOCIETIES IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 253, at 37, 37. As McGovern notes, advertising and marketing executives consciously played a key role in furthering these developments: “In metaphors
equating consumers with citizens and purchasing with voting, admen portrayed consumption as
the true exercise of the individual’s civic role and public identity; consumption was the ritual
means of affirming one’s nationality as an American.” Id. at 43.
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Regardless of the precise timeline, the “citizen-consumer,” exemplified by the Consumers’ White Label Campaign and the civil rights
consumer activism of the twentieth century,466 gave way to a vision
that Cohen calls the “purchaser as citizen.”467 Individuals could still
desire to benefit the general good through their purchasing activities,
but now, almost miraculously, the goal required no sacrifice of personal
interests: “Out of the wartime conflict between citizen consumers, who
reoriented their personal consumption to serve the general good, and
purchaser consumers, who pursued private gain regardless of it,
emerged a new postwar ideal of the purchaser as citizen who simultaneously fulfilled personal desire and civic obligation by consuming.”468
The continuing influence of this purchaser-as-citizen vision is evident
in omnipresent media invocations of consumer confidence and consumer spending as indicators of national welfare. As noted at the outset of this Article, it also was especially palpable during the effort to
equate national recovery from the events of September 11, 2001 with
increased consumer spending.469 As one major automaker’s advertising campaign put it, the way to “Keep America Rolling” was through
commodified purchase.470 And lots of it.
During the last two decades, however, Cohen argues that the concept of “a new combined consumer/citizen/taxpayer/voter has gained
influence,” such that “self-interested citizens increasingly view [even]
government policies like other market transactions, judging them by
how well served they feel personally.”471 Instead of equating private
consumer spending with the general good, Cohen argues that the new
American individual has abandoned entirely the notion of a general
good and instead views all of social interaction as a competitive game
in which the individual’s role is simply to satisfy her own interests.472
The government’s role, on this account, is merely to offer goods and
services like any other retail seller.473 According to Cohen, politicians
have reacted to these developments by speaking of themselves and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
466
467
468

See supra pp. 584–86 & note 262.
COHEN, supra note 2, at 8–9.
Id. at 119. As an instructive example of this shift, consider the monthly program of the
Consumer Conference of Greater Cincinnati, which in 1946–47 included topics such as “Your
Country’s Welfare Needs Your Wise Buying” and “Consumer’s [sic] Responsibility to Themselves
and Other Consumers,” while in 1947–48 pertinent topics became “Do You Have Drycleaning
Troubles?,” “Know Your Plastics,” and “Oh Lady Does Your Dress Fit?” Id. at 135.
469 See supra pp. 526–27.
470 See David Teather, Motor City Kingpin Who Kept America Rolling: Interview, Richard
Wagoner, CEO, General Motors, GUARDIAN, July 20, 2002, at 30.
471 COHEN, supra note 2, at 9.
472 Id. at 396–97.
473 Cf. AMAN, supra note 13 (manuscript at ch. 1, at 33–36, 54–59) (describing the emergence of
a self-conscious “government as business” model during the last four U.S. presidential administrations).
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their policies exclusively in market terms. Rather than offer a coherent vision of collective welfare, contemporary politicians instead assemble a package of issues targeted to attract a collection of distinct
segments of the voting population.474 Previously public or social subjects such as education, health care, and social security become merely
another market in which politicians ask consumers whether they are
getting their dollar’s worth from government services.475
This latter trope dovetails nicely with the academic risk reform literature, which repeatedly emphasizes the possibility that Americans
could be getting more “bang for their buck” from environmental,
health, and safety expenditures.476 Indeed, the ascendance of costbenefit analysis can be seen as a further entrenchment of the consumer
at the center of public policy, given that it seeks to hinge government
provision of public goods on preferences that are revealed by individuals acting in their capacity as market actors, whatever those individuals might express when acting as voters or in other social roles. To
give just one concrete example, EPA economists have examined a parent’s willingness to pay premium prices for organic baby food as an
indirect measure of the monetary value of an infant’s life — a value
that regulators may then use to set government health and safety standards that aim to protect children more generally.477 The heroic role
of the consumer, then, is becoming even more heroic. Long understood
to include a patriotic obligation continually to increase expenditure on
material goods, the consumer’s role also is being cast as an unwitting
mechanism for collective valuation.
The resurgence of process preferences provides a curious footnote
to this apparent triumph of market liberalism. Specifically, if the current consensus approach to collective governance focuses on the pursuit of individual welfare maximization in order to increase continually
the size of the aggregate pie — while letting distributive equity and
sustainable scale be achieved on a more ad hoc, ex post basis — then
consumers in many respects seem to be resisting this neoliberal view of
the world. Because consumption is now a principal vehicle by which
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
474 See COHEN, supra note 2, at 342 (arguing that politicians “at best construct a composite vision out of the specialized interests of their distinct constituencies, and at worst avoid discussing
any common good at all”).
475 See id. at 397 (“Whereas from the 1930s to as late as the 1970s, to refer to the consumer interest was also to appeal to some larger public good beyond the individual’s self-interest, the
ubiquitous invocation of the consumer today — as patient, as parent, as social security recipient
— often means satisfying the private interest of the paying customer, the combined consumer/citizen/taxpayer/voter whose greatest concern is, ‘Am I getting my money’s worth?’”).
476 See Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 39–40 (1998).
477 See KELLY B. MACGUIRE ET AL., WILLINGNESS TO PAY TO REDUCE A CHILD’S PESTICIDE
EXPOSURE: EVIDENCE FROM THE BABY FOOD MARKET 3 (Nat’l Ctr. for Envtl. Econ., Working
Paper No. 02-03, 2002), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/epa/eed.nsf/ffb05b5f4a2cf40985
256d2d00740681/8bd3cacb5bdb7be185256bb300492be9/$FILE/2002-03.pdf.
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individuals are connected to a globalized world that includes social injustice and ecological fragility, it is also through consumption that
those individuals’ hesitancies and objections are becoming most apparent. Thus, rather than waiting for post-market wealth transfers
and ameliorative environmental, health, and safety regulations, consumers of process-distinguished products instead express preferences
for sustainable, equitable outcomes through their market purchases ab
initio.478 Just as individuals do not evaluate GM foods in the compartmentalized fashion of federal regulators,479 they also do not evaluate market transactions, wealth distribution, and environmental quality as wholly separable concepts requiring wholly separate methods of
satisfaction and control.
This resurgence of process preferences also stands in tension with
the long-held view of scholars that individuals are more likely to express public-regarding values while acting in their role as citizens than
as consumers.480 In contrast to this traditional view, political scientist
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
478 For instance, consumers purchase organically produced, fairly traded goods at least in part
because they desire a society where producers receive a “fair” return for the fruits of “sustainable”
production practices. Similarly, the decisions to oppose rbST, GM foods, and sweatshop clothing
all can be construed as decisions about the levels of wealth inequality and/or ecological risk that
individuals believe are appropriate, not as a matter of personal welfare, but as a matter of social
policy. Marketing researchers already are devising a vocabulary for these developments, even as
many academics resist them on a theoretical level. Compare Imkamp, supra note 13, at 200 (noting based on survey results that “[t]he ecological perspective on consumer products seems to have
broadened” to include concerns about production and distribution impacts on the environment, as
well as concerns about the absolute level of consumption that individuals undertake), and A.W.
Browne et al., Organic Production and Ethical Trade: Definition, Practice and Links, 25 FOOD
POL’Y 69, 71 (2000) (noting that “ethical trading, reinforced by organic concepts of production,
contributes to the accumulation of both natural and social capital, through greater sustainability
of natural resources and increased access by producer groups to networks of production and
trade”), with Kysar, Sustainability, supra note 459, at 22–28 (describing a debate between conventional and ecological economists regarding the proper analytical treatment within economics of
sustainability and notions of environmental limits to growth).
479 See supra p. 590.
480 See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 4, at 378–79. This traditional view is premised on the fact
that, unlike the market, which requires individuals to make contributions to public goods without
guaranteeing equal levels of contributions from other beneficiaries, the ballot box ensures that
individuals will have to contribute only if their peers do as well. After all, as Amartya Sen has
put it, “it would be amazing if the payment I am ready to make to save nature is totally independent of what others are ready to pay for it, since it is specifically a social concern. The ‘lone
ranger’ model of environmental evaluation confounds the nature of the problem at hand.” Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 925 n.78 (1996) (citing
Amartya Sen, Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice: Contingent Valuation and the Market Analogy, 46 JAPANESE ECON. REV. 23, 29 (1995)). In addition to this perceived failure of markets to provide an appropriate framework for the pursuit of collective goals, some theorists argue
that markets also actively undermine other potential frameworks: “The market enhances the liberty of people to act as individual consumers; it undercuts severely their liberty to act otherwise.”
FREYFOGLE, supra note 389, at 197. On this view, fostering a greater role for process preferences
may have the unintended effect of encouraging consumer behavior to function merely as a palliative act that distracts individuals from more meaningful and collective responses to social and
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Deborah Lynn Guber’s recent review of environmental beliefs and behaviors finds a “paradox of marketplace success and ballot-box failure”
for environmental issues over the last decade.481 Citing James Buchanan’s classic work on individual choice,482 Guber argues that a
critical component of an individual’s willingness to engage in activity
designed to support environmental causes or other public goods hinges
upon the perceived efficacy of that activity.483 Significantly, the apparent rise of apathy in the public sphere has been accompanied by a
contrasting rise of faith in the power of markets to satisfy individual
wants.484 In an era of substantial skepticism regarding the effectiveness of political action, therefore, individuals may now regard the
market as a more promising route to public-regarding change than the
government.
From this perspective, making process information available to
consumers through product labels and other means constitutes an effort to enable and coordinate behavior among individuals who wish to
express regard for the welfare of others, but who lack confidence in alternative mechanisms for public expression.485 As Dan Kahan has
noted, individuals’ willingness to contribute to public goods is in part
a function of their perceptions regarding the behavior of others: if one
believes that shirking is widespread, one will be less inclined to contribute; if one believes that contributions are widespread, one will be
more inclined to contribute.486 In the case of process-labeled products,
the mere existence of such products on store shelves signals to the consumer that a sufficient number of other individuals are purchasing the
goods to support their commercial availability, a signal that in turn encourages purchases by those individuals who are inclined to recipro-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
environmental conditions. See Michael Maniates, Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike,
Save the World?, in CONFRONTING CONSUMPTION, supra note 450, at 58–59.
481 DEBORAH LYNN GUBER, THE GRASSROOTS OF A GREEN REVOLUTION: POLLING AMERICA
ON THE ENVIRONMENT 155 (2003).
482 James M. Buchanan, Individual Choice in Voting and the Market, 62 J. POL. ECON. 334
(1954).
483 See GUBER, supra note 481, at 160.
484 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1292–93 (2003) (“At least in the United States, the last few decades have been marked by an
increased faith in markets and a corresponding decrease in support for public institutions.”).
485 Cf. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 4, at 404 (“If . . . individuals are generally other-regarding
in their views on public goods, efforts to reduce feelings of hopelessness and facilitate cooperation
in the private sphere may be fruitful.”).
486 See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 71, 72 (2003); see also Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, Pro-Social Behavior in a Natural
Setting, 54 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 65, 66–67 (2004) (finding evidence of “conditional cooperation” among a sample of students deciding whether to contribute to social funds administered by a
university).
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cate the other-regarding gestures of their fellow consumers.487 Naturally, this ability to overcome “hopelessness”488 in the consumer marketplace should increase in strength as individuals continue to embrace
the view that the market is an efficacious and reliable mechanism for
change — even collective change.489
Evidence also suggests that the process-inflected nature of contemporary consumer product markets should increase in significance as
income levels rise. Through numerous empirical studies, economists
have identified a suggestive statistical relationship between per capita
income levels and the stringency of environmental standards that are
chosen by different nations. Although this literature is not without
important exceptions and ambiguities, scholars have widely interpreted
it to support the proposition that “only when we get sufficiently rich
can we afford the relative luxury of caring about the environment.”490
On an individual level, evidence similarly suggests that income is a
strong determinant of one’s willingness to pay for products such as or-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
487 Cf. Valerie S. Folkes, Recent Attribution Research in Consumer Behavior: A Review and
New Directions, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 548, 551 (1988) (noting that “[c]onsumers prefer to believe
that others share the same preferences and consumption habits,” and describing a study in which
“nonconservationists justify their irresponsible behavior by believing that most others waste energy”); John Thøgersen, Psychological Determinants of Paying Attention to Eco-Labels in Purchase Decisions: Model Development and Multinational Validation, 23 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 285,
307 (2000) (noting that “it is likely that consumer belief in the environmental significance of responsible purchase behaviour is strengthened by a strong prevalence because it makes it more
credible that consumers can make a difference by choosing such products”); KARINE NYBORG ET
AL., GREEN CONSUMERS AND PUBLIC POLICY: ON SOCIALLY CONTINGENT MORAL
MOTIVATION 17–18 (Univ. of Oslo Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper Memorandum No. 31/2003, )
2003 (reporting results of a modeling exercise demonstrating that “[h]igh adoption
rates . . . influence consumers’ propensity to interpret product adoption as a matter of moral responsibility”).
488 Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 4, at 379 (using this term to describe the collective action dilemma that accompanies the pursuit of public goods in market settings).
489 One specific reason such an increase might occur is that process preferences appeal to a
broader range of citizens than does more conventional government environmental regulation.
Thus, although political ideology correlates strongly with willingness to vote for a political candidate primarily because the candidate took strong environmental positions, no correlation appears
to exist between ideology and willingness to purchase environmentally safe or biodegradable
products. “Consumer choice, in this sense, does seem to transcend ideology and in doing so allows
environmental products to appeal to a wider audience.” GUBER, supra note 481, at 168; see also
James A. Roberts, Will the Real Socially Responsible Consumer Please Step Forward?, BUS.
HORIZONS, Mar.–Apr. 1996, at 79, 79, 82 (developing a scale measuring “responsible consumer
behavior” and finding little variance in individual responses due to demographic variables).
490 BJØRN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE
OF THE WORLD 33 (2001). For a discussion of the limitations and complications of the literature,
see Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications of Bjørn
Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist for Environmental Law and Policy, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q.
223, 249–52 (2003).

2004]

PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES

639

ganic food and fairly traded goods.491 Perhaps, then, consistent with
the environmental protection narrative on a national level, consumers
will begin to express ever more concern regarding the processes that lie
behind products as they become better able to afford the “luxury” of
ethical or environmental purchasing.
As Susan Strange writes, the “shift away from states and towards
markets is probably the biggest change in the international political
economy to take place in the last half of the twentieth century.”492
Paired with the global integration of economies, this shift has left in its
wake a variety of “democracy deficits,”493 perhaps best typified by the
lack of an international labor or environmental regulatory organization
comparable in scope and authority to the WTO. To the extent, therefore, that process preferences reflect the moral and political desires of
individuals who lack more direct means of effectuating their beliefs,
such preferences may represent a significant vehicle for countering the
distortions wrought by these deficits of democracy. To be sure, the ultimate impact that consumers may exert through process preferences is
limited by the nature of market activity,494 and thus, advocates of
process reforms can only view consumer activity as a complement to,
rather than a substitute for, more direct regulatory efforts to achieve
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
491 Cf. Arnab K. Basu et al., Eco-Labeling and Stages of Development, 7 REV. DEV. ECON. 228,
228–29 (2003) (finding a relationship between national income and eco-friendly purchasing like an
Environmental Kuznets Curve).
492 SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 43 (1996).
493 AMAN, supra note 13 (manuscript at ch. 4, at 1).
494 See, e.g., id. (manuscript at introduction, 17–18) (noting that “enhancing a person’s power as
a consumer” is limited as a democratic enhancement tool because consumer activities “are inevitably reactive” and do not involve “deliberative . . . participat[ion] in the creation of new options”); Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, supra note 459, at 716–27 (noting that some determinants of environmental impact, including, most critically, consumption and population levels,
are not redressed by technological advances in resource efficiency alone); Barton H. Thompson,
Jr., What Good Is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 175, 186–90 (2003) (arguing that “ethical
beliefs . . . frequently fall victim to personal convenience or cost considerations” and should therefore be complemented by regulatory tools that alter economic incentives). The threat of deception
by manufacturers poses an especially serious challenge to the efficacy of consumer activity as a
regulatory tool. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1425–27 (1999); Jon D. Hanson &
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 724–43 (1999). Indeed, famed conservationist Aldo Leopold offered an uneasy endorsement of consumer activism for precisely this reason, warning that “hitching conservation directly to the producer-consumer relation instead of to the government . . . would present the
professional advertiser with an opportunity for euphemized deception and equivocation vastly
larger than cigarettes. The more complex the product or process, the wider the field for the
trained hoodwinker.” ALDO LEOPOLD, Land-Use and Democracy, in THE RIVER OF THE
MOTHER OF GOD AND OTHER ESSAYS BY ALDO LEOPOLD 295, 300 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird
Callicott eds., 1991). Such opportunities for deception underscore the need to reject Nike’s arguments, which, if accepted, would impair the ability of states and litigants to police manufacturer
process claims. See supra pp. 610–14.
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their policy goals. Nevertheless, in an era that increasingly regards the
consumer and her pursuit of individual welfare as a central orienting
concept of law, politics, and culture, outlets for public-regarding consumer expression should not be dismissed out of hand.
As this Part has attempted to demonstrate, process preferences cannot be easily dismissed as erroneous or inappropriate; indeed, they
provide a legitimate, important determinant of consumers’ hedonic
and moral well-being. Moreover, because they appeal to individuals’
strong identification as consumers,495 because they provide a sensation
of personal autonomy and influence that seems to be lacking in contemporary political spheres,496 and because, more broadly, they fit well
alongside a conglomeration of forces that have placed the market and
the consumer unequivocally at the center of twenty-first-century
life,497 process preferences also may provide one of democracy’s best
hopes for public engagement in the new century. For this reason
alone, policymakers should reject the process/product distinction in its
various guises and instead become sensitive to the notion that process
preferences provide an answer — partial and unsatisfying, but in
many respects inescapable — to the vexing question, “how is political
activity possible in the global age.”498
CONCLUSION
By fostering ever greater market connections and economic opportunities, globalization helps to catalyze the expansion of commercial
relations and commercial activities within public life. Previously distanced market actors become linked not only by commodity chains,
but also by social and ecological feedback mechanisms of potentially
devastating magnitude. As Peter Singer observes, both the events of
September 11, 2001, and the problem of climate change are manifestations of the same underlying economic, cultural, and environmental
forces — forces that have bound all of humanity, in essence, into “one
world.”499 Accordingly, many consumers have come to view them–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
495
496

See COHEN, supra note 2, at 410.
See GUBER, supra note 481, at 169 (“In short, while scholars have long suspected that low
perceptions of efficacy are an ‘effective deterrent’ to environmental behavior, evidence
. . . suggests that actions taken in the marketplace might help Americans to feel better about their
own ability to effect environmental change.”).
497 See Freeman, supra note 484, at 1292 (“Privatization coincides with other political and economic developments — including globalization, free trade, market integration, and deregulation
— that similarly reinforce an ideological preference for private over public ordering and market
over noneconomic values.”).
498 BECK, supra note 11, at 132.
499 See PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 1 (2002). Although
Singer’s observation is particularly poignant in present times, it does not express a dramatically
new idea. In 1795, Immanuel Kant wrote that “[t]he peoples of the earth have thus entered in
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selves as purchasing with their disposable dollars not only products,
but also shares of responsibility in the moral and ecological economy
that produces them. On their surface, the fluorescent aisles of modern
retail environments tell only tales of abundance. Globalization, however, has enhanced the flow of information, not merely goods, and information regarding processes increasingly is finding its way downstream. Consumers are responding accordingly.
As consumer awareness and demand for process information increases, however, the impetus to regulate access to such information
grows as well. As this Article describes, in a number of areas of law
and policy, the mechanism being employed to engage in such regulation is a fairly rigid conceptual distinction between processes and
products. This process/product distinction has been invoked to question the authority of an importing nation to ban or label products that
are developed using processes deemed objectionable by its citizens; to
rationalize ignoring overwhelming consumer support for mandatory
labeling of food products that contain genetically engineered ingredients; and to narrow the constitutional conditions under which states
may force manufacturers to disclose process information or to face legal challenges for disclosing false or misleading process information.
These efforts to restrict the informational environment of consumers exist uncomfortably within a global political climate that increasingly embraces market liberalism and the rhetoric of consumer choice
as its fundamental guideposts. Although this tension currently encompasses only a handful of legal policy disputes concerning a few salient
process-related issues, it nevertheless seems likely to grow in significance. If civic life reduces to market life — if individuals come to
agree with Secretary Evans that going “back to the stores” constitutes
the most important “sacrifice” that they can make for the well-being of
the nation500 — then private consumer activities will become an even
more critical vehicle for public-regarding expression. Similarly, if the
trend toward a “cost-benefit state”501 continues to grow — if private
market behavior displaces other, more traditional means for determining government environmental, health, and safety standards — then
the struggle for control over the consumer’s decisionmaking environment only will intensify in scope and severity. In that regard, dolphinsafe tuna, GM foods, rbST, and Kasky may represent only the opening
shots in an emerging battle to determine the degree of “moral wriggle
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation
of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.” IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 93, 107–08 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed.
1991).
500 See supra pp. 526–27.
501 See supra p. 527.
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room” that governments and producers will afford their consumers.
Although the eventual outcome of such a battle is unknown, one thing
at present does seem clear: the process/product distinction is far too
meager of a conceptual device to bear the weight of these controversies.

